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Abstract 
The reign of Tiglath-pileser III (745-728 BC) is synonymous with a period of rapid upheaval and 
change. In the second half of the 9
th
 and the first half of the 8
th
 century the Assyrian empire was 
plagued with internal problems and revolt under a number of successive weak rulers. With the 
accession of Tiglath-pileser III (745-728 BC) to the throne, however, Assyria experienced a rapid 
recovery and entered into a ‗golden age‘ characterised predominantly by a vast and stable empire. 
While the achievement of Tiglath-pileser III has been widely recognised, the problem of how 
Tiglath-pileser III was able to achieve this feat so quickly and at a time when Assyria was still 
recovering from a period of weakness has continued to perplex scholars. The issue of what role 
provinces played in the empire-building of Tiglath-pileser III is of fundamental importance to this 
question. While the royal annals are clearly biased in their presentation of Assyrian history, some 
attempt has been made to overcome the limitations inherent in these sources here through the use of 
Assyrian letters and the adoption of a critical approach to the official Assyrian accounts. A number 
of texts utilised here, in particular some of the Nimrud letters presented in the Appendix, are also 
accompanied by new transliterations and translations.  This research concludes that the success of 
Tiglath-pileser III can be credited to introduced military reforms, as well as to the prevailing 
international situation, notably the weakness of other rival powers, which enabled Assyria to 
successfully pursue an aggressive imperial policy during this period.   
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CHAPTER 1     Introduction 
 
1.1 The Historical Background to Tiglath-pileser‘s Reign 
 
Tiglath-pileser III came to power in a turbulent period of Assyrian history following a significant 
period of decline under his immediate predecessors, Ashur-dan III (771-754 BC) and Ashur-nerari 
V (753-746 BC). Open rebellion erupted in Assyrian cities (763
1
, 762
2
, 746
3
) and provinces (761
4
, 
760, 759
5
), and several outbreaks of plague are recorded in Assyrian cities (765 and 759 BC). 
During this period, Assyria‘s armies had been sent on fewer campaigns6, and it is likely that the 
empire‘s borders receded considerably during this time as many vassal-states simply ceased to pay 
tribute under little threat of Assyrian military intervention. The year preceding Tiglath-pileser‘s 
official accession to the throne (746 BC) is marked in the Eponym Chronicle by a revolt in Kalah
7
, 
leading most scholars to conclude that Tiglath-pileser III was a usurper who took advantage of the 
civil unrest engulfing Assyria at this time to stage a coup d'etat
8
. Whatever the truth of his 
                                                 
1
 The revolt of 763 BC is recorded in the Eponym Chronicle as ―revolt in the citadel‖ (Millard 1994, p. 58). It is 
probable that the city referred to in this entry is the capital.  
2
 The revolt for this year is also recorded as ―in the citadel‖ in the Eponym Chronicle. See Note 1.  
3
 This revolt took place in the Assyrian city of Kalah during the year preceding Tiglath-pileser's ascension to the 
throne (Millard 1994, p. 58).  
4
 A revolt in Arrapha is recorded for this year, as well as the following year (760 BC) (Millard 1994: 58). 
5
 Revolt in Guzana (Millard 1994, p. 58).  
6
 The event entries in the Eponym Chronicle which use the formulaic expression ―ina māt” + place name are thought 
to refer either to the targets of Assyrian military campaigns or else the location of the king at a particular point in the 
year. For a further discussion of this, see Chapter 2.  
7
 The eponym entry for this year reads sihu ina KUR kal-hi (Millard (1994, p. 43). It is probably not a coincidence 
that Kalah later became the new capital in Tiglath-pileser III‘s reign.  
8
 That Tiglath-pileser III was a usurper is suggested by several inscriptions which provide conflicting lineages for 
Tiglath-pileser III. This evidence is discussed in Chapter 3.   
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legitimacy, we can be certain that Tiglath-pileser‘s political situation must have been incredibly 
precarious during the first few years of his reign, as he sought to establish his kingship and to assert 
his political authority over the empire. The crisis which had earlier engulfed Assyria, it seems, was 
remedied through a series of campaigns staged, rather conveniently, close to Assyria proper in 
Babylonia and east of the Tigris against tribal elements whose defeat was fairly assured. What 
follows from these relatively minor campaigns, however, is nothing short of spectacular: with the 
commencement of Tiglath-pileser III‘s assault on the west in 743 BC begins a rapid string of 
conquests that would carve out a vast territorial empire and establish Assyria as the supreme 
military power in the Near East. In the west, Assyrian territorial control was extended beyond the 
traditional boundaries of the empire marked by the Euphrates River (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, p. 
1), incorporating the lands of Syria and Palestine and extending all the way to the border of Egypt. 
Meanwhile in the south, Babylonia was conquered and ruled directly by Tiglath-pileser who 
ascended the Babylonian throne and assumed the title ―king of the lands of Sumer and Akkad‖. In 
the north-east, Tiglath-pileser‘s campaigns into the Zagros Mountains resulted in the subjugation of 
those polities occupying the eastern borderlands.  
 
How Tiglath-pileser was able to achieve such a rapid revival and expansion of the empire during 
this period remains a contentious issue in scholarship which has never been satisfactorily resolved. 
Some scholars, including Dezső (2012a, pp. 151 ff.), Dubovský (2004/05), Fuchs (2011, pp. 393-
396) and Saggs (1984), have pointed to the significance of improvements in weaponry, including 
siege technology, incorporating cavalry units (see also Archer 2010, pp. 70-71), and developments 
in the area of military strategy during this period. But there is little diffinitive proof to credit 
Assyria‘s rapid and decisive success during our period exclusively to advances made in the armed 
forces
9
. While studies focused around military advances during this period have sought to stress the 
                                                 
9
    Fuchs (2011, p. 393), for example, notes that although the Assyrians made some advances in weapon technology, for     
     the most part, the Assyrian army was no better equipped with iron combat weapons than their enemies. Some      
10 
 
point that territory must first be conquered before it can be transformed into empire and ruled, 
Tiglath-pileser‘s achievement has more commonly been explained as resulting from an overhaul of 
the administrative system during this period. This is the fundamental question the following thesis 
will attempt to grapple with: was Tiglath-pileser III a great reformer who was able to solve 
Assyria‘s internal troubles by uniting Assyria under an ambitious expansionist policy? Or should his 
success more readily be attributed to the historical setting of Tiglath-pileser‘s conquests, notably the 
decline of other foreign powers such as Egypt, Urartu and Babylonia during this period, which were 
subsequently unable to check Assyria‘s expansion (Brinkman 1968, p. 228 ff.; Pečíraková 1987, p. 
164; Saggs 1984, p. 87
10
)? While the study undertaken here may not be able to resolve all of the 
issues associated with Tiglath-pileser‘s reign, it is hoped that it will shed some light on what 
remains a defining period in Assyrian history.   
 
1.2 What was the Achievement of Tiglath-pileser III? 
 
It has already been noted above that Tiglath-pileser III‘s reign was synonymous with an 
unprecedented surge in Assyrian imperial expansion, which was also accompanied by the adoption 
of a wide annexation and deportation policy. Although provinces came to dominate the political 
landscape in many areas of the empire, Assyria also continued to maintain a number of semi-
independent vassal-states alongside provinces, and thus conquest did not always bring about the 
annexation of subjugated lands
11
. Still, the expansion of the province system during this period is 
                                                                                                                                                                  
     advances, however, such as that made to the structure of the army, including the incorporation of light infantry   
     incorporating auxiliary archers and spearman, were more significant (see Dezső 2012a, pp. 151-154). 
10
 Note also Grayson‘s argument that the vast expansion of the empire in the West under Tiglath-pileser III was not a 
deliberate attempt at imperial expansion but was, rather, a consequence of the war against Urartu (1981, p. 86).   
11
 It is during this period that the empire is typically viewed as being transformed from a predominately hegemonic 
empire, characterised by indirect rule over semi-independent vassal-states, into a centralised-territorial one based on 
direct Assyrian governance of conquered lands. The difference between these two forms of governance is 
11 
 
traditionally tied to the introduction of extensive administrative reform (Forrer 1920; Saggs 1984, 
pp. 85-86), which it is theorised was necessary for both the operation of a centralised empire and to 
accommodate the huge expansion of the province system during this period
12
. Yet, the nature of 
these reforms has never been properly defined
13
. This problem was already noted by Saggs who 
stated in his 1984 work: ―What Tiglath-Pileser did in general is very clear; what he did in particular 
is less easily arrived at‖ (p. 86). Moreover, a number of the assertions made in Forrer‘s study which 
suggested a major reform of the provincial system during this period have since been disproved. 
The notion, for instance, that the office of šaknu was replaced with bēl pāḫiti during this period has 
since shown to be incorrect by the discovery of evidence which attests to the presence of this term 
                                                                                                                                                                  
significant. A hegemonic empire is based on the creation and maintenance of indirect mechanisms of imperial 
control, whereby the imperial nation exerts only indirect control over a subjugated state which fulfils certain 
obligations, typically pledging its loyalty to the imperial state and paying some form of taxation in return for 
retaining a certain degree of political and economic independence. An imperial state in a territorial empire will, by 
contrast, assume direct control over the political, military and economic systems of a subjugated territory, creating 
an entirely different imperial structure requiring the support of large and complex bureaucratic and military support 
systems. For the characteristics of a territorial empire, see Parker (2001, p. 14). For the various direct and indirect 
mechanisms of Assyrian control, see Allen (1997, pp. 176-212). 
12
   By contrast, the Middle Assyrian period was significantly less centralised with areas of the empire dominated by 
members of the Assyrian ruling class who retained virtual autonomy only ‗loosely‘ under the control of the Assyrian 
king. There is also little evidence for the mass movement of goods/commodities from the conquered territories to the 
core (Brown 2013, p. 118). 
13
 This is exemplified in a description of these changes by Grayson, who states: ―The organization and manoeuvring of 
the army were considerably improved in his reign, and weapons and military equipment also underwent substantial 
changes for the better. The provincial system of administration which was born in the 9
th
 century now became more 
rigorous, with the inevitable result that the empire was not only more efficiently and profitably managed but was 
also more secure from foreign invasion‖. Although Grayson does give a good overall indication of the changes 
responsible for the empire‘s growth and improved efficiency during this period, he does not cite any specific 
examples of these changes or indeed refer to any evidence for them.    
12 
 
already in Assyrian documents of the early 8
th
 century
14. Saggs‘ discussion of administrative reform 
for this period, moreover, is limited to only a brief discussion of the sophistication of the 
communication network operating during this period and to changes made to the appointment of 
governors which restricted inheritance of the office by their sons. This change, however, may date 
to the preceding period. Indeed, although evidence for the imperial administrative system is rather 
scant for the 9
th
 and first half of the 8
th
 centuries, there is little evidence to suggest that a vast 
overhaul of this system was carried out under Tiglath-pileser III.   
  
There is little consensus on the form taken by provinces in the 9
th
 and early 8
th
 centuries prior to the 
reign of Tiglath-pileser III
15
. Liverani has argued that Assyrian provinces of the 9
th
 and early 8
th
 
centuries lacked complex administrative structures which were necessary for a centralised authority 
to exert control beyond the core centres
16
. However, there is some evidence to suggest that the 
province system was already quite sophisticated and highly developed already in the 9
th
 century
17
. 
The first thing to note is that the same terminology later used to express the annexation of a territory 
ana miṣir mātia uter is already found in the Assyrian Royal Inscriptions during the 9th century BC. 
Thus, Ashur-naṣirpal II (883-859 BC) states that he had a-na mi-iṣ-ri KUR-ia ú-ter ―brought within 
                                                 
14
 Postgate suggests that both words may refer to the same office and simply reflect the common and formal usage of 
these terms (1995, p. 3).  
15
 Liverani views these administrative units as simply ―Assyrianised‖ centres which did not exert control beyond their 
immediate peripheries despite the presence of Assyrian palaces, an Assyrian population comprised of soldiers and 
officials, along with their families, and an Assyrian governor (1987, pp. 90 & 91). Grayson, moreover, expresses his 
own reservations concerning the identification of these centres as fully developed provinces, noting: ―From the royal 
inscriptions of the ninth century one has the impression that the system was too new to be functioning efficiently; 
there seems to be little system and some confusion even over the terminology‖ (1976, p. 136).   
16
  See the note above. Liverani‘s model of empire for the 9th century, as well as Postgate‘s criticism of this, is 
discussed in detail in Chapter 6. 
17
    Note that the geographical extent of the empire comprised of provincial administrative units underwent very little 
change between the 13
th
 and 12
th
 centuries to the 9
th
 century BC (see Radner 2014, p. 103; 2006, p. 49). 
13 
 
the boundaries of my land‖ all of the city-states occupying land east of the Tigris to ―Mount 
Lebanon and the Great Sea (the Mediterranean Coast)‖ (Grayson 1991a, A.0.101.1, 129b-131a, p. 
212). This suggests that, at least conceptually-speaking from the point of view of the Assyrians, the 
core characteristics of Assyria‘s annexation policy was already developed by the 9th century18. There 
is also evidence from the Assyrian Royal Inscriptions that Assyrian kings of the 9
th
 century were 
already systematically exploiting the territories of annexed lands.  Ashur-nasirpal II states in 
relation to the annexation of Nairi that ―tribute, taxes, (and) tax-collectors‖ were imposed on one 
city (Madara) (Grayson 1991a, A.0.101.17, iv 48-49, p. 250), suggesting that tax was not limited to 
a single payment made in the Assyrian capital per year, but was collected directly from cities, towns 
and villages on a periodic basis, presumably on manufactured goods and traded products. These 
Assyrian agents must have maintained a permanent presence in this territory and provide some 
evidence of a centralised bureaucracy during this period. Further evidence from Nairi suggests that 
Assyrian control, even over a territory that was largely pastoral and semi-sedentary, was capable of 
penetrating beyond the core centres during this period. According to the Assyrian Royal 
Inscriptions, under the rule of Ashur-nasirpal II barley and straw reaped from 250 conquered cities 
of Nairi was stored in the territory‘s capital city, Tusha, where a royal residence was also 
constructed (Grayson 1991a, A.0.101.17, iv 105-108, p. 251). This evidence points not only to 
Assyria‘s direct exploitation of Nairi‘s territory, but also provides further evidence of a centralised 
bureaucratic system which would have been responsible for monitoring and organising these tax 
contributions from local cities.  
 
Forrer‘s study of the Neo-Assyrian provincial system revealed that Tiglath-pileser III redivided and 
consolidated a number of provincial territories, adding newly conquered lands to existing territories 
                                                 
18
   This contradicts Yamada‘s suggestion that explicit statements referring to the annexation of territories  
   (ana miṣir māt  Aššur utirra) is found only in Assyrian sources from the reign of Tiglath-pileser III onwards        
   (2000, p. 300).   
14 
 
where possible (1920). However, Postgate has more recently shown that a more extensive 
reorganisation of the provincial system had already taken place under Adad-nirari III at the 
beginning of the 8
th
 century, when a large number of provinces were reorganised and divided into 
smaller territories (see Postgate 1995, p. 5 ff.)
19
. Indeed, evidence collated from the Eponym 
Chronicle and illustrated in Table 1 confirms Postgate‘s thesis and shows that Tiglath-pileser was 
not solely responsible for establishing a ‗new‘ provincial system of governance given that Assyria 
had already begun the process of steadily increasing the number of directly governed territorial 
holdings under its control from the beginning of the 8
th
 century
20:
     
                                                 
19
 Postgate suggests that this reform was aimed at curbing the power of some of the provincial governors that occupied 
large territories (1995, p. 5).  
20
 The table shown includes evidence only from the Eponym entries, and from here, only those entries dated from the 
middle of the 9
th
 century to the middle of the 8
th
 century due to the fragmentary nature of the text. On this point, it 
should also be noted that we are missing the relevant section in the chronicle for a number of years pertaining to the 
reigns of several Assyrian kings included in this study, including Shalmaneser III (848-843, 841-840, 831, 826-823) 
and Shamshi-Adad V (821, 819-818). In constructing this table, I have sought only to show the reader that a general 
pattern existed during this period in the number and geographical distribution of provinces. I have not sought to 
provide a fully comprehensive survey of Assyrian provincial holdings during this period, which can be found in the 
work by Radner (2006). I have also not included use of the ARI, which I believe is far beyond the scope of this 
study and has, in any case, already been comprehensively undertaken by Postgate (1995) for this period. The 
information provided by the Eponym Chronicle and shown in Table 1 regarding the nature and extent of Assyria‘s 
empire during this period does, in any case, parallel that information found in the ARI. This only further confirms 
Postgate‘s conclusions (1995) regarding the formation of empire during the early 8th century BC. A further point of 
clarification is needed regarding the inclusion of ‗old‘ provinces in the table. Where provinces were not new, but 
were rather, the result of being broken up from larger earlier provincial holdings known under different names in the 
Assyrian sources this is indicated in the footnotes. It should also be noted that included in the following table are 
those provinces scholars generally recognise as comprising  the core of Assyria‘s ‗traditional heartland‘,  including 
Nineveh, Assur, Arbela, Ahizuhina, Kalhu, Kilizi etc. The inclusion of these provinces here is not intended to 
mislead the reader in any way or to give a false impression of the extent of Assyria‘s territorial expansion during this 
period. Rather, the table aims to provide a uniform picture of the province system and its extent during this period. 
15 
 
Table 1 – Provincial Territories Noted in the Eponym Entries 850 – 750 BC 
Provinces Eponym References: 950-800 BC Eponym References: 800-750 BC 
 
Nairi
21
  
 
849 BC 
 
― 
Kalah 851 BC 
  
797 BC; 772 BC 
Nineveh 834 BC 789 BC; 761 BC 
Arrapha 811 BC; 802 BC 769 BC 
Arbela 
(Arbil/Arbail)
22
 
― 787 BC; 759 BC 
Nisibin 852 BC; 815 BC;  
800 BC 
782 BC; 774 BC; 746 BC 
Raqmat 836 BC; 812 BC  795BC; 773 BC 
Rasappa  838 BC; 803 BC 775 BC; 747 BC 
Guzana
23
  ― 793 BC; 763 BC 
Ahizuhina  837 BC; 801 BC 767 BC 
Habruri 835 BC; 813 BC 796 BC; 765 BC 
Kilizi 832 BC 760 BC 
                                                                                                                                                                  
For a more extensive collation of the data available for Assyrian provinces, see Postgate (1995, Table 1, p. 4) and 
Radner (2006).   
21
  See the notes below for Tushan and Amedi. 
22
   Amedi was presumably under Assyrian governance prior to its first appearance in the Eponym lists but may have   
        come under a different name (see Postgate 1995, p. 5).  
23
   Postgate (1995, p. 5) suggests that under Adad-nerari III only Guzana‘s status changed from that of a former   
       tributary state to a newly annexed territory.  
16 
 
Mazamua/Zamua 810 BC 783 BC; 768 BC
24
 
Tille
25
  ― 792 BC; 766 BC 
Shibhinish
26
 ― 791 BC; 755 BC 
Tushan
27
          794 BC; 764 BC 
Isana
28
 ― 790 BC; 758 BC 
Talmusa  ― 786 BC; 754 BC 
Tamnunna ― 785 BC; 756 BC 
Amedi
29
  ― 799 BC; 762 BC 
Kurbail ― 757 BC 
 
Table 1 suggests that Tiglath-pileser‘s policy of expanding the number of directly governed 
territories under Assyrian rule was but a continuation of a policy already begun under his 
predecessors. One significant area of difference may be detected, however, in the location of these 
territories. While the location of a number of the provinces listed in the table above remains 
uncertain, it can be said with some degree of certainty that few of the territorial holdings acquired 
                                                 
24
 Tiglath-pileser III refers to this province in his annals where he reports that he had resettled Aramaeans here  
following his 1
st
 campaign against Namri (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 5, 9-10, p. 27). 
25
 Note that Postgate (1995, p. 5) theorises that Tille may have earlier occupied part of the province of Naṣibina. 
26
 The location of this province is not certain.  
27
 Note that Tushan represents territory formed from the province of Nairi (Postgate 1995, p. 5). It should also be noted 
that outside sources attest to the inclusion of Tushan in the provincial system for the years 867* and 849* (Postgate 
1995, Table 1; Radner 2006, p. 53).          
28
 The location of Isana is not certain but the province may have fallen under Assyrian governance prior to 790 BC. It 
is possible that Isana was known under a different name or even formed from the province of Assur as Postgate 
suggests (1995, p. 5).   
29
 Note that Amedi earlier occupied part of the province of Nairi (Postgate 1995, p.5). 
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by Assyria in the first half of the 8
th
 century were located far from Assyria proper
30
, and several of 
these represented a mere re-organisation of the earlier system and therefore do not represent 
territory acquired through conquest at all (Postgate 1995, p. 5). While the north and north-eastern 
regions presented considerable geographical barriers to Assyrian expansion, these geographical 
hindrances did not exist in the West where Assyria still did not make any territorial gains beyond the 
natural border marked by the Euphrates River
31
. Since Assyrian power was concentrated in Assyria 
proper in the form of the Assyrian army, Assyrian authority diminished gradually the further 
subjugated states were located from the source of this power (Parker 2001, p. 21 ff.), and as a result, 
could only be maintained in the peripheral areas of the empire through regular military campaigning 
(Parker 2001, p. 21 ff.)
32
. There was thus a direct correlation between the maximum extent of the 
empire‘s outer borders and the military capabilities of the Assyrian army. Tiglath-pileser‘s real 
accomplishment was thus not the degree or rate of imperial expansion achieved during this period, 
but rather his ability to overcome certain logistical restrictions which hindered the army from 
maintaining imperial gains beyond the boundaries of the northern Mesopotamia and the Upper 
Euphrates areas. The answer to the question posed here, which asks how Tiglath-pileser III was able 
to rapidly accomplish the creation of such a vast and stable empire, must therefore take into account 
the nature and organisation of Assyria‘s military system during this period.   
 
Following a review of the written evidence available for this period in Chapter 2, which also deals 
with some of the historiographical issues surrounding the Assyrian Royal Inscriptions and their 
                                                 
30
 Although the location of some of these provinces is uncertain, most were located immediately north of Assyria or on 
the north-western border with Urartu, suggesting that the establishment of these provincial centres was largely 
strategic. For the location of these provincial centres, see Parpola & Porter (2001) and Postgate (1995).  
31
 Isana may be an exception to this (but see note 26). Note, however, that the location of this province remains highly 
speculative (Parpola & Porter 2001).  
32
 This is because the maintenance of hegemonic control in these peripheral regions relied on the threat of force.  For a 
discussion of this tactic, see Parker (2001, p. 259 ff.) and Chapter 6. 
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presentation of empire and imperial expansion, Chapter 3 examines the accession of Tiglath-pileser 
III and proposes a revised understanding of the entries in the Eponym Chronicle for Tiglath-pileser 
III‘s first few years on the throne, suggesting that Tiglath-pileser‘s reign should more likely be 
understood as the result of legitimate succession rather than usurpation. Chapter 4 examines the 
chronology of Tiglath-pileser‘s Babylonian campaigns and the development of imperial policy here 
during our period, which it is argued evolved to take the form of direct Assyrian rule in response to 
Tiglath-pileser‘s failure to properly assert Assyrian authority here following the 745 BC campaign. 
Following this, Chapter 5 deals with Assyrian foreign policy in the West and challenges the notion 
that ―anti-Assyrian‖ coalitions can be understood as governing Assyria‘s relations with the West 
during the 9
th
 and 8
th
 centuries BC. This chapter argues that the coalition which confronted Tiglath-
pileser III at Arpad in 743 BC was not specifically ―anti-Assyrian‖ or formed with the single 
purpose of resisting Assyrian expansion, but was, rather, a local coalition that mobilised in defence 
of Arpad. In this context, Tiglath-pileser‘s first campaign to this area should be viewed not as an 
attempt to conquer the West, but rather as an attempt to reassert Assyrian control over Arpad, a 
former Assyrian vassal which had revolted from Assyrian rule during the preceding period of 
weakness. The conclusions drawn from the preceding chapters are brought together in Chapter 6, 
which explores the nature of Tiglath-pileser‘s imperialist policies and the purpose and objectives 
behind Tiglath-pileser III‘s annexation policy. This discussion will show that Assyrian territorial 
control, though being motivated by economic, strategic and ideological considerations, was also 
driven by the need to establish permanently stationed military forces outside of Assyria proper in 
order to facilitate Assyria‘s vast imperial expansion during this period. The conclusions drawn from 
the following chapters show that Assyria‘s rapid and vast expansion during this period cannot solely 
be attributed to the persistent and ambitious campaigning of Tiglath-pileser III, but was also 
dependent on calculated opportunism, the decline of other rival states and the success of reforms 
made to the military system during this period.  
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This dissertation is intended to challenge some of the conventional interpretations of the nature of 
Assyrian imperialism during this period, and to provoke further discussion and enquiry into what 
was a transitionary and formative period in the history of the Assyrian empire.  
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CHAPTER 2     The Written Evidence 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
 
The Assyrian Royal Inscriptions (henceforth referred to as the ARI) refer to inscriptions 
commissioned by the Assyrian kings that provide a written record of the achievements of their 
reigns. Unfortunately, they are extremely fragmentary for our period, and this has resulted in the 
Eponym Chronicle becoming perhaps our most important source of information for this period. In 
particular, the Eponym Chronicle has proved invaluable for establishing a precise chronological 
framework for Tiglath-pileser III‘s reign, as well as for reconstructing a narrative of the events 
pertaining to Tiglath-pileser‘s campaigns from the annals, which cannot be done from Tiglath-
pileser‘s inscriptions alone because of large gaps in the surviving copies of the texts. The 
Babylonian Chronicle is, like the Eponym Chronicle, particularly useful for determining issues of 
chronology, though it concerns only those events specific to Babylonia. A final source of 
information which has not been much utilised in recent years is derived from the corpus of Neo-
Assyrian letters discovered at Nimrud, which are a source for the royal correspondence between 
Tiglath-pileser III and his officials stationed in various parts of the empire. Of particular interest 
here are those letters which concern political and military affairs in Babylonia during this period.     
 
 
2.2 The Assyrian Royal Inscriptions 
 
 
The corpus of royal inscriptions for our period contains texts classified by Tadmor (1994) as 
―annalistic‖ texts or ―annals‖, which contain detailed accounts of the events pertaining to the king‘s 
reign, and ―summary‖ (also known as ―display‖) inscriptions, which provide more concise 
narratives of these events. Few royal inscriptions from Tiglath-pileser III have survived from 
antiquity because they suffered significant damage during the reign of Esarhaddon, who used them 
as building materials in the construction of his palace (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, p. 4). The 
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standard edition for the royal inscriptions of Tiglath-pileser III is that of Tadmor, The Royal 
Inscriptions of Tiglath-pileser III (1994), which replaced Rost‘s earlier work, Die Keilschrifttexte 
Tiglat-Pilesers III (1893). Tadmor‘s edition contains more accurate transliterations and translations 
of the texts which reflect our current understanding of the Akkadian language, and publishes a 
number of new texts not included in Rost‘s earlier publication (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, p. 3). The 
inscriptions have since undergone a further revision by Tadmor and Yamada (2011), which though 
based largely on Tadmor‘s earlier work (1994), also includes a number of corrections and 
previously unpublished texts from Tiglath-pileser III‘s reign. Where texts pertaining to this corpus 
of royal inscriptions are referred to in the following chapters, the citation given for these texts 
follows the latest edition of translations by Tadmor and Yamada (2011). For those who are more 
familiar with Tadmor‘s earlier work and his classification system33, the corresponding name of the 
text as it appears in Tadmor‘s earlier publication (1994) is also provided.   
 
The ARI provide detailed reports of the campaigns of Tiglath-pileser III, however these texts are 
biased and any use of the information contained within them should take into account the literary 
context of the inscriptions themselves. The Assyrian annals are primarily concerned with the 
commemoration of the Assyrian king‘s building achievements and military exploits. These events 
were narrated with the purpose of promoting the king‘s heroic qualities and providing justification 
for his right to rule
34
. Narratives were constructed around a series of established ideological themes 
and literary formulas (Tadmor 1997; 1981). The audience of the ARI remains a contentious issue. 
One school of thought postulates that the ARI were constructed for a contemporary audience and 
were perhaps even intended to be read aloud to an audience of elites (see Grayson 1981b, p. 43; 
Liverani 1979: 302; Oppenheim 1979, pp. 124-135; Porter 1993, pp. 105-116, 1995). However, the 
                                                 
33
   Tadmor numbers and orders the inscriptions in accordance with a classification system that divided the texts into 
ʻannalsʼ, ʻsummaryʼ inscriptions and ʻmiscellaneousʼ texts (1994).   
34
 For a discussion of this theme, see Tadmor (1997, p. 326 ff.)  
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problem remains that most of these texts would not have been accessible to the general populace 
either in Assyria or throughout the rest of the empire, either because of illiteracy or due to the 
location and positioning of the texts themselves (Weeks 2007). A more reasonable thesis put 
forward, given the text‘s addressees, is that the ARI were composed for the gods (Tadmor 1997, p. 
331), as well as for future rulers of Assyria (Weeks 2007)
35
. This is a more reasonable conclusion 
given, as Weeks asserts, that there is no evidence the Assyrian king ever used the annals as 
―propaganda‖ in the modern sense of the word to justify his rule to his contemporaries (Weeks 
2007, p. 81). These texts were more likely intended to preserve the king‘s achievements, so that the 
glory of his deeds could be recognised by future rulers and preserved as a kind of immortality 
(Weeks 2007). Regardless of who the intended audience of the annals was, it is clear that the ARI 
do not present a wholly accurate account of the historical events they describe, particularly in 
regard to Assyrian military operations. References to Assyrian military defeats are either completely 
omitted or else concealed, presumably in the interest of preserving the heroic image of the Assyrian 
king (Fuchs 2011, pp. 383-385; Laato 1995). In misrepresenting many of the historical events they 
narrate, it must also be acknowledged that the ARI consequently present a false image of how 
empire was created and maintained.  
 
 2.2.1 The Creation and Maintenance of Empire according to the Assyrian Royal Inscriptions  
 
Warfare is overwhelmingly presented in the ARI as the primary instrument used by the Assyrian 
king in the creation and maintenance of empire. Tiglath-pileser III, for example, states in the 
opening lines of inscription No. 51 (Summary Inscription 11, Tadmor 1994, pp. 193-197), that he 
                                                 
35
 Though no evidence exists to support the claim, Tadmor admits that the central themes of the royal inscriptions 
would certainly have appealed to Assyria‘s elite, and thus would have served an important role in reconfirming the 
loyalty of this group to the Assyrian king (1997, p. 334). 
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―smashed like pots all who were unsubmissive to him, swept over (them) like the Deluge, (and) 
considered them as (mere) ghosts‖ (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, p. 135). This statement presents the 
view that Assyrian domination was achieved predominately through force, here being the swift 
slaughter of those peoples unsubmissive to Assyria. This view is supported in more detailed 
campaign reports where the ARI often provide lengthy descriptions of how an area was initially 
conquered but provide little information on how control was established once the initial conquest 
was over. In one statement concerning the subjugation of Damascus, Tiglath-pileser III states of 
Raḫiānu (Rezin) of Damascus that: ―In order to save his life, he (Raḫiānu) fled alone and entered 
the gate of his city [like] a mongoose. I [im]paled his foremost men alive while making (the people 
of) his land watch. For forty-five days I set up my camp [aro]und his city and confined him (there) 
like a bird in a cage. I cut down his plantations, […] …, (and) orchards, which were without 
number, I did not leave a single one (standing). I surrounded (and) captured [the city ...]ḫādara, the 
ancestral home of Raḫiānu (Rezin) of the land Damascus, [the pl]ace where he was born. I carried 
off 800 people, with their possessions, their oxen (and) their sheep and goats. I carried off 750 
captives from the cities Kuruṣṣâ (and) Samāya, (as well as) 550 captives from the city Metuna. Like 
tell(s) after the Deluge, I destroyed 591 cities of 16 districts of the land of Damascus‖ (Tadmor and 
Yamada 2011, No. 20, 8‘b‘-17‘, p. 59). While we know that Aram-Damascus was annexed 
sometime after these operations in 733 BC, the text does not detail any of the events associated with 
this political transition. Instead, the text focuses on detailing the conquest of Damascus, including 
the destruction of its cities, the flaying of people, and the seizure of captives and property. Although 
there is reference to Assyrian deportation in this description, it is not clear whether this reference 
should be taken as evidence of a punitive measure used by Tiglath-pileser III against the population 
of Damascus. The text seems to suggest deportation should be viewed as a type of punishment, but 
in reality people were relocated with their families and some people stood to gain from this policy
36
. 
                                                 
36
  Deportation was certainly a known technique used by Assyria to deal with political enemies (see Postgate 1992). 
Tiglath-pileser‘s removal of Zaqiru, the leader of the Babylonian Bīt-Šaʾalli tribe, following the tribe‘s subjugation 
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The violent destruction and total subjugation of Damascus described here in the ARI is, however, 
very effective in conveying the power of the Assyrian king. The leader of Damascus, Rezin, is 
presented as an ineffective leader and completely powerless against the Assyrian onslaught; forced 
to flee within the confines of his city Rezin‘s elite supporters (‗foremost men‘) are impaled and the 
land completely destroyed. Yet, there are clearly details missing from this account about the 
conquest which warrant mention. Did part of the Assyrian army remain in Damascus to ensure that 
the population did not rebel once Tiglath-pileser‘s main army had moved on to its next target? We 
can assume some forces must have, if only to secure the territory and ensure the Assyrian army was 
not flanked as it moved further south, but this is not stated in the ARI. Did talks or negotiation take 
place with the remaining ruling elite in Damascus to establish their support for the new government 
and ensure the area‘s continued economic functioning? Some discussion must have taken place and 
measures put in place to oversee this, however nothing is mentioned in the inscriptions. This is not 
to say that the ARI do not tell us about mechanisms other than warfare used in the creation of 
empire, only that these methods are often grossly understated or their importance downplayed 
because they did not provide effective subject material for conveying the ideological themes the 
texts are most concerned with. Further discussion of alternative methods of empire creation during 
the reign of Tiglath-pileser III will be made in Chapter 6. 
 
 
2.3 The Eponym Chronicle 
 
 
The Eponym lists and chronicles represent a series of texts compiled by Assyrian scribes that record 
                                                                                                                                                                  
(see Tadmor and Yamada (2011), No. 47, 19b-20, p. 119), suggests that deportation was used for this purpose under 
Tiglath-pileser III, as a means of removing political opponents that might encourage future resistance against 
Assyrian rule. However, deportation also served an important economic function in the empire and its use cannot 
always be taken as an indication that Assyria intended to use punitive measures against a subjugated population. 
There is some evidence, for example, that deportees could actually benefit from deportation, such as those of low 
social status who could stand to gain land from resettlement. On the subject of land grants, see Gallagher (1994). 
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the name of the limmu or high-ranking official who gave their name to each year in chronological 
sequence. While the Eponym Lists record only the name and title of the limmu or eponym for each 
year
37
, the Eponym Chronicle from the reign of Shalmaneser III (857-827 BC) onwards also 
included a historical notation recording one or more significant religious, military or civil events 
that took place each year (Millard 1994, pp. 4-5). In Assyria, the Eponym Lists were used for dating 
purposes and to keep track of the year name, and were necessary for accurately calculating spans of 
time (Millard 1994, p. 4) and for dating legal and economic documents, which included the phrase 
―in the eponymy of ...‖ as a means of recording the date of the text‘s composition. However, the 
purpose of the Eponym Chronicle and the meaning of the historical entries recorded is less certain. 
Some historical entries refer to religious or civic events, such as the founding of a new temple or an 
incidence of plague or revolt in Assyrian cities, yet, most entries provide the names of geographical 
locations given by the formulaic expression ana + place name. It has been suggested that the 
formula may refer to the possible location of the Assyrian army (Kuan 1995, p. 11; Millard 1994, 
pp. 4-5) or the king and his camp (Tadmor and Millard 1973, p. 62) at a particular point in the year, 
most likely at the time of the annual New Year festival. However, given that the locations in the 
chronicle appear to marry up with details given of campaign operations in the annals, many scholars 
now consider or assume the formula refers to the target of Assyrian military operations (see Tadmor 
and Yamada 2011, p.12). While the interpretation of the eponym formula adopted here follows this 
general consensus and interprets this phrase as giving the target of Assyrian military campaigns, it is 
also acknowledged that the meaning of this entry is far from certain and that it should not be 
assumed that the city identified in this entry represent the chief military target of the Assyrian army 
for any given year. Regardless of their precise meaning, the historical entries do provide a sound 
starting point for establishing a chronological framework for this period, and it is from this source 
                                                 
37
 Note that the significance of the office of limmu and the role that the eponym played in the Assyrian state is not 
known with absolute certainty, though it is thought to have been attached to a ceremonial or religious role of some 
kind. For this,
 
see Millard (1994, pp. 7-9).  
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that many of the fragmentary annalistic texts for this period have been dated (Tadmor and Yamada 
2011, pp. 12-13).The Eponym Chronicle has been widely published with recent translations 
appearing in the works of Glassner (2004, No. 8, pp. 160-176), Kuan (1995, pp. 136-138), Millard 
(1994), and Tadmor and Yamada (2011, pp. 17-18). This dissertation utilises the translation of the 
texts provided by Millard (1994).  
    
Turning our attention now to the purpose of the event entries in the Eponym Chronicle, it is clear 
that these notations differ from those of other chronicle texts, such as the Babylonian Chronicle, in 
that they are concise and lack descriptive detail. The inclusion of unfortunate events such as revolt 
and plague further highlights the fact that these texts exhibit less overt bias and hence do not pertain 
to the same literary tradition as the Assyrian Royal Inscriptions. Although Millard has asserted that 
the chronicle served a different purpose to the eponym texts (Millard 1994, p. 5), there seems little 
reason to think that the Eponym Chronicle was not also used for dating. During the reign of 
Shalmaneser III, when the event entry first appears
38
, a number of changes were also made to the 
composition of the texts. The first is that the order of the person serving as limmu became more 
fixed. Prior to the reign of Shalmaneser III, aside from the Assyrian king who served in his second 
regnal year and the turtānu who served after, the office in all other years was determined by casting 
a lot using dice (Millard 1994, p. 8). However, with the accession of Shalmaneser III the holder of 
the office became strictly determined by an order of succession. After the Assyrian king, the office 
passed to the king‘s four chief ministers and then to the governors of the major provinces (Millard 
1994, pp. 8-11). One result of this rigid system was that there was no specified number of times an 
official was permitted to hold the office of limmu39. The second change concerns the fact that the 
annals began dating years according to the king‘s regnal year or palû rather than the name of the 
                                                 
38
 Note that Shalmanesar III‘s earliest texts bear remnants of the earlier dating system. See, for example, the Fort 
Shalmanesar inscription (Grayson 1996, A.0.102.1, 82‘b-85‘a, p. 10). 
39
 Shamshi-ilu, for example, held the title of limmu for the years 780,770 and 752 BC.  
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eponym serving in office (Grayson 1996, p. 5)40. One reason for this shift away from using the name 
of the eponym to date years was probably the realisation that there were increasing incidences of 
overlap in the names of the eponyms, which could lead to confusion about the dates of documents. 
As the following table illustrates, overlap could occur in the names of eponyms where officials 
either served as limmu on more than one occasion in their careers, often with the same rank, or 
where eponyms held the same name as officials who had formerly served in the office during 
previous years, to whom they may have been related through common ancestry.   
 
 
Table 2 - Cases of limmu overlap in the Eponym Texts 
 
Name of Eponym Rank Years Served 
Adad-bēlu-ka‘in governor of the land 
governor of the land 
748 BC 
738 BC 
Adad-rēmanni Unknown 841 BC 
Aššur-bēlu-uṣur Habruri 
governor of Kalah 
governor of Shahuppe/Kadmuhi 
796 BC 
772 BC 
695 BC 
Aššur-būnāya-uṣur chief butler 
unknown 
chief butler 
855 BC 
825 BC 
816 BC 
Aššur-da‘inanni Unknown 
Mazamua 
Que 
908 BC 
733 BC 
685 BC 
Aššur-ilāya Unknown 
chief vizier 
861 BC 
653 BC 
Aššur-taklāk Unknown 
Chamberlain 
904 BC 
805 BC 
Bēl-ēmuranni Rasappa 
Carchemish 
commander of the right 
737 BC 
691 BC 
686 BC 
Bēl-būnāya Palace herald 
Unknown 
850 BC 
823 BC 
Bēl-dān Palace herald 
palace herald 
chief butler 
Kalah 
Kalah 
820 BC 
807 BC 
750 BC 
744 BC 
734 BC 
Bēl-Ḫarrān-bēlu-uṣur Palace herald 
Guzana 
741 BC 
727 BC 
Bēl-lū-dāri Tille 730 BC 
Dayān-Aššur Commander 
Unknown 
853 BC 
826 BC 
Iddin-aḫḫē Dur-Sharruken 693 BC 
                                                 
40
  This contrasts with the reigns of previous Assyrian kings who dated their annals according to the eponym in office. 
Ashur-nasirpal II states, for example, in one of his annals that ―In the eponymy of Assur-iddin a report was brought 
back to me‖ (Grayson 1991a, A.0.101.17, ii 77, p. 244). 
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Simirra 688 BC 
Ilu-issīya governor of the land 
governor of Damascus 
804 BC 
694 BC 
Ištar-dūrī governor of Nisibin 
governor of Arrapha 
774 BC 
714 BC 
Kanūnāyu chief judge 
governor of the new palace 
671 BC 
666 BC 
Mannu-kī-Adad Governor of Raqmat 
Supite 
773 BC 
683 BC 
Marduk-rēmanni chief butler 779 BC 
Marduk-šarru-uṣur Arbela 784 BC 
Mušallim-Ninurta Tille 
Tille 
792 BC 
766 BC 
Nabû-bēlu-uṣur Arrapha 
Simme 
Governor of Dur-Sharruken 
745 BC 
732 BC 
672 BC 
Nabû-da‘inanni Commander 742 BC 
Nabû-šarru-uṣur Talmusa 
Governor of Mar‘ash 
786 BC 
682 BC 
Nergal-ēreš governor of Rasappa 
governor of Rasappa 
803 BC 
775 BC 
Nergal-ilāya unknown 
[Is]ana 
governor of [……] 
commander 
861 BC 
830 BC 
817 BC 
808 BC 
Ninurta-ilāya unknown 
[Ahi]zuhina 
Ahizuhina 
Nisibin 
Unknown 
863 BC 
837 BC 
801 BC 
736 BC 
722 BC 
Ninurta-mukīn-nišī Unknown 
Habruri 
846 BC 
765 BC 
Pān-Aššur-lāmur governor of the land 
Arbela 
776 BC 
759 BC 
Qurdi-Aššur Unknown 
Raqmat 
Ahizuhina 
872 BC 
836 BC 
767 BC 
Šamaš-abūa Unknown 
governor of Nisibin 
unknown 
894 BC 
852 BC 
840 BC 
Šamaš-bēlu-uṣur Unknown 
unknown 
governor of Kalah 
governor of Arhuzina 
893 BC 
864 BC 
851 BC 
710 BC 
Šamaš-upaḫḫir Unknown 
governor of habruri 
874 BC 
708 BC 
Šamši-ilu Commander 
commander 
commander 
780 BC 
770 BC 
752 BC 
Šarru-ḫattu-ipēl Unknown 
governor of Nisibin 
831 BC 
815 BC 
Tāb-bēlu Unknown 
Amendi 
859 BC 
762 BC 
Yaḫalu Chamberlain 
unknown 
unknown 
833 BC 
824 BC 
821 BC 
 
As Table 2 suggests, some officials held the title of limmu with the same rank several times, while 
others bore the same name as others who had previously served as limmu, sometimes more than half 
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a century or more earlier. The turtanu Shamshi-ilu, for instance, held the same rank and served as 
limmu for three years during the course of his career, for the years 780, 770, and 752 BC, while the 
name ‗Ninurta-ilaya‘ was used by a number of officials who served as limmu for the years 863, 837, 
801, 736, and 722 BC. In these cases, if a document were dated to the eponomy of Shamshi-ilu or 
Ninurta-ilaya, one could not be sure to which year the text truly dated, thus creating confusion in 
the dating system.  
 
The problem of eponym overlap was certainly an issue in the ARI which abandoned the practice of 
dating years according to the eponym after the historical notation was introduced in the Eponym 
Chronicle during the reign of Shalmaneser III
41
. For kings such as Shalmaneser III, who 
campaigned every year of his reign and held the position of eponym twice during his reign, we can 
see why dating years according to the eponym rather than regnal year or campaign might create 
confusion in the narration of the events in the ARI, particularly since it was expected that future 
rulers would read the accounts given in the ARI of the Assyrian king‘s achievements. It was not 
necessary to apply these measures to private documents, which were not expected to be consulted in 
future generations. Thus, common economic and legal documents continued to be dated according 
to the eponym year following the reign of Shalmaneser III
42
, suggesting that Assyrian society 
                                                 
41
 Shamshi-Adad V‘s campaigns are dated in the ARI according to the king‘s palû rather than the eponym (Grayson 
1996). Although Shamshi-Adad‘s successor, Adad-nerari III, dated campaigns according to his regnal years rather 
than palûs (see Grayson 1996, A.0.104.6, pp. 208-209), it is interesting to note that he too did not date years 
according to the eponym. Shalmaneser IV‘s ―Letter to the God‖ that dates the text to the eponym year rather than the 
king's palû or regnal year (Grayson 1996, A.0.105.3, pp. 243-244) is the only exception to this practice of which I 
am aware. Note, however, that this inscription represents a different genre of text to the ARI.      
42
    See, for example, the following grants of land or tax from the reign of Adad-nerari III (Kataja and Whiting 1995, 
No. 1, pp. 4-7; No. 10, pp. 13-14; No. 11, p. 14; No. 12, pp. 14-15) and Tiglath-pileser III (Kataja and Whiting 1995, 
No. 13, p. 15; No. 14, pp. 15-16) which are dated according to the eponym and not the king‘s regnal year. An 
exception to this is a land grant dating to the reign of Sargon II which includes both the name of the eponym and the 
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continued to function on the basis of the eponym dating system. It thus became possible only to 
accurately date an event recounted in the ARI by consulting the historical entry in the Eponym 
Chronicle, particularly where the king had dated the entries according to his palû, which did not 
always agree with the king‘s regnal year43. This accounts for the over-representation of references to 
major military events in the historical notations of the Eponym Chronicle, which were necessary for 
cross-referencing with events recorded in the annals and the summary inscriptions.  
 
As the following table illustrates, the references to military events noted in the Eponym Chronicle 
for years eighteen to twenty-four of Shalmaneser III‘s reign are directly paralleled in the summary 
and annalistic texts for these years
44
. Entries related to military events found in all three text types 
have been highlighted.   
 
Table 3 – A Comparison of Data in the Eponym Chronicle, the Annals and Summary Inscriptions 
for Years Eighteen to Twenty-Four of the Reign of Shalmaneser III. 
 
Year  Sources for 
Campaign 
Events from the campaign 
based on the inscriptions 
Events contained in all 
accounts of the 
campaign 
Historical Entry in 
the Eponym 
Chronicle 
841 BC RIMA 3: 
A.0.102.8, 
1) Crossing of Euphrates 
2) Battle with Hazael of     
2) Battle with Hazael of  
    Damascus 
To Damascus?
45
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
king‘s regnal year (Kataja and Whiting 1995, No. 19, pp. 20-22). The following edicts and decrees for temple 
maintenance from the reign of Adad-nerari III also date texts according to the eponym year (Kataja and Whiting 
1995, No. 69, pp. 71-77; No. 71, pp.78-79; No. 74, p. 81; No. 76, pp. 82-84). A text adding the land of Hindanu to 
that of Raṣappa from the reign of Adad-nerari III is also dated to the eponym year (Kataja and Whiting 1995, No. 
85, pp. 98-100). See also the following economic text from the reign of Tiglath-pileser III (Kataja and Whiting 1995, 
No. 1, pp. 4-5) and an unassigned letter from a priest dated to the reign of Esarhaddon or Ashur-banipal (Cole and 
Machinist 1998, No. 211, p. 173) which are also dated to the eponym year.     
43
 Shalmaneser III is the exception to this of course, launching a campaign every year of his reign, though he did not 
lead all of these campaigns himself.   
44
  For the inscriptions used to complete this table, see Yamada (2000).   
45
  See Yamada (2000, pp. 63-64). 
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A.0.102.10, 
A.0.102.12, 
A.0.102.8, 
A.0.102.14 
A.0.102.16, 
A.0.102.9. 
    Damascus 
3) Siege of Damascus 
4) March to mountains of  
    Hauran and destruction   
    of cities 
5) Placing of royal image on    
    mountain of Ba‘ali-ra‘si 
6) Receiving of tribute 
7) Placing of royal image     
    on Mount Lebanon 
840 BC RIMA 3: 
A.0.102.10, 
A.0.102.11, 
A.0.102.12, 
A.0.102.14, 
A.0.102.16. 
1) Crossing of Euphrates 
2) Receiving of tribute from   
    the land of Hatti 
3) Cutting of cedar in the   
    Amanus Ranges 
4) King went hunting at the  
    city of Zuqarri 
1) Crossing of 
Euphrates 
3) Cutting of cedar in 
the   
    Amanus Ranges 
 
To the Cedar 
Mountain 
20
th
  
(839 BC) 
RIMA 3: 
A.0.102.10, 
A.0.102.11 
A.0.102.12, 
A.0.102.13, 
A.0.102.14, 
A.0.102.16.  
1) Crossing of Euphrates  
2) Assembling of allies   
    from land of Hatti  
3) March through the  
    Amanus to the cities of  
    Que. 
4) Conquering of cities of  
    Que. 
5) Placing of two royal  
    images in the cities of  
    Katê.    
1) Crossing of the  
    Euphrates 
4) Conquering of cities    
    of Que. 
 
To Que 
838
46
 BC  RIMA 3: 
A.0.102.13,   
A.0.102.14, 
A.0.102.16. 
1) Crossing of Euphrates. 
2) Receiving of tribute from   
    the kings of the land of   
    Hatti. 
3) Crossing of Mount    
    Lebanon and Mount    
    Saniru. 
4) Campaign against   
    Damascus and the cities  
    of Hazael. Conquest of  
    Malahi and Danabu and   
    two other cities. 
5) Receiving of tribute from   
    Tyre, Sidon and Byblos.   
4) Campaign against  
    Damascus and the  
    cities of Hazael.    
   Conquest of Malahi   
   and Danabu and  two  
   other cities. 
 
 
To Malahi  
837 BC  
― 
 
Not preserved  
 
Not preserved  
 
To Danabu 
 
836 BC RIMA 3: 
A.0.102.14, 
A.0.102.16, 
A.0.102.40. 
1) Receiving of tribute from    
    the land of Hatti and    
    Melid 
2) Crossing of Mt. Timur    
    and destruction of the   
    towns of Tuatti of Tabal. 
3) Receiving of gifts from   
    the kings of Tabal  
2) Campaign to Tabal  To Tabal 
                                                 
46
  Yamada suggests that the entries in the Eponym Chronicle for the king‘s 21st and 22nd regnal years correspond to a 
single campaign in the Annals for the king‘s 21st palû (2000, pp. 205-206). This is a plausible argument in 
consideration of the evidence from A.0.102.16, II. 152‘-162‘a (Grayson 1996, pp.78-79) which suggests that both 
cities were only conquered after sieges.  
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4) Crossing of Mount Tunni  
     and march to Hubushna. 
5) Erecting of royal image  
835 BC RIMA 3: 
A.0.102.14, 
A.0.102.16. 
1) Crossing of Euphrates 
2) Receiving of tribute from   
    the land of Hatti. 
3) Crossing of Mt. Pala […]  
4) Conquering of towns of  
     Lalla of Melid. 
5) Conquering of towns on     
    the Tabal-Melid  
    border?
47
 
6) Receiving of gifts from  
    kings of Tabal.  
1) Crossing of the   
    Euphrates 
4) Conquering of towns  
    of Lalla of Melid. 
6) Receiving of gifts   
    from kings of Tabal.  
 
 
 
To Melid  
834 BC RIMA 3: 
A.0.102.14, 
A.0.102.16, 
A.0.102.40. 
1) Crossing of the Lower   
    Zab and Mount Hašimur  
    to the land of Namri 
2) Capture and plunder of  
    Sihišalah, Bīt-Tamul,   
    Bīt-Šakki, and Bīt-Šēda. 
3) Receiving of tribute from  
    kings of the land of    
    Parsua 
4) Conquest of cities in the    
    lands of Mēsu, Media,    
    Araziaš, and Harhār. 
5) Erection of a royal statue   
    in Harhār. 
6) Carrying off of the king  
    of Namri, Ianzû, his  
    gods, and booty from his   
    land to Assyria.     
1) Campaign to Namri 
6) Carrying off of the   
    king of Namri, Ianzû,  
    his gods, and booty  
    from his land to  
    Assyria.  
To Namri 
833 BC RIMA 3: 
A.0.102.14, 
A.0.102.16, 
A.0.102.40 
1) Crossing of the  
    Euphrates 
2) Receiving of tribute from  
    the kings of the land of  
    Hatti. 
3) Crossing of the Amanus  
    Ranges to Que and the  
    capture of Timur among  
    other cities. 
4) Capture of Aramu in the  
     land of Bit-Agusi and    
     the establishment of a  
     new royal residence.   
3) Campaign to Que To Que 
 
 
2.4 The Babylonian Chronicle 
 
Along with the Eponym Chronicle, the Babylonian Chronicle is vital for establishing a firm 
chronological framework for this period, although it only deals with Tiglath-pileser‘s activities in 
Babylonia during this period. The Babylonian Chronicle is a compilation of a series of texts which 
                                                 
47
  The identification of these cities on the Tabal-Melid border is not certain. For a discussion of this geographical 
problem, see Yamada (2000, p. 217).  
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provide a continuous chronological narrative of political, military and religious events concerning 
Babylonia from the middle of the eighth century until the third century BC. A translation of this text 
appears in Grayson‘s work, Assyrian and Babylonian Chronicles (1975), as well as in Glassner‘s 
Mesopotamian Chronicles (2004). The text called by Grayson (1975) ―Chronicle 1‖ is that which 
concerns us here, and covers the period from the reign of Nabu-nasir (747-734 BC) to the reign of 
Shamash-shuma-ukin (668-648 BC). Although the nature of the sources used to compile the 
Babylonian Chronicle remains a subject of controversy (Gerber 2000, p. 553), the chronicle itself is 
largely considered to be a reliable source for this period.   
 
 
2.5 Assyrian Letters 
 
 
Assyrian letters dating to this period are represented solely by a collection of letters discovered at 
the site of Kalah (Nimrud). These letters provide us with a rare insight into the workings of empire, 
which can, in some cases, compensate for the bias and lack of detailed information provided by the 
ARI. The letters largely represent correspondence between the Assyrian king and his provincial 
officials stationed all over the empire, but those which concern us here are applicable only to 
Babylonia. These letters were originally published by Saggs in a series of articles that appeared in 
the Iraq journal from 1954 to 1974
48
, and have since been republished by Saggs in 2001, with 
amendments, in a more comprehensive publication titled The Nimrud letters, 1952 (hereafter 
referred to as CTN5). One of the most notable features of this volume is that it not only sought to 
publish letters not included in the earlier publications, it also incorporated use of improved copies of 
the texts. Since then, revised transliterations and translations have been more recently published by 
Luukko in 2012 as part of the Neo-Assyrian Text Corpus Project. The transliterations and 
translations which appeared in Luukko‘s edition titled The Correspondence of Tiglath-pileser III 
                                                 
48
  See Saggs (1955a, pp. 21-50), (1955b, pp. 126-54), (1956, pp. 40-56), (1958, pp. 182-212), (1959, pp. 158-79), 
(1963, pp. 70-80), (1965, pp. 17-32), (1966, pp. 177-91), (1974, pp. 199-221).  
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and Sargon II from Calah/Nimrud made a number of technical improvements on those of Saggs, 
and, in some cases, involved use of clearer copies of the texts which can in some cases be attributed 
to the cleaning efforts of the British Museum (see Luukko 2012, p. LV). However, Luukko was only 
able to access half of the collection of cuneiform tablets, being those stored in the British Museum, 
with the remainder of his transliterations based on those copies produced by Saggs and republished 
in CTN 5 (see Luukko 2012, p. LV & n. 252)
 49. Moreover, while many of Luukko‘s restorations 
can be considered valid, and are often far superior to those produced by Saggs in CTN 5, 
particularly in cases where part of the original word or phrase remains intact before the lacuna or a 
common phrase can be predicted, many of his restorations can be questioned on the basis of a lack 
of evidence. The inclusion of questionable restorations is, at times, so extensive as to be considered 
quite detrimental to any clear interpretation of the letters and their overall context to the extent that 
they may lead to inaccurate assertions regarding the political situation in Babylonia at this time. 
Due to the difficulties posed by the letters and their poor preservation, there is thus grounds for their 
re-examination here. The transliterations provided in Appendix A include many of the amendments 
and suggestions made by Saggs (2001) and Luukko (2012) where appropriate, but also attempt to 
make clear to the reader areas where transliterations are ambiguous and further evaluation is 
needed, if possible. In an effort to provide an objective translation of the letters, suggested 
reconstructions are only included in the translations where the missing text is fairly assured.  It may 
be noted that of the letters transliterated and translated here in the Appendix, Luukko was only able 
to access the original cuneiform tablet for one of those letters (ND 2385) in the writing of his 
volume, and thus any differences which appear in the transliterations given here and in Luukko‘s 
volume, with the exception of ND 2385 of course, are my interpretation and can not be attributed to 
Luukko‘s access to the original tablets which might therefore, if it had been possible, result in a 
clearer reading of the cuneiform signs.  
 
                                                 
49
 The other half of the corpus is stored in the Iraq Museum, Baghdad. 
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Accurate dates for the Nimrud letters are particularly difficult to assign. Dating is often proposed on 
the basis of the letter‘s content, including reference to personal names such as high officials known 
from other sources
50
 or historical events recounted therein. The accuracy of this dating can be 
challenged particularly where dating is assigned only on the basis of reference to individuals, such 
as high officials, who could have served for extensive periods in the same office not limited to the 
reign of a single Assyrian king. Nevertheless, while the chronological assignment of the Nimrud 
letters presents perhaps the greatest problem arising from the inclusion of the letters in the 
discussion of events in Babylonia during Tiglath-pileser‘s reign, every attempt has been made only 
to include those letters which can be assigned to our period with a fair degree of certainty.   
 
 
                                                 
50
  Some letters refer to known individuals active in Babylonian political life during the period under study here and 
can be dated on this basis. However, it is not always possible to assign some individuals to a specific period. 
Marduk-apla-iddina (Merodach Baladan) of Bit-Yakin was active during the reign of Tiglath-pileser III, as well as 
his successors Sargon II and Sennacherib. Letters which refer to Balasu of Bit-Dakkuri are also problematic and 
difficult to firmly assign a date. Although the individual named Balasu can firmly be placed in Tiglath-pileser's reign 
on the basis of evidence from the Babylonian Chronicle (see Grayson 1975), later references to a high-ranking 
Babylonian official with the same name during the reign of Sargon make it difficult to be certain of this dating (see 
Radner 1999, p. 256-257) . Letters referring to Mukin-zeri of Bit-Amukkani can be more firmly dated to Tiglath-
pileser‘s second Babylonian campaign, sometime between the years 731 BC and 729 BC. However, it must be 
pointed out that while the death of Mukin-zeri is reported in one of the letters there is no confirmation from the ARI 
or Eponym Chronicle that this event certainly can be attributed to the reign of Tiglath-pileser III.  
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CHAPTER 3     The Accession of Tiglath-pileser III: Usurpation or   
                            Legitimate Succession?  
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
Almost nothing is known of the origins of King Tiglath-pileser III, who is reported to have 
officially ascended the Assyrian throne in 745 BC when a revolt is also known to have taken place 
in the city of Kalah, the Assyrian capital, according to the Eponym Chronicle
 
(Millard 1994, p. 43, 
Pl. 12). The civil unrest noted in Kalah for this year, as well as the conflicting reports given of 
Tiglath-pileser‘s ancestry in various sources51, has suggested to scholars that Tiglath-pileser‘s 
accession to the Assyrian throne probably took place through usurpation rather than hereditary 
succession
52
. More recently this view has been challenged by Garelli, who argues that although 
Tiglath-pileser III came to the throne as a result of a rebellion, this coup was staged not by Tiglath-
pileser but by the turtānu Shamshi-ilu, a powerful official during the reigns of Tiglath-pileser‘s 
predecessors (1991, p. 48). While there is not sufficient evidence to directly tie the turtānu to these 
                                                 
51
 In the Assyrian King List, Tiglath-pileser III is called the son of Ashur-nerari V (Glassner 2004, p. 145), while in a 
brick inscription from Ashur he is claimed to be the son of Adad-nerari, which can only be Adad-nerari III (Grayson 
1991b, p. 73; Tadmor and Yamada 2011, 58, pp.147-148).    
52
 Tadmor notes that the standard formula used in the ARI to denote a king‘s accession to the throne contains both a 
reference to divine selection and to royal parentage. For Tiglath-pileser III‘s reign, however, he notes that only the 
reference to divine selection is present while that of direct parentage has been omitted, which it is claimed supports 
the notion that Tiglath-pileser was a usurper. Tadmor further notes that the Babylonian King List identifies Tiglath-
pileser III and his successor, Shalmaneser V, as belonging to a separate dynasty suggesting Tiglath-pileser III was 
not the legitimate successor to Ashur-nerari 1981, pp. 25-27. This view is shared by Baker (forthcoming, p. 668); 
Brinkman (1968, p. 228; 2004, p. 40), Grayson (1991b, p. 73), Kuan (1995, p. 135), Olmstead (1951, p. 175), Smith 
(1925, p. 32), and Zawadzki (1994). Note that Grayson suggests a further possibility- that there is a scribal error in 
the Assyrian king list and that Tiglath-pileser was the son of Adad-nerari III and the brother of Ashur-nerari V 
(1991b, p. 73). 
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events in 746 BC
53
, the suggestion that Tiglath-pileser III was not responsible for the rebellion 
warrants attention and is more readily reconcilable with the available evidence than the 
conventional theory. However, while Tiglath-pileser III likely played no role in the rebellion 
himself, the notion that he was not the legitimate successor to the throne should not be so easily 
dismissed. The following chapter seeks to show through an examination of the Eponym Chronicle 
entries for Tiglath-pileser‘s first few years on the throne (approximately 745-743 BC) that Assyria 
was likely ruled by a co-regency for a time, perhaps resulting from the civil turmoil which had 
engulfed Assyria at this time. 
 
3.2 The Eponym Chronicle 
 
The Eponym entries for the first three years of Tiglath-pileser‘s reign do not follow the standard 
sequence determined by the office of the limmu or eponym holders
54
. Customarily, the Assyrian 
king held the office of eponym during his second regnal year
55
, followed by his magnates and then 
the provincial governors of his territories. However, as Figure 1 shows, if we accept that Tiglath-
pileser III ruled independently from 745 BC, then we must consider that the sequence was broken in 
744 BC when Bel-dan, the governor of Kalah, held the office of eponym during Tiglath-pileser‘s 
second regnal year
56
. Yet, if Ashur-nerari V‘s reign did not come to an end until 744 BC, as the 
                                                 
53
  Note here, however, Zawadzki‘s alternate thesis that the coup was staged by Tiglath-pileser III under the influence 
of Shamshi-ilu (1994, pp. 53-54). 
54
 This was first suggested by Forrer (1920). 
55
 The eponym entries for the reign of Shalmaneser III indicate that the Assyrian king was also ent itled to become 
eponym again in his thirtieth regnal year (Millard 1994, p. 14). For the eponym sequence order, see also Finkel & 
Reade (1995).   
56
 Millard (1994, pp. 9-11) has noted a number of variations in the ordering of office holders throughout the Eponym 
chronicle which essentially represent ―breaks‖ in the standard sequence of offices. Officials, for instance, might be 
unable to serve in the position of eponym during their appointed year if they had, for instance, died or been removed 
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entry for this year in the Eponym Chronicle suggests
57
, then Tiglath-pileser III‘s official second 
regnal year would not have taken place until 743 BC, and therefore the entry for this year cannot be 
considered a break in the sequence of eponym holders, since in the basic sequence of eponym 
holders it was the governor of Kalah‘s turn to hold this office following the governor of Arrapha 
(Millard 1994, p. 11).  
 
 
 
Figure 1 – The Eponym Chronicle Entries 745-743 BC  
 
 
746    Nergal-nasir                             of Nisibin                           revolt in Kalah 
745    Nabu-belu-usur                        of Arrapha                         on the 13
th
 Ayar Tiglath-pilesar  
                                                                                                      took the throne; [in] Teshrit he   
                                                                                                      went to Mesopotamia.  
744    Bel-dan                                     of Kalah                            to Namri 
                                                           10 years [Ashur-nerari] king of Assyria 
743    Tiglath-pilesar (III)                  King of Assyria                In Arpad; defeat of Urartu   
                                                                                                     made  
        
Further, the presence of two horizontal rulings, one beneath the entry for the year 746 BC and a 
further ruling below the official notation marking the conclusion of Ashur-nerari V‘s reign in 744 
BC, also suggests that Ashur-nerari V ruled concurrently with Tiglath-pileser III for a time, between 
the years 745-744 BC
58
. It is unlikely that the additional ruling here represents a scribal error, since 
                                                                                                                                                                  
from their position of office. According to Millard, the office of eponym was likely allocated a full year before the 
eponym was due to hold this office, probably at the New Year festival (1994, p. 8). Note, however, that the break in 
sequence of limmu-holders for this year is often taken as evidence for Tiglath-pileser‘s involvement in the rebellion. 
Zawadzki argues that Bel-Dan was made limmu for this year to recompense him for his involvement in the coup 
d’etat (1994, p. 54). Radner attributes the rebellion to a defeat in a battle fought against Urartu in the territory of 
Arpad in 754, Assur-nerari V‘s accession year (2014, p. 104).     
57
 Note that the official notation marking the conclusion of Ashur-nerari‘s reign which records the number of years he 
ruled over Assyria is given as ten years rather than the expected nine if his reign had come to an end in 745 BC. The 
reign length noted here also agrees with that given in the Assyrian King List for Ashur-nerari V‘s reign (Glassner 
2004, p. 145).  
58
 It is unclear whether these horizontal rulings were intended to mark the beginning of a king‘s reign or his royal  
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it falls below the entry marking the conclusion of Ashur-nerari V‘s reign, which correctly recorded 
the king‘s reign length. While the current trend in scholarship has been to view Tiglath-pileser III as 
a usurper who ascended the throne as a result of a coup d’etat, this is highly unlikely given that any 
civil war could not have come to a conclusion before 744 BC when Ashur-nerari V‘s reign officially 
came to an end, and the fact that Tiglath-pileser mounted two successive campaigns during this time 
which he would not have done if Assyria was in the grip of a civil war. The only logical explanation 
which can explain the odd entries in the Eponym Chronicle for these years is that Assyria was 
operating under a co-regency during this time for final few years of Ashur-nerari V‘s reign59. It may 
be that the practice of allowing the crown prince to have an active role in government before his 
formal accession to the throne, first attested during this period by Shalmaneser V‘s assumption of 
this role under his father Tiglath-pileser III, had its origins in the preceding period.   
 
The irregular circumstances surrounding Tiglath-pileser‘s accession to the throne resulted in 
confusion surrounding the exact length of his reign. This is reflected in the Eponym Chronicle 
                                                                                                                                                                  
eponymate. For Shalmaneser III‘s reign an additional horizontal ruling was made beneath the entry for 828 BC 
marking the king‘s additional term in office as eponym for this year. However, from 746 BC (the beginning of 
Tiglath-pileser‘s reign) the eponym texts vary in where the horizontal line is placed (Millard 1994, p. 13). For 
Tiglath-pileser‘s reign, two horizontal rulings were made because the king did not serve as eponym in his first full 
regnal year, as was customary. Hence, the ruling was used both to mark Tiglath-pileser‘s official accession year in 
745 BC, as well as his eponym year in 744BC. The presence of two horizontal rulings for the reign of Tiglath-pileser 
III clearly created confusion in how the rulings were intended to be used, and variations are noted in the use of these 
rulings in the following periods. For Shalmanesar V‘s reign, for instance, a ruling was also used to mark the 
accession year of the king‘s reign rather than his eponymate, which he did not serve until his final regnal year in 723 
BC.  
59
 Hagens (2005) has already observed that dynastic overlap is probably responsible for the incorrect chronological 
information noted for several of the periods of Assyrian history in the Eponym texts and that it is impossible to 
identify whether any of the kings who reigned in these periods actually ruled from the capital or enjoyed 
independent rule for those years recorded (2005, p. 40).   
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which does not provide a reign notation for Tiglath-pileser III‘s final regnal year (728 BC), which 
should record the total number of years he ruled over Assyria. This is despite the survival of text A7 
for this period, one of only two sources available which included the reign notation and is used to 
reconstruct the eponym entries (see Table 4).     
 
Table 4 – Sources for the Eponym Chronicle and the Reign Notation 
 
Assyrian King Last Regnal 
Year  
Reign 
Notation? 
Sources
60
 Source with Reign 
Notation 
Adad-nirari II 890 BC No A2, A8 ― 
Tukulti-Ninurta II 883 BC No A2, A8 ― 
Ashur-nasirpal II 858 BC Yes A1, A7, B5 A7 
Shalmaneser III 823 BC Yes A1, A8, B4, B8, B10,  B10 
Shamsi-Adad V 810 BC Yes A1, A8, B1, B2, B6, 
B10 
B10
61 
(fragmentary) 
Adad-nirari III 782 BC Yes A1, A2, A3, A6, A7, 
A8, B1, B2, B10 
A7, B10 
Shalmaneser IV 772 BC Yes A1, A8, B1, B2, B10 B10 
Ashur-dan III 754 BC No A1, A8, A3, B1, B2 ― 
Ashur-nerari V 744 BC Yes A1, A2, A3, A4, A7, 
B1 
A7 
Tiglath-pilesar III 728 BC No A1, A7, B1, B3 Source A7 available 
but reign notation 
not recorded
62
.   
 
3.3  Conclusion 
 
With the exception of the Eponym Chronicle, the co-regency which existed between Ashur-nerari V 
                                                 
60
  The abbreviated names given to the texts mentioned in this table are those outlined by Millard (1994, pp. 17-21) 
and are as follows: A1 (Kuyunjik: K 4329 (+) 4329a (+) 4329b); A2 (Kuyunjik: K 4388); A3 (Kuyunjik: K 4389); 
A4 (Kuyunjik: K 4390); A7 (Assur: VAT 11254 + 11257 + 11276, 11258 + 11259B, 11260, 11255, 11256); A8 
(Sultantepe: SU 52/150); B1 (Kuyunjik: K 51); B2 (Kuyunjik: K 3403 + 81-2-4, 187 + 95-4-6,4); B3 (Kuyunjik: K 
3202); B4 (Kuyunjik: Rm 2, 97); B5 (Kuyunjik: 82-5-22,526); B10 (Sultantepe: SU 52/18 + 18A + 21 + 333 + 337).   
61
 Though this line is very fragmentary it certainly included the reign notation in its complete form. 
62
 Though the beginning of this line is missing from A7 the cuneiform signs were well spaced out and included only 
two more signs reconstructed by Millard from other texts as the name of the eponym for that particular year (Millard 
1994, p. 45). It may be noted that where A7 did record the total amount of years comprising the king‘s reign the 
cuneiform signs were squashed tightly together.   
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and Tiglath-pileser III during the final two years of Ashur-nerari V‘s reign was completely 
concealed from the official records. It is perhaps as a result of these unique circumstances that such 
importance was given to recording the date of Tiglath-pileser‘s first campaign in his annals: ―At the 
beginning of my reign, in my first palû, in the fifth month after I sat in greatness on the throne of 
kingship...‖ (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 4, pp. 24-25) where no mention is made of these 
unique political circumstances. Yet, the existence of a co-regency might help explain the 
contradictory reports we have of Tiglath-pileser‘s ancestry63. If reports of the co-regency were 
stricken from the official records in Assyria, it is easy to see how this could give rise to a scribal 
error. A king‘s reign typically came to an end only upon his death, and it is logical to assume that 
his successor was his son. However, where a co-regency existed there was every chance that the 
natural succession had been broken and that the king‘s successor was not his son. In this case, a co-
regency might ensure that the person appointed by a king to succeed him was later accepted as the 
legitimate ruler by his court. On the other hand, Hagens (2005, p. 39) has also shown in the case 
Tukulti-Ninurta‘s two sons, Aššur-nadin-apli and Aššurnaṣirpal, that cases of civil war may give rise 
to an unofficial co-regency where rivals clash over succession claims. The reason for the existence 
of a co-regency in Assyria in our period is not entirely clear. However, if Ashur-nerari V‘s death in 
744 BC was preceded by a period of serious illness which prevented him from performing his duties 
of state, this may have necessitated the early succession of Tiglath-pileser to the throne. Whether 
Tiglath-pileser was the son of Ashur-nerari or his brother, as Tadmor and Yamada suggest (2011, p. 
12), may never be known with certainty. However, there is no real evidence to support the notion 
that Tiglath-pileser was a usurper to the throne. 
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 Tadmor and Yamada (2011, p. 12) have suggested that the brick inscription from Ashur which claims that Tiglath-
pileser III was a son of Adad-nerari III, and therefore the brother of his predecessor Ashur-nerari V, is in fact an 
accurate report of Tiglath-pileser‘s parentage, and that the copy of the Assyrian king list which states that Tiglath-
pileser was the son of Ashur-nerari V is a scribal error (Grayson 1991b, p. 73). 
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CHAPTER  4   The Conquest of Babylonia and the Origins and   
                           Evolution of Tiglath-pileser’s Babylonian Policy 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Tiglath-pileser III‘s Babylonian policy in many respects resembled that of his successors, who with 
the exception of Sennacherib, sought to win the support of the Babylonian population
64
. Tiglath-
pileser secured the submission of the Babylonian city-states without using force, established the 
privileges of citizens, and sacrificed to the principal Babylonian gods in their chief cult centres. In 
729 BC, Tiglath-pileser broke with convention and ascended the Babylonian throne, participating in 
the annual akītu festival and ruling over Babylonia directly. In assuming the title and traditional 
duties of Babylonian kingship, Tiglath-pileser sought not only to gain the prestige associated with 
claiming the title ―king of the lands of Sumer and Akkad‖, which had been taken by the great 
Mesopotamian kings of the past, but also to present himself as a legitimate king of Babylonia and 
not a foreign conqueror (Grayson 1991b, p. 82; Frame 2008, p. 23). This policy, however, had 
proceeded probably from Tiglath-pileser‘s failure to firmly establish Assyrian authority over 
Babylonia following the 745 BC campaign.  
 
In 745 BC Tiglath-pileser undertook his first campaign into Babylonian territory where he targeted 
the north Babylonian cities of Dur-Kurigalzu and Sippar, as well as the Aramaean tribes which 
inhabited both north and north-eastern Babylonia. These military operations were largely focused 
on removing local opposition in these areas as a means of securing a route for future campaigning 
into Namri and the Zagros Mountains. However, during the course of his campaign it is also clear 
from the Assyrian annals that Tiglath-pileser ventured south into Babylonia proper where he
                                                 
64
   For a brief history of Assyrian policy in Babylonia, see Porter (1993, p. 27 ff.).  
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claimed sovereignty over the Babylonian city-states (Karduniash) there. However, there is reason to 
doubt Tiglath-pileserʼs claim to have established Assyrian control here. Although Tiglath-pileser III 
claims in his annals to have annexed Karduniash ―as far as the Uqnû River, [which are on the shore 
of the Lo]wer [Sea]‖, placing them under the control of his eunuch, a provincial governor (Tadmor 
and Yamada 2011, No. 5, 5b-8a, p. 27), only Aramaeans are referred to in relation to Babylonian 
deportations (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 5, 8b-11a, p. 27) suggesting that only that territory 
occupied by the Aramaeans subjugated at this time was annexed. There is no record in the Assyrian 
inscriptions of the Assyrian army laying siege to any of the principal Babylonian cities and 
Babylon, the capital, is never directly referred to in Tiglath-pileserʼs inscriptions as one of the cities 
conquered during the course of this campaign. Nor is there any mention in Tiglath-pileserʼs annals 
that any of the Babylonian cities willingly submitting to Tiglath-pileser III. In Babylon, the 
Babylonian king, Nabu-nasir, remained on the throne. However, following Nabu-nasir's death in 
734 BC, Babylonia fell into a state of disarray as a number of different factions vied for control 
over the throne, providing further confirmation that Tiglath-pileser‘s campaign of 745 BC had failed 
to successfully extend Assyrian authority over Babylonia proper. According to the Babylonian 
Chronicle, Nabu-nadin-zer, the son of Nabu-nasir, ascended the throne before being overthrown and 
killed in a rebellion after only two years of rule. He was succeeded by Nabu-shuma-ukin, a bēl 
pīhāti (governor) and leader of the rebellion, who only ruled for a total of one month and two days 
before also being overthrown. The Babylonian throne next fell in 732 BC to the Chaldean leader, 
Mukin-zeri (Grayson 1975, No. 1, 12-18, p. 72), and was retained by him until his eventual 
overthrow by Tiglath-pileser III. While Assyria‘s inability to control the succession to the 
Babylonian throne is clear evidence of the continued autonomy of Babylonia during this period, it is 
tempting to suggest that the bēl pīhāti, Nabu-shuma-ukin, may actually have been an Assyrian 
governor
65
 who had attempted to claim possession of the throne in Tiglath-pileser‘s name during 
                                                 
65
  Though this term stems from Babylonia, its use it attested in Assyrian sources from the early 8
th
 century along  with 
the term šakin māti. For this, see Postgate (1995, pp. 2-3).  
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this turbulent time. Although there is no concrete proof of this, it would be interesting if this 
assertion were correct, since the short duration of Nabu-shuma-ukin‘s reign, as well as the 
suggestion that he was the leader of a ‗rebellion‘ in the Babylonian Chronicle, might tell us 
something of the attitudes prevalent in Babylonian society towards Assyrian rule at this time. In any 
case, the failure of the Babylonian Chronicle and the Babylonian Kinglist to recognise Tiglath-
pileser‘s sovereignty over Babylonia prior to his direct ascension to the Babylonian throne in 729 
BC, confirms that despite Tiglath-pileser‘s annexation of territory pertaining to Babylonia, as well 
as the probable presence of garrisoned troops here
66
, Assyrian authority was not officially 
recognised in Babylonia proper until Tiglath-pileser took possession of the Babylonian throne 
directly. Evidence from the Babylonian Chronicle for the reign of Sennacherib, who appointed a 
number of puppet kings to rule over Babylonia in his stead, including one Bel-ibni, as well as his 
own son, Ashur-nadin-shumi, clearly shows that rule via proxy was recognised as a legitimate form 
of government in Babylonia which was noted by Babylonian scribes (Grayson 1975, No. 1, 23-31, 
p. 77). The lack of any centralised Assyrian authority over Babylonia prior to 729 BC and the 
seizure of the throne by a number of usurpers was clearly a problem for Tiglath-pileser III. Control 
over these cities held both political and ideological significance (see Frame 2008), and Babylon's 
control by a ruler that had not been sanctioned by the Assyrian king was a clear threat to Assyria 
and its imperial ideology. However, the removal of Mukin-zeri from the throne and the subjugation 
of the Chaldeans was not enough to secure Assyrian rule over Babylonia, which was also largely 
dependent on the success of a public relations program. This led to the initiation of Tiglath-pileser 
III‘s ʻBabylonian policyʼ which, though subject to some revision in later periods67, continued to be 
applied by successive Assyrian kings who were, each in turn, also confronted with the problem of 
how to rule Babylonia (see Brinkman 1973).  
 
                                                 
66
  Annexation demanded some form of military presence to ensure that control could be adequately maintained over 
the subjugated state or territory. 
67
 For the further development of this policy under Esarhaddon, see Porter (1993).  
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Tiglath-pileser III‘s Babylonian policy, and the events which led to the adoption of this policy in 
Babylonia, form the basis of the discussion presented in this chapter. Following an overview of the 
political landscape of Babylonia and the historical sources available for this period, this chapter 
leads into a discussion of the chronology of Tiglath-pileser‘s Babylonian campaigns and the 
objectives and methods of Assyrian imperial policy in Babylonia during this period. 
 
4.2 Terminology 
 
The number of different geographical terms used to refer to Babylonia such as ―Chaldea‖, ―Akkad‖, 
―Karduniash‖, and the ―Sealand‖ is sometimes cited as evidence for a lack of political unity in 
Babylonia in the Neo-Assyrian period (see Frame 1992b, p. 33), yet the meanings of these terms are 
not entirely clear from the sources and some were clearly in use long after the political boundaries 
defined by the original geographical term ceased to be in existence, probably because the 
terminology had become customary or even prestigious. The term ‗Karduniash‘, for example, was 
the Old Kassite term for Babylonia which continued in use as the standard term for Babylonia after 
the fall of the Kassite dynasty. Babylonia is also referred to in the Assyrian sources as ‗Akkad‘, the 
term traditionally used to denote the northern part of Babylonia, as well as the city of the same 
name
68
, and it is not known whether the Assyrian sources of our period intended this to mean 
Babylonia as a whole or just the northern area of Babylonia, as the name traditionally suggests. The 
alternating use of these terms in the Synchronistic History suggests that confusion may have existed 
in the precise geographical/political boundaries defined by each term. For the reign of Ashur-bel-
kala, a treaty established between Assyria and Babylonia is recognised through the statement ―the 
peoples of Assyria and Karduniash were joined together‖ (nišūmeš kurAššur kurKar-du-ni-á[š] it-ti a-
ḫa-meš i[b]-ba-[lu]) (Grayson 1975, No. 21, (ii) 36‘-37‘), while for the reign of Adad-nirari II, the 
same phrase is used but replaces ‗Karduniash‘ with ‗Akkad‘,  stating ―the peoples of Assyria and 
                                                 
68
    The location of this city is widely debated. For a summary of this debate, see Porter (1993, n. 141).   
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Akkad were joined together‖ ([nišū]me[š kurAš]-šur kurAkkadîki  it-ti a-ḫa-meš ib-ba-[al-lu] (Grayson 
1975, No. 21, (iii) 19). By the reign of Shalmaneser III it is clear that the original 
geographical/political boundaries meant by the use of each term had been lost where scribes worded 
a similar treaty between Assyria and Babylonia as follows: ―the peoples of Assyria and 
Karduniash/Akkad were joined together (nišūmeš kurAššur kurKar-du-ni-áš Ak-kadîki it-ti a-ḫa-meš) 
(Grayson 1975, No. 21, (iii) 3‘).  
 
Though the term ‗Akkad‘ for Babylonia became increasingly popular in usage during the reigns of 
his successors
69
, Tiglath-pileser‘s inscriptions only use the traditional term for Babylonia  
‗Karduniash‘ to refer to this geographical area70. The term ‗Akkad‘ is only attested in Tiglath-
pileser's adoption of the traditional royal title ―King of Sumer and Akkad‖ used to denote his 
ascension of the Babylonian throne
71. In The Babylonian Chronicle the term ‗Akkad‘ is used to 
indicate Babylonia, while The Eponym Chronicle refers to this geographical area simply as birīt 
nāri ‗Mesopotamia‘ (Millard 1994, p. 43)72. Though the ARI further distinguish ‗Chaldea‘ as 
forming a separate political/geographical entity from that territory occupied by the principal 
Babylonian city-states, Tiglath-pileser‘s statement that he ―ruled over the extensive land of 
                                                 
69
 Note also that the term ‗Karduniash‘ is not used in any of the private correspondence of the reigns of Sargon and  
 Sennacherib (Dietrich 2003, p. 199), and that the preference for the term ‗Akkad‘ over ‗Karduniash‘ is common  
 in works pertaining to Assyrian and Babylonian scholars of the later Neo-Assyrian period (see Parpola 1993, p.  
 377). 
70
 See the following texts in Tadmor and Yamada (2011): No. 39, 14 (Summary Inscription 1); No. 40, 1 (Summary    
Inscription 2); No. 41, 3 (Summary Inscription 3); No. 47, 12 (Summary Inscription 7); No. 51, 11 (Summary    
 Inscription 11); No. 5, 7 (Annal 9). 
71
 See the following texts in Tadmor and Yamada (2011): No. 39, 1 (Summary Inscription 1); No. 40,2 (Summary  
  Inscription 2); No. 47, 1 (Summary Inscription 7); No. 51:1 (Summary Inscription 11); No. 52, 1 (Summary    
  Inscription 12); No. 35, i 26 (Iran Stele). 
72
  The term birīt nāri literally means ―region enclosed by river(s)‖ (Black et. al. 2000, p. 45). 
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[Kardu]niash (Babylonia) and exercised kingship over it‖ (Tadmor and Yamada (2011, No. 51, 11, 
p. 136) would seem to suggest that Chaldea was also included in the geographical area defined as 
‗Babylonia‘ here, since Chaldeans are also said in the same inscription to have offered tribute and 
thus to have been subject to Assyrian sovereignty during this period
73
. Thus, while we are not 
always certain of the precise geographical/political limits of the areas denoted by geographical 
terms used in the Assyrian sources of this period, it must be acknowledged that most terms probably 
do not refer to the entire geographical limits of the area which we define today as ancient 
‗Babylonia‘.  
 
4.3 Babylonian Population Groups 
 
Babylonia during the 8
th
 century BC was comprised of a number of different population groups 
including an older ―Babylonian‖74 population, as well as Chaldeans and Aramaeans which formed 
the dominant tribal groups
75
. The older Babylonian population resided almost exclusively in the 
                                                 
73
   Note, however, that Tiglath-pileser did not receive tribute from all of the Chaldean tribes at this time, suggesting    
   that several tribes continued to retain their autonomy for a time. This issue is discussed further below in 4.5.3.  
74
  The term ―Babylonian‖ is used here to denote the population descended from past inhabitants of Babylonia     
  including Sumerians, Akkadians, Kassites and Amorites, following Brinkman (1984, p. 11) and is preferred here   
  over the term ―Akkadians‖ used by Cole (1996) to denote the same population group.  
75
  The foremost work on the population of Babylonia, especially the Chaldean and Aramaean tribal groups, is still   
   Brinkmanʼs work, A Political History of Post-Kassite Babylonia. Dietrich‘s work, Die Aramäer südbabyloniens   
   in der Sargonidenzeit, also provides a thorough discussion of these groups, however, some of his conclusions   
   have been heavily criticised by Brinkman (1977, pp. 304-25). A discussion of Babylonia‘s population groups  
   can also be found in Frame‘s work on Babyloniaʼs political history in the later Neo-Assyrian period (1992b, p.  
   32 ff.) and in Porterʼs work on Esarhaddonʼs Babylonian policy (1993, pp. 32 ff.) . Note that it is unclear whether    
    Arabs were present in Babylonia at this time and the date of their penetration of Babylonia remains a contentious   
    issue in scholarship which is outside of the scope of this study. For this see the works of Cole (1996, p. 34) and    
    Ephʿal (1974).     
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urban centres, especially the traditional cult-centres. These centres had traditionally fallen under the 
authority of the Babylonian king, forming provinces with many administered directly by governors 
answerable only to the king (Brinkman 1984, pp. 16-17; 1968, pp. 296-311). However, from the 
middle of the 9
th
 century the Babylonian monarchy, with its capital based in Babylon, shows 
significant evidence of decline. The Babylonian throne fell into the hands of a number of kings who 
each followed one another in relatively quick succession and were not related through a common 
blood line
76
, and there are recorded instances of civil disturbances in some of the major cities during 
this period. Immediately prior to the reign of Tiglath-pileser III civil unrest and discord is noted in 
Babylonia under the reign of Nabu-shuma-ishkun (760-748), a Chaldean of the Bit-Dakkuri tribe
77
, 
and under Nabu-nasir (748-734 BC) despite the long duration of these kings‘ reigns78. The extent to 
which the Babylonian government was able to retain control over the Babylonian city-states at this 
time is not known, though it has been suggested that some of the more powerful city-states enjoyed 
greater autonomy during this period (Brinkman 1984, p. 16)
79
.  
                                                 
76
  The only known exception to this is the succession of Nabu-nasir (Nabonasser) to the throne in 734 BC   
  following the reign of his father, Nabu-nadin-zeri. There are very few documents attributed to the reigns of   
  these kings. For a further discussion of this, see Brinkman (1968, pp. 213-216).  
77
 A clay cylinder inscription from Nabu-shuma-ishkun‘s reign reports on a civil disturbance in Borsippa where  
  fighting had erupted within the city after the Borsippa‘s rich fields were set upon by Chaldeans, Aramaeans,    
  Babylonians and Dilbatians. It is interesting to note that the text credits the governor of Borsippa, Nabu-shuma- 
  imbi, with putting down the disturbance and not the Babylonian king (see Frame 1992a, pp. 123-126). Civil  
  unrest also prevented the akitu New Year festival from taking place during Nabu-shuma-ishkun‘s fifth and sixth  
  regal years. According to a later text, Nabu-shuma-ishkun‘s reign was not a popular one and he is charged with  
  denying the major cult centres of Babylon, Borsippa and Kutha their traditional kidinnu privileges (see Frame  
  1992a, Nos. 8-11, p. 120).         
78
  In 746 BC, the year immediately preceding Tiglath-pileser‘s first Babylonian campaign, there was no akītu  
   festival held in Babylonia (Grayson 1975, 1: 1*, p. 70) and in 744 BC Nabu-nasir was forced to launch a  
  campaign against Borsippa which had ―committed hostile acts against Babylon‖ (Grayson 1975 1: 6-8, p. 71).  
79
  Local officials of some Babylonian city-states credited themselves, not the king, with repairs to temples, a task  
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‗Chaldeans‘ are first attested in an Assyrian inscription pertaining to Ashur-nasirpal II which dates 
to 878 BC (Brinkman 1968, p. 260; Frame 2013, p. 97), and from this date appear relatively 
frequently in accounts of the campaigns of the Assyrian kings to Babylonia. However, despite the 
use of a single term in the Assyrian records to describe this tribal group, the Chaldaeans were not 
one cohesive population group, but consisting of a number of different tribal groups each inhabiting 
different geographical areas in Babylonia. During our period, the largest ones were Bīt-Amukāni, 
Bīt-Dakūri, and Bīt-Yakin, followed by the two smaller tribal units of Bīt-Ša’alli and Bīt-Šilāni80. In 
general, the Chaldeans had settled principally along the lower Euphrates river system in parts of 
south-western and south-central Babylonia (Brinkman 1968; 1977, p. 306; Frame 2013, pp. 102-
103) and their occupation of this area allowed them to prosper by controlling the trade routes that 
                                                                                                                                                                  
  traditionally reserved only for the king (Brinkman 1968, n. 1928,  p. 295), and in Nippur, one of the more  
  prominent Babylonian city-states, a number of private letters from the so-called ―Governor‘s Archive‖ suggests  
  that Nippur enjoyed a high degree of independence from centralised Babylonian rule during this period. A  
  majority of the letters from the archive concern the correspondence of one Kudurru, identified by Cole as the  
  šandabakku or governor of Nippur on the basis of his great political influence (1996, p. 6). In one letter,  
  Kudurru has been charged with carrying out repairs for the city of Dēr, in which he appears to have shared the  
  responsibility with another official, and there is confusion over who should carry out the repairs (Cole 1996,  
  No. 33, pp. 97-99). In another letter, Kudurru requests aid from Mukin-zeri in the recovery of four men and    
  five donkeys stolen by a patrol from Bit-Yakin. Kudurru refers to a treaty that existed between Mukin-zeri and   
  the leader of Bit-Yakin and in asking for help confirms that friendly relations also existed between Mukin-zeri   
  and Nippur at this time (Cole 1996, No. 18, pp. 72-73). Elsewhere in another letter from the same collection, a  
  treaty between Nippur and Mukin-zeri and the Rubu‘ tribe is referred to concerning compensation over the theft  
  of slaves and other property matters (Cole 1996, No. 6, pp. 48-50). In addition to providing evidence of the  
  political autonomy of Nippur during this period, these letters suggest that highly successful network of alliances  
  and political relations existed between the diverse population groups of Babylonia. 
80
  Note that the tribe of Bit-Shilani is known only from the reign of Tiglath-pileser III, while Bit Sha‘alli also  
  appears later in the annals of Sennacherib (see Luckenbill 1927, No. V.II. 261, p. 131). 
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ran from the Persian Gulf along the Euphrates River (Brinkman 1984, p. 15; Frame 2013, p. 103). 
The Bit-Dakkuri tribe are thought to have occupied territory south of Babylon along the Euphrates 
River, while further south, the Bit-Amukkani tribe occupied territory around Uruk
81
. The Bit-Yakin 
tribe occupied the southernmost limits of Babylonia, holding territory situated around the city of Ur 
and in the southern marshlands of the Persian Gulf region
82
. The extent to which the Chaldean 
tribes exercised independence from the Babylonian city-states is not known with any degree of 
certainty. Brinkman has asserted that the Chaldean population do not appear to have come under 
Babylonian provincial rule (1984, p. 19). However, the only conclusive evidence of this comes from 
the reign of Shamshi-Adad V, when the Babylonian king, Marduk-balassu-iqbi, summoned an 
alliance of forces from Chaldea, Aram, Elam, and Namri against Assyria in 814 BC (Grayson 1996, 
A.0.103.1: iv 37-45, pp. 187-188), and it is not known whether such independence also existed in 
other periods.  
 
While the Assyrian sources tend to emphasis the social divisions between the different groups in 
Babylonian society at this time, there is significant evidence for an acculturation of the tribal groups 
into Babylonian society by the middle of the 8
th
 century. Despite the apparent tribal structure of the 
Chaldean population group, the Chaldeans were a predominantly sedentary population by the 8
th
 
century, occupying cities and towns within their defined territories and residing in some of the 
larger Babylonian urban centres such as Nippur and Babylon (Brinkman 1984, n. 73, p. 18). It is 
also clear that by this time a significant portion of the Chaldean population had integrated 
                                                 
81
  For a discussion of the territories occupied by the Chaldean tribal groups, see Brinkman (1968; 1977) and Frame  
  (1992b, pp. 32 ff.; 2013, pp. 102-103).  
82
 Note that the location of the ―Sealand‖ and its extent is debated among scholars. Sargon‘s statement that this tribe 
occupied territory ―on the shore of the sea as far as the border of Dilmun‖(Luckenbill 1927, No. II, V 98, p.  
 50) suggests Bit-Yakin‘s territory extended into parts of the Arabian peninsula. Note Frame‘s reservations,    
 however, on the geographical extent of the territory claimed by Sargon (1992b, pp. 40-41).   
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themselves into Babylonian cities, where many had even adopted Babylonian names and settled on 
lands around the major Babylonian urban centres (Brinkman 1984, p. 15; Frame 1992b, p. 37; 
2013, p. 109). A number of Chaldeans had even ascended the Babylonian throne and come to rule 
Babylonia in their own right. Eriba-Marduk (-760) of the Bīt-Jakin tribe was one such Chaldean 
king who ascended the Babylonian throne in the years prior to Tiglath-pileser‘s invasion of 
Babylonia. The date of his accession is uncertain
83
, but he is known to have ruled over Babylonia 
for at least nine years with a maximum terminus date of 760 BC (Brinkman 1968, n. 1384 and p. 
221). Though Eriba-Marduk was a Chaldean, there is good evidence to suggest that his reign was 
nonetheless accepted by the Babylonians
84
. He performed all of the traditional duties of Babylonian 
kingship: he participated in the annual New Year akītu festival where he ―took the hands of Marduk 
and Nabu‖ (Brinkman 1968, n. 1394 and p. 222), initiated a building program to expand the Nana 
shrine in the Eanna complex at Uruk (Brinkman 1968, n. 1392 and p. 222), and resisted the 
encroachment of Aramaeans onto the land of citizens from Babylon and Borsippa (Brinkman 1968, 
n. 1398 and p. 223)
85
.  
                                                 
83
 The length of Eriba-Marduk‘s reign remains uncertain. However, the latest date for the termination of his rule  
  has been identified by Brinkman as 760 BC (1968, p. 221). 
84
  Frame (2013, p. 104) credits the acceptance of his legitimacy to an absence of a strong royal bloodline in Babylonia 
at this time. However, it is possible that the divide between the Chaldean and local Babylonian population so often 
stressed in the ARI was an Assyrian construct which did not reflect the reality of Babylonia‘s political life. Since the 
ARI were composed chiefly for the gods, the maintenance of a distinction between these groups might have served 
to legitimise Assyrian military action against Babylonia by stressing the preservation of the sanctity of the major cult 
centres, which were largely inhabited by the local Babylonian population. The discovery of more evidence in the 
future may reveal that Chaldean rulers were actually viewed with a sense of legitimacy by Babylonian society and 
gained widespread support from the ruling classes. While it has often been asked how rulers from the major tribal 
groups came to sit on the Babylonian throne, of more importance perhaps, is the question of why Assyria was so 
keen to have them removed from this office. 
85
   Note Frameʼs (2013, p. 104) assertion here that Chaldean kings only appear in Babylonia during a period of relative      
      weakness in Assyria. 
52 
 
 
Aramaeans represent a further tribal group active in Babylonia during our period, which are thought 
to have arrived earlier in Babylonia than their Chaldean counterparts, from at least the end of the 
twelfth century (Frame 2013, p. 90; see also Brinkman 1984, n. 46, pp. 12-13)
86
. Tiglath-pileser 
III‘s inscriptions attest to the presence of at least thirty-five Aramaean tribes in Babylonia during the 
middle of the 8
th
 century, including the Itu‘u, Rubu‘u, Hamrani, Luhuatu, Hatallu, Rubbu, Rapiqu, 
Hiranu, Rabilu, Naṣiru, Gulusu, Nabatu, Rahiqu, Kapiri, Rummulutu, Adilê, Kipre, Ubudu, 
Gurumu, Hudadu, Hindiru, Damanu, Dunanu, Nilqu, Rade, Ubulu, Karma‘u, Amlatu, Ru‘ua, 
Qabi‘i, Li‘tau, Marasu, Amatu, Hagaranu (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 47, 5-8, p. 118)87 and 
Puqudu (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 47, 13, p. 118). Tiglath-pileserʼs inscriptions situate these 
tribes along the major river systems of the Tigris, Euphrates and Surappi rivers (Tadmor and 
Yamada 2011, No. 47, 9, p. 118)
88
. Though many Aramaeans lived a non-sedentary lifestyle as 
pastoralists, some had begun to settle by the start of the 8
th
 century (Brinkman 1968, p. 281; Frame 
2013, pp. 90-91), with many settlements located to the east along the border with Elam (Frame 
2013, p. 91). Tiglath-pileser‘s inscriptions identify several Aramaean towns and note that some were 
even fortified (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 47, 8, p. 118). In general, references to Aramaeans in 
                                                 
86
  The origin of these tribes is unknown. However, for a discussion of the various theories  
 surrounding their origins, see Brinkman (1968, pp. 282-3).    
87
 Note that the names of Aramaean tribes are also given in texts 5 (Annal 9), 39 (Summary  
 Inscription 1), 40 (Summary Inscription 2), 46 (Summary Inscription 6) and 51 (Summary  
 Inscription 11) (Tadmor and Yamada 2011). Text  no. 47 (Summary inscription 7) provides the most  
 comprehensive list of Aramaean tribes and hence has been quoted here.     
88
 Note Frame‘s reservation that this reference in Tiglath-pileser‘s inscriptions to the location of Aramaean tribal 
groups in Babylonia is far too general for certain identification, particularly considering that the water courses 
followed by these river systems is far from certain (2013, p. 89). Frame further points out that pinpointing the exact 
territory occupied by some of Babylonia‘s tribal groups is also made difficult by the seasonal migrations of many of 
these tribes (2013, p.88). Some tribal groups, however, can be geographically placed with some degree of accuracy 
in this period. For this, see Frame (2013, pp. 94-96). 
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Assyrian and Babylonian sources are negative. Here, they are frequently referred to looting 
caravans, engaging in theft and occupying agricultural lands belonging to some of the citizens of 
major cities in Babylonia (see Frame 2013, pp. 92-94).   
 
4.4. The Written Evidence 
 
The sources utilised in this chapter include the ARI, the Eponym Chronicle, the Synchronistic 
History, the Babylonian Chronicle, and Assyrian and Babylonian letters. The Assyrian letters, 
known as the ―Nimrud letters‖, represent correspondence between Tiglath-pileser III and his 
officials stationed in Babylonia during the final few years of Tiglath-pileser‘s reign. New 
translations of relevant letters have been provided below.  
4.4.1 The ARI  
 
The Assyrian royal inscriptions remain our most important source of information for the reign of 
Tiglath-pileser III. The poor preservation of these texts and the historiographical issues surrounding 
their interpretation have already been discussed in Chapter 2, and there is no need to reiterate this 
here. Pertaining to Tiglath-pileser‘s campaigns against Babylonia, only one complete annalistic text 
(No. 5/Annal 9) has survived and this relates to the first campaign against Babylonia in 745 BC 
(Tadmor and Yamada 2011, pp. 26-28). Fragments of several other annalistic texts have survived 
(No. 23/Annal 7 and No. 24/Annal 8) covering Tiglath-pileser‘s later campaign or campaigns 
against Babylonia, but these are too poorly preserved to give significant information. A number of 
summary inscriptions (No. 39/Summary Inscription 1, No. 40/Summary Inscription 2, No. 
46/Summary Inscription 6, No. 47/Summary Inscription 7, No. 51/Summary Inscription 11, No. 
52/Summary Inscription 12, and No. 45/Summary Inscription 14 (Tadmor and Yamada 2011) 
provide a detailed overview of Tiglath-pileser‘s campaigns against Babylonia, but these texts are 
arranged geographically and thus provide little chronological information. The following table 
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presents a comparison of the narratives contained in each of the summary inscriptions. For these 
texts, see Tadmor and Yamada (2011). 
 
Table 5 – A Comparison of the Babylonian Campaigns in the Summary Inscriptions 
 
Text No. 39  
(Summary 
Inscription 1) 
Text No. 40 
(Summary 
Inscription 2) 
Text No. 46 
(Summary  
Inscription 6) 
Text No. 47 
(Summary  
Inscription 7) 
Text No. 51 
(Summary  
Inscription 11) 
Subjugation of 
Aramaean tribes 
along banks of the 
Tigris and 
Surappi rivers up 
to the river Uqnu. 
Dur-Kurigalzu, 
Sippar, Pasitu of 
the Dunanu tribe, 
as far as Nippur, 
the Itu‘u and 
Rubu‘u tribes 
captured. 
Subjugation of 
Aramaean tribes 
along the banks of 
the Tigris, 
Euphrates and 
Surappi rivers up to 
the Uqnu river by 
the shore of the 
Lower Sea. 
Captured were the 
tribes of Itu‘u, 
Rubu‘u, Hamarani, 
Luhuatu, Puqudu, 
Nabatu, Hindiru, 
Li‘tau, Marusu. 
Annexation of 
tribes to Assyria. 
Subjugation of 
Aramaean tribes 
along the banks of 
the Tigris and 
Euphrates including 
the tribes of Hatallu 
and the land of 
Labduba. Annexation 
of tribes to Assyria. 
Subjugation of 
Aramaean tribes 
along the banks of 
the Tigris, Euphrates 
and Surappi rivers up 
to the Uqnu river by 
the shore of the 
Lower Sea. Captured 
were the tribes of 
Itu‘u, Rubu‘u, 
Hamarani, Luhuatu, 
Hatallu, Rubbu, 
Rapiqu, Hiranu, 
Rabilu, Nasiru, 
Gulusu, Nabatu, 
Rahiqu, Kapiri 
Rummulutu, Adile, 
Kipre, Ubudu, 
Gurumu, Hudadu, 
Hindiru, Damunu, 
Dunanu, Nilqu, 
Rade, Da…[…]…, 
Ubulu, Karma‘u, 
Amlatu, Ru‘ua, 
Qabi‘i, Li‘tau, 
Marusu, Amatu, 
Hagaranu, the cities 
Dur-Kurigalzu, and 
Adini, and the 
fortresses of Saragiti, 
Labbanat, and Kar-
Bel-matati. 
Annexation of tribes 
to Assyria. 
Subjugation of 
Aramaean tribes along 
the banks of the Tigris, 
Euphrates and Surappi 
rivers up to the Uqnu 
river by the shore of 
the Lower Sea. The 
Itu‘u, Rubu‘u, 
Hamarani, Luhuatu, 
Hatallu, Rubbu, 
Rapiqu, Nabatu, 
Gurumu, Dananu, 
Ubulu, Ru‘ua, Li‘tau, 
Marusu, the cities Dur-
Kurigalzu and Adini, 
and the fortresses of 
Saragiti and Labbanat 
captured. 
Building of Kar-
Assur. Annexation 
of Aramaean 
tribes to Assyria. 
Defeat of Bit-
Shilani and Bit-
Sha‘alli. 
Destruction of the 
cities of Sarrabanu 
and Dur-Balihaya. 
Deportation of 
people to Assyria. 
Building of Kar- 
Assur. 
Building of Kar-
Assur. 
Establishment of cult 
centres in Sippar, 
Nippur, Babylon, 
Borsippa, Cutha, Kish, 
Dilbat, Uruk. 
Conquering of 
Bit-Shalani 
(destruction of 
Sarrabanu and the 
defeat of its king 
Nabu-ushabshi) 
and Bit-
Entering of 
Babylon. Offering 
of sacrifices to 
Marduk. 
Declaration of 
sovereignty over 
Babylon. 
Subjugation of the 
Nasiku and Naqru 
tribes from Dur-
Kurigalzu, Sippar of 
Shamash and the 
Shumandar canal. 
Offering of sacrifices 
in Sippur, Nippur, 
Babylon, Borsippa, 
Cutha, Kish, Dilbat, 
and Uruk.  
Offering of sacrifices 
and gifts to Bel, 
Zarpanitu, Nabu, 
Tashmetu, Nergal and 
Las.  
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Amukkani. 
Defeat of the 
Puqudu, Ru‘ua 
and Li‘tau tribes 
and their 
deportation. 
Tribute imposed on 
the land of 
Chaldea. 
 The defeat of the 
Puqudu tribe and the 
capture of the cities 
of Lahiru of 
Idibirina, Hilimmu, 
and Pillutu on the 
border of Elam. 
Annexation of tribes 
to Assyria. 
Destruction of Bit-
Shilani and Bit-
Sha‘alli, and the 
capture of their kings 
Nabu-ushabshi and 
Zaqiru. The capture of 
their royal cities: 
Sarrabanu, Tarbasu, 
Yaballu, Dur-Balihaya, 
Malilatu, and the 
deportation of 
inhabitants.  
The offering of 
sacrifices to 
Assur, Sheru‘a, 
Nabu, Tashmetu, 
Nanay the Lady 
of Babylon, 
Nergal, and Las in 
Hursag-
kalamma
89
.   
  Capture of Sarrabanu 
and its king Nabu-
ushabsi of Bit-
Shalani.  
Defeat of Bit-
Amukkani and the 
siege of Mukin-zeri in 
Shapiya.  
 
 
 
  Capture of the cities 
of Tarbasu and 
Yaballu. 
Conquest of Hilimmu 
and Pillutu on the 
border of Elam.   
 
 
 
  Zaqiru is captured 
after joining a 
rebellion. The city of 
Dur-Balihaya is 
captured and the land 
of Bit-Sha‘alli 
devastated. 
Annexation of Bit-
Shalani and Bit-
Sha‘alli to Assyria. 
Receiving of tribute 
from Merodach-
baladan of Bit-Yakin. 
   Defeat of Bit-
Amukkani and the 
siege of Mukin-zeri 
in Shapiya. 
 
 
 
  Receiving of tribute 
from Balasu of Bit-
Dakkuri, Nadini of 
Larak, and 
Merodach-baladan of 
Bit-Yakin.  
 
 
As Table 5 shows, there was no set order in which the events pertaining to the Babylonian 
campaigns were recounted in the summary inscriptions. In text No. 39, the conquest of Sarrabanu 
and the defeat of Nabu-ushabshi is described before the subjugation and deportation of the Puqudu, 
Ru‘ua and Li‘tau tribes, whereas text No. 47 describes the capture of Sarrabanu and Nabu-ushabshi 
after the conquest of the Puqudu, Ru‘ua and Li‘tau tribes. This suggests that the chronological 
                                                 
89
   An eastern district of the city of Kish (Tadmor 1994, n. 16, p. 124).  
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sequence of events was not the foremost concern of scribes composing these inscriptions. 
Moreover, there is great variation in the episodes selected. The inclusion of the building of Kar-
Assur, for example, is only included in text No. 39,46 and 47, whereas text No. 40 and 51 omit any 
reference to this building work. This suggests that scribes may have employed some discretion in 
the choice of events chosen for inclusion here.  
 
4.4.2 The Eponym Chronicle 
 
The Eponym Chronicle, discussed in length in Chapter 2, records two campaigns against Babylonia 
during this period. The first was carried out in 745 BC, where the event entry reads ―In the month 
Ayyāru, on the thirteenth day, [Tiglat]h-pileser (III) ascended the throne. [In the month T]ašrītu, he 
marched to the (land) Between the River(s)‖. A further campaign is noted in 731 BC where the 
event entry records ―to Šapiya‖ (Millard 1994, p. 59; Tadmor and Yamada 2011, p. 17)90. It is 
possible that the second campaign to Babylonia lasted longer than a single campaign season, 
traditionally carried out only in the summer months, and saw the Assyrian army situated in 
Babylonia until the following year when further military operations were carried out.    
 
4.4.3 The Babylonian Chronicle 
 
For Tiglath-pileser‘s first campaign to Babylonia in 745 BC, the Babylonian Chronicle records that 
(Tiglath-pileser) ―went down to Akkad, plundered Rabbilu and Hamranu, and abducted the gods of 
Shapazza‖ (Grayson, (1975), No. 1, 3-5, p. 71). The chronicle goes on to provide information 
concerning the political turmoil which accompanied Nabu-nasir‘s death in 734 BC and led to 
Mukin-zeri claiming kingship over Babylonia. For Tiglath-pileser‘s second campaign, the chronicle 
notes that ―The third year of Mukin-zeri: When Tiglath-pileser had gone down to Akkad he ravaged 
                                                 
90
 Šapiya was a city located in southern Babylonia and the capital of Mukin-zeri, the leader of the Bit-Amukkani tribe. 
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Bit-Amukkanu and captured Mukin-zeri. For three years Mukin-zeri ruled Babylon. Tiglath-pileser 
ascended the throne in Babylon‖ (Grayson 1975, No. 1, 19-23, p. 72).   
 
4.4.4 The Nimrud Letters  
  
Letters comprise a further written source that may illuminate the political and military events taking 
place within Babylonia during the period under consideration here. Although revised translations of 
these letters have recently been published by Luukko (2012), there is good reason to present a 
further revision of Saggs‘ original transliterations/translations, particularly where Luukko was not 
able to access the original cuneiform texts or a clear reading of the cuneiform is not possible due to 
damage sustained by the text. The decision to only include revised transliterations and translations 
of eight letters here in Appendix A was based largely on the problem of dating the letters assigned 
by Saggs (2001) and Luukko (2012) to the reign of Tiglath-pileser III. Although these studies 
include a large number of letters dated to the reign of Tiglath-pileser III, it must be pointed out that 
the dating of many of these letters is not assured. The assigning of letters to this corpus was largely 
carried out on the basis of letter‘s content or on the basis of the letterʼs sender, if this was a 
particularly well-known official (see Saggs 2001, pp. 9-11; Luukko (2012). However, many of the 
letters are missing the name of the sender or contain the names of officials who often served under 
more than one Assyrian king and whose chronological context cannot be firmly established, making 
this method problematic. Aside from ND 2602 and ND 2365, whose dating is less assured, all other 
letters included here can be firmly dated to the reign of Tiglath-pileser III. Letter ND 2385 describes 
the final defeat of Mukin-zeri and can be firmly dated to the reign of Tiglath-pileser III. The defeat 
of Mukin-zeri is reported in Tiglath-pileserʼs annals (text No. 47, obv. 23 and text No. 51, 16), as 
well as the Eponym (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, p. 18) and Babylonian chronicles (Grayson 1975, 
p. 72) which date this event to the accession of Tiglath-pileser III to the Babylonian throne (729 
BC). Reference in letters ND 2632, ND 2717, ND 2700, ND 2603, ND 2674, ND 2385 to Mukin-
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zeri enable us to firmly date these letters to the reign of Tiglath-pileser III on this basis. The dating 
of ND 2602 and ND 2365 is more problematic. The sender of ND 2602 was Aššur-šallimanni, the 
governor of Arrapha during this period according to the Eponym Chronicle for the year 735 BC 
(Tadmor and Yamada 2011, p. 17).
 However, Aššur-šallimanni held this post late in Tiglath-pileser‘s 
reign and we have no idea if his career carried on into the reign of Shalmaneser V, thus making the 
date of this letter less assured. ND2602 is therefore dated to this period largely on the basis of the 
letterʼs content, which describe hostilities with the Bit-Amukkani tribe. ND 2365 refers to Balasu, 
the leader of the Bit-Dakkuri tribe during the reign of Tiglath-pileser III. However, the dating of this 
letter is not assured on this basis, since later letters also attest to a high-ranking Babylonian of the 
same name during the reign of Sargon II (see Radner 1999, p. 256). The sender of the letter, Ašipa, 
was also governor of a northern province during the reign of Sargon II, further suggesting that some 
caution needs to be exercised in utilising this letter.    
 
Although fragmentary, the letters discovered at Nimrud for this period give us a rare insight into 
what must have been the reality of Tiglath-pileser‘s second campaign to Babylonia.  
The image portrayed in the ARI of the smashing defeat of Mukin-zeri and the Chaldean forces 
shows remarkable differences from the reports of these military operations provided in the Assyrian 
letters. Here, Assyrian efforts to secure the defeat of Mukin-zeri and his allies are carried out 
through a combination of military operations and diplomatic efforts to secure the political and 
military support of the Babylonian city-states against Mukin-zeri. Nimrud Letter 1, which describes 
a tense situation between the inhabitants of Babylon who have barricaded themselves inside the city 
walls and the Assyrian envoys who are attempting to negotiate for the city‘s surrender, provides 
effective evidence for the non-aggressive policy pursued by Tiglath-pileser III with regard to the 
Babylonian city-states. When the Assyrian envoys‘ offer to restore the Babylonians‘ kidinnūtu status 
in return for their submission is refused, the Assyrian envoys return and repeat their offer for the 
submission of the city, lamenting to the king that they could do nothing but return to the city and 
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make their plea again to the Babylonian citizens. Letter 2 describes further efforts by Mukin-zeri to 
secure the support of the citizens of Babylonia against Assyria, and we are told that the Itua‘ tribe 
has sided with Mukin-zeri in the conflict, while the Larakeans are firmly placed against Mukin-zeri. 
Letter 6 reports on the final defeat and death of Mukin-zeri, but indicates that Merodach-baladan of 
the Bit Yakin tribe may have been cooperating with the Assyrians during this period
91
. The omission 
of these events from the annals suggests that they occurred relatively late in Tiglath-pileser‘s reign, 
certainly after the summary inscriptions were composed which deal only with events up to 729 
BC
92
. The chronological implication of this letter is that Tiglath-pileser had yet to secure the final 
defeat of Mukin-zeri when he officially ascended the Babylonian throne.  
 
While the Nimrud letters have an important role to play in reconstructing the nature of Assyria‘s 
military and political involvement in Babylonia during this period, it is important not to draw far-
reaching conclusions not substantiated by other sources. SAA 19 82 (a letter not translated here), for 
example, reports on the movements of the King of Elam around Der and is cited by Luuko (2012, p. 
XXIX) as evidence of Assyria‘s strategy to block Elam from providing Mukin-zeri with any 
military aid against Tiglath-pileser‘s forces in Babylonia. While the content of the letter suggests 
that the Elamite king‘s movements are related to some military manoeuvre, there is nothing in the 
letter to connect these events with the Mukin-zeri rebellion, or indeed with events in Babylonia. The 
area around Der is well-known for being a contested area which held strategic and economic value 
to Assyria, Babylonia and Elam. That the events described in SAA 19 82 should be connected with 
events which transpired in Babylonia around 731 BC by Luukko (2012, p. XXIX) goes far beyond 
the evidence, not only because the letter contains no reference to Mukin-zeri, but also because the 
                                                 
91
  This is not surprising given that Bit-Yakin is recorded as having paid tribute in the ARI.  
92
  Tadmor plausibly dates all of the summary inscriptions, aside from text No. 39/Summary Inscription 1, to the same 
year on the basis of the use of the formula ―from the beginning of my reign until my seventeenth palû‖ (1994, pp. 
269-272 (Supplementary Study E).  
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letter can only be assigned an approximate date.     
 
 
4.5 The Chronology of Tiglath-pileser‘s Babylonian Campaigns 
 
The most recent comprehensive chronology of Tiglath-pileser‘s Babylonian campaigns is that 
proposed by Tadmor in Supplementary Study A in The Inscriptions of Tiglath-pileser III: King of 
Assyria (1994, pp. 232-7). Tadmor‘s reconstruction of the events pertaining to Tiglath-pileser‘s 
Babylonian campaigns is reproduced in the table below: 
 
Table 6 –A Reconstruction of the Babylonian Campaigns according to Tadmor (1996) 
Date Sources Main Event 
745 BC Eponym Chronicle 
No. 5, 7 (Annal 9-10) 
No. 35, i 36-4‘ (The Iran 
Stele) 
―Campaign into northern and eastern Babylonia; defeat of the Aramean 
tribes near Dur-Kurigalzu east of the Tigris as far as the Uqnu river; 
their deportation to the north-eastern provinces‖ 
738 BC No. 13, 13-18 (Annal 19) ―Capture of several Aramaean tribes located across the Tigris river and 
their deportation to Syria‖93 
731 BC Eponym Chronicle 
No. 23 (Annal 7)  
No. 24 (Annal 8) 
―Defeat of the Chaldaean chieftains of central and southern Babylonia; 
siege of Shapiya‖  
729 BC Eponym Chronicle 
The Babylonian Chronicle 
―Defeat of (Nabu)-Mukin-zeri, king of Babylonia; Tiglath-pileser 
ascends the Babylonian throne and participates in the akītu festival 
during Nisan (of the Babylonian year 728).‖ 
728 Eponym Chronicle ―Tiglath-pileser participates in the akītu festival during Nisan (of the 
Babylonian year 727).‖ 
 
The dates proposed above by Tadmor for Assyria‘s intervention in Babylonia during the reign of 
                                                 
93
  Tadmor and Yamada (2011, pp. 43-44). 
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Tiglath-pileser III are based on chronological data obtained from the Eponym and Babylonian 
chronicles, and can therefore be considered accurate.  
 
4.5.1 The Campaign of 745 BC 
 
The date and time of year of Tiglath-pileser III‘s first Babylonian campaign is well-established.  The 
Eponym Chronicle provides a precise date for this campaign, stating; ―On 13th Ayar Tiglath-pileser 
took the throne; [in] Teshrit he went to Mesopotamia‖ (Millard 1994, p. 59). That this campaign 
took place approximately six months after Tiglath-pileser ascended the throne in Assyria is further 
confirmed by information from text No. 35 (The Iran Stele) (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, i 36-7, p, 
83) and from the Babylonian Chronicle (Grayson 1975, No. 1, i 2-3, pp. 70-71). An account of this 
campaign is preserved in the ARI in the text labelled by Tadmor as No. 5 (Annal 9). Here, the result 
of this campaign is given by Tiglath-pileser III as follows, ―I exercised authority over [… from] the 
cities Dūr Kuri(galzu), Sippar of the god Šamaš, [… the (tribes) Na]sikku, Naqru, (and) Tanê, the 
city Kalaʾin, the Šumandar canal, [the city Pa]ṣitu of the (tribe) Dunanu, the land Qirbutu, [… the 
(tribe) Adil]ȇ, the land Būdu, the city Paḫḫaz, the land Qin-Nippur94, (and) the cities of Karduniaš 
(Babylonia) as far as the Uqnû River, [which are on the shore of the Lo]wer [Sea]. I anne[xed] 
(those areas) to Assyria (and) placed a eunuch of mine as [provincial governor over them].‖ 
(Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 5, 5b-8a, p. 27).  
 
Many of the Aramaean tribes identified in text no. 5 above remain obscure. Some tribes noted in the 
summary inscriptions, such as the Puqudu and Itu‘, are well known outside of the inscriptions of 
Tiglath-pileser, yet others fail to find more than a brief mention in later letters or are not attested at 
all outside of this period. With such little documentation available on these tribes the identification 
of the territory they occupied is often unknown or, at best, remains speculation. It must also be 
                                                 
94
 The location of Qin-Nippur is unknown. Cole places Qin-Nippur in the locality of Nippur but this is far from certain 
(Cole 1996, p. 70, n.2). 
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considered that the location given for some of these tribes in later periods might not accurately 
reflect their earlier geographical positions if they were subject to Assyria's deportation policies. A 
letter from the reign of Sargon II suggests that the Rabbilu and Hamaraneans are to be located in the 
vicinity of Sippar, while the Hatallu may also have occupied territory close to Sippar on the basis of 
their inclusion in the same letter
95
 (Dietrich 2003, No. 7, pp. XXII-XXIII and p. 12)
96
. It is not 
known where the Adilê tribe were to be found but was perhaps to be located on the north-eastern 
border with Elam. The land of Qin-Nippur may refer to the hinterland surrounding Nippur, but 
again there is no proof of this. Thus, we can surmise that most of the Aramaean targets of Tiglath-
pileser‘s first Babylonian campaign were predominantly located in north and north-eastern 
Babylonia
97
. 
 
Evidence from the Babylonian Chronicle further suggests that Tiglath-pileser‘s campaign activities 
in this year were largely concentrated in north and north-eastern Babylonia. The chronicle does not 
provide much description of this campaign, but states that Tiglath-pileser had gone down to Akkad 
where he ―plundered Rabbilu and Hamranu, and abducted the gods of Shapazza‖ (Grayson 1975, 
No. 1, i 3-5, p. 71). The location of the city of ‗Shapazza‘ is unknown, but the location of the cities 
of Rabbilu and Hamranu are probably to be located in the territory of the Aramaean tribes of the 
same name
98
. Grayson places Hamranu east of the Tigris in the Diyala region (1963, p. 28), yet they 
are elsewhere placed further west during the reign of Sargon when they are associated with the city 
                                                 
95
  In this letter an Assyrian commander stationed at Sippar writes that the Rabillu, along with several other Aramaean 
tribes, were starving and in need of bread, suggesting that this tribes dwelt somewhere in this local area.    
96
 The location of these tribes in the vicinity of Sippar further supports Tadmor‘s reconstruction of ―Sippar of 
Shamash‖ in line 9 of text no. 46 (Summary Inscription 6) as one of the cities conquered by Tiglath-pileser during 
this campaign along with Dur Kurigalzu, also located nearby.  
97
  For the location of the Hamranu and Rabbilu tribes, see n. 99.  
98
  See Brinkman (1968, n. 1446). Note that Brinkman has called the tribalisation of these cities by the Assyrians an 
―Assyrian fabrication or simplification‖ (1968, p. 271). 
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of Sippar on the Euphrates river
99
.  
 
That Tiglath-pileser did not target the Chaldean tribes located further south in Babylonia is clear 
from text No. 5. Although Tiglath-pileser‘s claim to have exercised sovereignty over Babylonia was 
likely not recognised in Babylonia itself, it is probable that his campaign of 745 BC led him further 
south into the vicinity of Babylonia proper.   
 
4.5.2 The Campaign of 731-729 BC 
 
    The chronology of events pertaining to Tiglath-pileser‘s second campaign against Babylonia is 
difficult to establish. This campaign is dated to 731 BC on the basis of the event entry in the 
Eponym Chronicle for this year, which reads ―to Šapiya‖, and is generally equated with the siege of 
Mukin-zeri‘s capital, Shapiya, narrated in the annals100. There is some suggestion from the 
evidence, however, that this campaign lasted longer than a single year or campaign season. 
According to the Babylonian Chronicle, Mukin-zeri remained on the Babylonian throne until 729 
BC when Tiglath-pileser III took the throne for himself (Chronicle No. 1, i 19-23 in Grayson 1975, 
p. 72)
101
, suggesting that if the campaign was undertaken in 731 BC then the final defeat of Mukin-
zeri and his allies took at least three years to complete. The only problem with this reconstruction is 
the entry in the Eponym Chronicle for the year 730 BC, which reads ―in the land‖ (ina māti), 
suggesting that Tiglath-pileser was in Assyria during this time rather than on campaign. However, 
even if we accept that ina māti refers to the location of the Assyrian king in Assyria, which is not 
                                                 
99
  A further letter dating from the reign of Sargon also associates the Hamranu with the city of Sippar, reporting that it 
was hither that the Hamranu had fled in the face of Sargon‘s army (Lie 1929, No. I, 379, pp. 56-57).   
100
  See Tadmor and Yamada (2011,  No. 47, 23-24, p. 119 and No. 51, 16, p. 136). 
101
  The Babylonian Chronicle indicated the start of a new year by incising a horizontal line in the tablet between 
passages. Tiglath-pileser‘s ascension to the Babylonian throne is included in the same passage as the defeat of Ukin-
zer dated by the chronicle to Ukin-zer‘s third regnal year.   
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assured
102
, evidence from other royal inscriptions clearly indicates that Tiglath-pileser did not 
personally lead the army on every campaign and so this evidence need not disprove the theory that 
the second Babylonian campaign exceeded a year in duration. Texts 13, 18b-20 (Tadmor and 
Yamada 2011, p. 44) and 14, 1-3 (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, p. 45) refer to operations conducted by 
the governors of Na‘ari and the Lullumu against a number of cities located east of the Tigris in 738 
BC while Tiglath-pileser was on campaign in Syria. At the conclusion of the campaign, the officials 
were instructed to deliver the booty to him personally in Syria. There is also further evidence that 
the final defeat of Mukin-zeri occurred relatively late in the Assyrian king‘s reign. Both the 
Babylonian Chronicle and Nimrud Letter 6 (ND 2385) report the final defeat of Mukin-zeri, and yet 
a report of this event is conspicuously absent from the royal inscriptions where, Tiglath-pileser 
claims only ―I confined Mukin-zeri to Sapê (Shapiya), his royal city. I inflicted a heavy defeat upon 
him before his city-gates‖ (No. 47, 23b, Tadmor and Yamada 2011, p. 119) (Summary Inscription 
7)
103
. This suggests that the final defeat of Mukin-zeri, which resulted in his death, took place later 
in Tiglath-pileser‘s reign after the summary inscriptions were composed. This notion is further 
confirmed by the absence of the Bit-Amukkani tribe from the list of tribute bearers recorded in text 
No. 47, 26-28 (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, p. 120), indicating that Assyria had yet to bring about the 
final defeat of the Bit-Amukkani tribe when the other Chaldean tribes formally pledged their 
submission to Assyria.  
 
4.6 The Babylonian Campaigns: Assyrian Foreign Policy under Tiglath-pileser III 
 
4.6.1 The First Babylonian Campaign: The Objectives of Assyrian Policy in 745 BC 
 
                                                 
102
  See 2.3. 
103
  See also text No. 51 and 16 (Summary Inscription 11) in Tadmor and Yamada (2011, p 136.).  
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Scholars such as Postgate (1974, p. 200 ff), Brinkman (1974, p. 16)
104
 and Cole (1996) have 
emphasised the role of  international trade in determining Assyrian foreign policy in Babylonia, 
particularly caravan trade originating from the Persian Gulf, which was a source of raw materials 
and luxury items in high demand in Assyria during this period. Brinkman argues that since trade 
was often controlled by the Chaldaean and Aramaean population that resided along the major trade 
routes in Babylonia, Assyrian military campaigns against these population groups was motivated by 
a desire for booty or to control the international trade which flowed through this region in order to 
prevent any disruptions in supply (Brinkman 1984, p. 16). More recently, Cole has proposed that 
Tiglath-pileser‘s first campaign was conducted as part of a long-term strategy to gain control over 
the trade which flowed through Babylonian territory linking the Iranian Plateau with the 
Mediterranean port cities and the Arabian Gulf (1996, p. 70 and n. 1). According to Cole, the first 
campaign targeted the Aramaean population, particularly in eastern Babylonia in the vicinity of the 
Tigris River and along the steppe, with the aim of controlling the trade which passed between Elam 
and western Babylonia (1996, p. 70-72). That Assyrian campaigning in Babylonia was motivated by 
economic factors is not under dispute here. Assyria‘s demand for raw materials is well documented 
(see Pečírková 1977; Postgate 1974; 1979) and much of this was sourced from outside of Assyria 
from provinces as tribute or else directly through campaigning as booty. Thus, that Assyrian 
campaigning in Babylonia had an economic dimension is likely. However, we need not accept that 
campaigns were only ever carried out with one objective in mind, and the purpose of this discussion 
is to draw attention to factors other than economic gain which might have encouraged Assyrian 
campaigning here during Tiglath-pileser III‘s reign.  
                                                 
104
  Note, however, the suggestion made by Brinkman that Tiglath-pileser‘s 745 BC campaign was ultimately aimed at 
securing the throne of the Babylonian king, Nabu-nasir. He asserts that Assyrian intervention resulted from a treaty 
between the two states during this period and that Nabu-nasir was a weak ruler unable to effectively deal with the 
troublesome Aramaean population which resided in the north and north-eastern regions of Babylonia (Brinkman 
1968, p. 228; 1972, p. 279; 1984, pp. 39-42). However, there is no evidence that a treaty of this nature ever existed 
between Assyria and Babylonia during this period. 
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There is little doubt that Tiglath-pileser‘s annexation of the region encompassing Sippar to the 
south, Dur-Kurigalzu to the north and the Shumandar canal to the east, as well as the Aramaean 
tribes which inhabited this region, established a zone of Assyrian control that traversed the major 
trade and transport routes in north-eastern Babylonia. However, this region was also of great 
strategic value, particularly since the army was required to utilise the same major roads as caravan 
trade and tended to move along major water courses where possible. The campaign launched by 
Tiglath-pileser III against Namri, Parsua and Mannea the following year probably utilised a route 
which passed through this territory, moving down along the Euphrates River and crossing into the 
Zagros Mountains via the Diyala Basin
105
. The campaign of 745 BC might then be interpreted as an 
effort to remove opposition from this area and to establish supply depots for further campaigns to be 
carried out in the north-east. From a strategic standpoint, the subjugation of north-eastern Babylonia 
in 745 BC further secured for Tiglath-pileser his southern flank against a possible attack by Elamite 
forces during the campaign of the following year
106
, and should perhaps be viewed as a necessary 
                                                 
105
  The use of a southern route in 744 is supported by the reports in the annals that the first targets of Tiglath-pileser‘s 
army were Parsua and Bit-Hamban, located near the Elamite border, which were annexed from Dalta of Ellipi, the 
rulers of Namri, Singibute and the Medes. Tiglath-pileser‘s statement that Iransu of Mannaea submitted on his return 
journey after hearing of the defeat of the other city rulers further confirms this suggestion, since it indicates that the 
Assyrian army were only in a position to threaten Mannaea, located to the north on the Elamite border, on their 
return journey to Assyria (Tadmor and Yamada (2011, No. 35:  i 5‘-19, p. 84).  
106
  Garelli has asserted a similar argument but states that Tiglath-pileser‘s campaign to Babylonia in 745 BC effectively 
secured his ―rear‖ so that campaigning in Syria could be conducted safely (1991,  p. 47). In regard to this, it may 
also be noted that Sennacherib‘s campaign against Namri was also preceded by a campaign into Babylonia in 703 
BC (Levine 1982). There seems little reason, however, to think that Babylonia was capable of, or indeed interested 
in, blocking Assyria‘s expansion into Syria at this time. Note also that Assyrian annexation of this area was also of 
strategic value for later campaigns targeting the south-eastern frontier, such as that to Der in 738 BC, providing 
supplies to the armed forces and a springboard for further penetration of the south-eastern frontier. The use of 
provinces for this purpose has been discussed by Parker, who argues that Shalmaneser III‘s annexation of the Upper 
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precaution should Tiglath-pileser have also encountered any opposition from Urartu further north at 
this time
107
.    
 
It is clear that Tiglath-pileser‘s annexation of Bit-Hamban and Parsua was not motivated by 
economic objectives alone, and should probably be viewed in the context of the war against Urartu. 
The eastern trade that flowed through these regions was already being intercepted by Assyria in 
Arrapha, located further east, which was already an Assyrian province
108
. A further explanation for 
this annexation was that Assyria sought to strengthen its grip over this area
109 
and to protect it 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Tigris area, while providing the obvious economic benefits of access to raw materials, also served as a supply station 
for Shalmaneser‘s northern campaigns (Parker 2001, pp. 214-215). 
107
  The Urartian king, Argiši (c. 785-756), had repeatedly campaigned to Mannea (Mana) and Buštu in the east. The 
Urartian annals of this period claim several victories over Assyria in this region (Salvini 1995, pp. 51-52).  
108
  It is certain that Arrapha was still under Assyrian control at this time despite the city‘s earlier involvement in a 
rebellion in the years 761 and 760 BC (Millard 1994, p. 58). The governor of Arrapha, Nabu-belu-usur, served as the 
eponym for the year 745 BC and there is no recorded campaign against the city during the course of Tiglath-pileser‘s 
eastern campaign of 744 BC. It can also be noted that Tiglath-pileser also later charged the governor of Arrapha with 
authority over the cities of Hilimmu and Pillutu situated on the border of Elam (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 47, 
14, pp. 118-119 and No. 51, 17, p. 136). 
109
 This area was again targeted in 738 BC with a further campaign launched against the Aramaean tribes of Aklam-
Akkadi
 
and Gurume, which were targeted along with a number of cities including Kinia, Mulugani, and several 
others whose names are not preserved. Mulugani, which was located ―behind the fortress of the Babylonian‖ 
(Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 13, 19, p. 44), is to be identified with Silhazi in western Media (Tadmor and 
Yamada 2011, No. 16, 11, p. 51). The dan-ni-ti ša DUMU KÁ.DINGIR.RA.KI or ‗fortress of the Babylonian‘ had 
offered protection to the people of a place preserved only in part as Bit-Sa[…….] who had fled from the Assyrian 
advance during this campaign (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 16, 9-10, p. 51). It is not clear whether this campaign 
represents a direct attack against representatives of Babylonia‘s central government in this region. Tadmor suggests 
that this colony was probably founded in the Kassite period but remained under strong influence from Babylonia 
during this period (Tadmor 1994, n.11, pp. 72-73). 600 Aramaeans were also deported from the town of Amlatu of 
the Damunu tribe, along with more captives taken from Der (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 14, 3-4, pp. 45-46). 
68 
 
against the possible encroachment of Urartu. Annexed territory here was of great strategic value, 
enabling Assyria to challenge any attempt made by Urartu to expand in the south-east. The 
incorporation of Mannea as a tributary state, which threatened Urartu‘s south-eastern border, and 
may have been the staging point for Tiglath-pileser‘s later invasion of Urartu in 735 BC110, provides 
further evidence of Assyria's strategic response to the threat posed by Urartu in the north during this 
period. Finally, the restoration of lost territory here during the preceding period of weakness (see 
Chapter 5) would also have served to strengthen Tiglath-pileser‘s political position back in Assyria, 
signalling a return to a strong and dominant Assyria.  
 
4.6.2 The Second Babylonian Campaign: The Evolution of Tiglath-pileser III‘s Babylonian Policy  
 
While the 10
th
 century had seen a surge in interaction between Assyria and Babylonia characterised 
by what Brinkman defines as ―battles, alliances, shifting borders, and diplomatic marriages‖ (1968, 
p. 169), from the middle of the 9
th
 century it is clear that Assyrian kings were pursuing different 
policies in Babylonia with regard to different geographical areas and population groups. Though 
kings of the 11
th
 and 10
th
 centuries such as Tiglath-pileser I (1115-1077 BC), who captured Babylon 
as well as ―the holy cities and their citadels‖ (Glassner 2004, No. 10, ii.14''-ii.21'', pp. 180-181), had 
not hesitated in launching punitive military campaigns against the principal Babylonian cult centres, 
abducting their gods and looting their cities, Assyrian kings from the middle of the 9
th
 century 
refrained from initiating direct military action against these centres. Shalmaneser III (858-824 BC), 
who conducted two campaigns to Babylonia in order to intervene in a dynastic dispute, records only 
                                                                                                                                                                  
This campaign was carried out by the governors of Na‘ari and the Lullumu while Tiglath-pileser was on campaign in 
Syria (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 13, 20, p. 40 and No. 14, 1-3, pp. 45-46).   
110
  Although we cannot be certain of this because of the fragmentary state of the annals (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, 
No. 18 and 19), Sargon II‘s later use of Mannea to launch an invasion of Urartu may suggest that Tiglath-pileser also 
used this same route to launch an attack against Urartian territory in 735 BC. For an alternate suggestion that 
Tiglath-pileser may have used the route through Guzana and Tušḫan, see Parker (2001, p. 219).  
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a single campaign outside of this civil war, and this was directed against the Chaldean chieftains. 
His relations with the principal Babylonian cities were entirely peaceful during this period, and the 
annals report that Shalmaneser made sacrifices to the gods in the principal cult centres of Babylon, 
Borsippa and Cutha (Grayson 1996, A.0.102.10, ii 31-44, pp. 52-53). The statement made in one of 
his inscriptions that, ―for the people of Babylon and Borsippa, his people, he established protection 
and freedom under the great gods at a banquet. He gave them bread (and) wine, dressed them in 
multi-coloured garments, (and) presented them with presents‖ (Grayson 1994, A.0.102.5, vi.1b-5a, 
p. 31), suggests that Shalmaneser may even have asserted authority over Babylon and established 
the traditional privileges or kidinnūtu status of the citizens of these centres. Even Shamshi-Adad V, 
who pursued an aggressive intervention policy in Babylonia, campaigning here repeatedly and even 
taking two Babylonian kings hostage, was sure to respect the sanctity of the Babylonian chief cult 
centres, looting only cities outside of these centres and ensuring that he made sacrifices to the gods 
in Babylon, Borsippa and Cutha (Glassner 2004, 10: iii.6‘-iv.14, pp. 182-183). Under Shamshi-
Adad V‘s successor, Adad-nirari III (810-783 BC), Assyria continued this policy of avoiding direct 
military action against the principal cult centres of Babylonia, and like his predecessors, 
Shalmaneser III and Shamshi-Adad V, adopted a different policy toward the Chaldean chieftains, 
whom he forced to pay tribute (Grayson (1996, A.0.104.8, pp. 212-213). The policy pursued by 
Tiglath-pileser III in Babylonia from 745 BC was thus a continuation of the policies pursued by his 
predecessors in the 9
th
 century. Tiglath-pileser took no military action against the principal 
Babylonian city-states and allowed the Babylonian king to remain on the throne. In relation to the 
tribal population of Babylonia, however, a new policy was pursued by Tiglath-pileser III. Rather 
than just carry out punitive campaigns against the Aramaean population which resulted in the 
acquisition of booty, Tiglath-pileser‘s campaign of 745 BC was carried out with the single purpose 
of bringing about their subjugation and annexation of the Aramaean tribes to the empire.    
 
While the close affinity of Assyria‘s and Babylonia‘s religious and cultural traditions seems to have 
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afforded the Babylonian city-states a special status under the Assyrian empire
111
, this relationship 
made it incredibly difficult for Assyria to exert the same degree of control and authority over 
Babylonia as it did over other areas of the empire. Assyrian kings had, from the middle of the 9
th
 
century, become increasingly reluctant to establish direct rule over the chief Babylonian centres, 
and in this tradition, Tiglath-pileser III also pursued a non-intervention policy here from 745 BC. 
Though it is not known for certain if Tiglath-pileser III ruled indirectly over Babylonia through 
Nabu-nasir from this time, the events following the death of Nabu-nasir support the conclusion that 
Assyrian authority was not at all recognised in Babylonia at this time. Tiglath-pileser‘s second 
campaign to Babylonia was almost certainly a reaction to Mukin-zeri‘s seizure of the Babylonian 
throne (Brinkman 1984, p. 42; Hallo 1960, p. 50; Grayson 1991b, p. 82; Olmstead 1951, p. 178; 
Saggs 1984), and that this coincided with a reversal of Tiglath-pileser‘s earlier policy in favour of 
direct rule over Babylonia would seem to suggest that this campaign was also an admission that the 
passive non-intervention approach pursued here since 745 BC was not at all working. Tiglath-
pileser had earlier sought to promote an acceptance of Assyrian rule in Babylonia, and now this 
policy was intensified. He ascended the Babylonian throne, participating in the annual akītu festival, 
and adopted the title šar māt Šumeri u Akkadi ―King of Sumer and Akkad‖. The adoption of this 
title is a clear indication of Tiglath-pileser‘s desire to claim the prestige associated with this 
position
112
, however, it was also the traditional title denoting sovereignty over Babylonia and was 
thus, more importantly, a symbolic representation of Tiglath-pileser‘s desire to be viewed as a 
legitimate king of Babylonia. Although a number of earlier Assyrian kings of the 9
th
 and early 8
th
 
century had also adopted this title, including Shamshi-Adad V (823-811 BC) and Adad-nirari III 
(810-783 BC), unlike his predecessors who were never recognised as rulers of Babylonia in the 
Babylonian sources, Tiglath-pileser III was the first Assyrian king to be accepted as the legitimate 
king of Babylonia in the Babylonian accounts (Frame 2008, pp. 23-24).  
                                                 
111
  See Radner (2010, p. 30) for an alternate perspective suggesting that Babylonia‘s special status was maintained for 
ideological reasons connected to the Assyrian ‗world view‘ and the interpretation of omen texts.  
112
  A suggestion already made by Olmstead (1951, p. 181). 
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In conjunction with this policy, Tiglath-pileser III also granted benefits to the Babylonian cities. The 
granting of kidinnūtu status to the citizens of Babylon is only alluded to in Nimrud Letter 1, 
however it is confirmed in a later letter from the reign of Sargon or Sennacherib where the writer 
laments that the king has not come and established the privileges (kidinnūtu) of Babylon as past 
kings, including Tiglath-pileser III and Shalmaneser V, had done (see Dietrich 2003, No. 23, 21‘- r.8 
and r. 14-15). It may be noted that the exact meaning of this status is not understood with certainty, 
and Porter associates this status only with protection from physical harm rather than exemption 
from taxes or corvée (1993, n. 145, p. 64). However, other scholars have sought to interpret this 
status as meaning exemption from taxes and corvée labour, and Tiglath-pileser‘s statement in the 
ARI that he ―exercised authority over Karduniaš (Babylonia) (and) firmly established tribute (and) 
payment on the chieftains of Chaldea‖ (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 39,14b-15a, p. 97), may 
provide some evidence, though indirect, to support the assertion that the principal Babylonian cult 
centres remained exempt from taxation under Assyrian rule during this period, as they would under 
the rule of a traditional Babylonian king. 
 
Though it can not be said that the cities which received benefits from Tiglath-pileser III 
subsequently accepted Assyrian rule, or that they even adopted a pro-Assyrian policy, there is some 
scant evidence for the success of Assyria‘s policies in Babylonia. The Nimrud letters suggest that 
Tiglath-pileser‘s public relations program in Babylonia was at least partially successful in gaining 
the support of the citizens of Babylon against Mukin-zeri, and a later letter reports that the city of 
the author, whose name is not preserved in its entirety, had ―[kep]t the watch of the kings of 
[Assyria]‖ (No. 187, 5-7, Reynolds 2003), meaning they had remained loyal to Assyria over an 
extended period of time. Statements such as this suggest that despite the difficulties which Assyrian 
kings experienced in trying to establish Assyrian authority here, some cities like that referred to in 
the above extract, did pursue long-term pro-Assyrian policies in Babylonia, which perhaps 
originated in our period where the origins of Assyria‘s Babylonian policy can be traced.      
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CHAPTER 5   The Context of Tiglath-pileser III’s Campaigns   
Against the West: The Arpad Alliance and the Problem of Alliance 
Formation in the West during the 9
th
 and 8
th
 centuries BC 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Prior to his conquest of the West, beginning in 743 BC, Tiglath-pileser III had already conducted 
several military campaigns, one directed to the south against Babylonia in 745 BC, and another into 
the central Zagros during the following year. It was concluded in Chapter 4 that campaigning was 
pursued in these areas both for strategic reasons
113
 and because the inhabitants of these areas 
presented easy targets at a time when Assyria was still recovering from a period of weakness and 
Tiglath-pileser‘s reign was not yet firmly established114. In the West lay a number of powerful and 
wealthy states which would pose a far greater challenge for Tiglath-pileser III than had the eastern 
frontier. The wealth of these city-states had already drawn the attention of a number of Assyrian 
kings who in the 9
th
 and early 8
th
 centuries had regularly campaigned to this region and sought to 
establish Assyrian control here
115
. However, Assyrian campaigning during this period had often 
been met with resistance from alliances involving Syrian, Palestinian and South Anatolian states, 
which have widely been interpreted as ―anti-Assyrian‖ coalitions, that is, formed as a response to 
Assyrian expansion in this area and for the specific purpose of providing opposition against 
Assyrian campaign efforts.  
                                                 
113
 For the view that Assyrian expansion here was part of a wider strategy against Urartu, see Grayson (1954, p. 34). 
114
 The mountainous area to the east would have been much easier for Tiglath-pileser to subdue given the low-level 
socio-political development of the area, which was characterised by a large pastoral economy. For the economy and 
social organisation of polities in the Zagros, see Greco (2003).   
115
 Note, however, that this control was limited to certain regions and characterised largely by the creation of semi-
independent vassal-states. 
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Given the wider interpretation of coalition formation in the West during the preceding period, it is 
no wonder that the coalition of North-Syrian states which opposed Tiglath-pileser III in 743 BC 
during the course of his first campaign against the West has also been identified as a further 
example of a strictly anti-Assyrian alliance in the West (Ikeda 1999, p. 289; Kuan 1995, pp. 138, 
142 and 187; Parker 2001, pp. 218-19). The problem with this premise, however, it that it identifies 
Assyria as the sole threat to states in the West, and does not acknowledge that alliances provided 
mutual protection for members against threats which might emerge from both local and 
international sources. Alliances could also be advantageous to members as they often served to 
strengthen economic ties between states and to promote trade. Thus, the decision by a state in the 
West to join an alliance was likely just as much a response to local conditions, both economic and 
political, as it was to international conditions. There is every reason to believe that alliances in the 
West also varied enormously not just in their political makeup, and the extent to which larger, more 
powerful states were able to dominated smaller states, but also in their objectives, and that both the 
makeup and objectives of alliances was largely influenced by the political and economic conditions 
under which they were formed. Since we often lack historical sources produced by coalition states 
themselves, one critical issue is how we interpret and utilise Assyrian sources that refer to 
coalitions, since these often present us only with an Assyrian perspective on events.  
 
With regard to the coalition which faced Tiglath-pileser III in 743 BC, there are a number of reasons 
to believe that this alliance was a local coalition, that is, one which predated Tiglath-pileser‘s 
campaign and was formed in response to local political and/or economic conditions. The argument 
put forward here suggests that this alliance did not form in response to Assyrian campaign efforts, 
but had only become drawn into a larger conflict against Assyria when one of its member states, 
Arpad, was attacked by Tiglath-pileser III in 743 BC. Assyria‘s weakened position in the period 
preceding Tiglath-pileser‘s accession to the throne meant that Assyria had recently posed little 
threat to the autonomy of states in the West, certainly not enough to encourage states to form a 
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coalition as a response to regular campaign efforts. Before we delve into this discussion, however, it 
is necessary first to address the broader issue of alliance formation in the West in more depth and 
the problem of interpreting these political alliances as strictly ―anti-Assyrian‖ coalitions.    
 
5.2 The Origins and Growth of the ―Anti-Assyrian Coalition Theory‖ 
 
The origins of the anti-Assyrian coalition theory are rooted in biblical scholarship where the theory 
was  first used to account for the cause of the Syro-Ephraimite War, or the attack on Judah by Aram-
Damascus and Israel on the eve of Tiglath-pileser III‘s conquest of Syria-Palestine in 734BC116. 
According to 2 Kings 16: 5-9, king Ahaz of Judah requested aid from Tiglath-pileser III against the 
coalition, offering Judah‘s submission in return for Assyrian military intervention against the 
coalition forces. Assyria‘s intervention in this conflict was quite early on, from the late 19th century, 
interpreted as the result of the coalition‘s attempt to force Judah into an alliance which was deemed 
―anti-Assyrian‖ (see Tomes 1993, p. 55 ff.). Although it had also been argued that the war was a 
local conflict which had no bearing on the developing international political situation involving 
Assyria
117
, historians enthusiastically embraced the idea that states might align in common unity 
                                                 
116
  See Tomes (1993).  
117
  For early criticisms to the theory, see Tomes who argues that the theory suggesting that Aram-Damascus and Israel 
were trying to force Judah into an anti-Assyrian coalition lacks evidentiary support (1993, ns. 9,10 & 11). In 
agreement with Tomes, the biblical account makes it clear that Aram was attempting to expand at this time by 
acquiring additional territory: ―At that time, Rezin king of Aram recovered Elath for Aram‖ (2 Kings 16: 6). 
Moreover, the biblical account makes it clear that Ahaz of Judah had pledged his submission to Assyria in return for 
protection from Aram and Israel: ―Ahaz sent messengers to Tiglath-pileser king of Assyria, ―I am your servant and 
vassal. Come up and save me out of the hand of the king of Aram and of the king of Israel, who are attacking me‖ (2 
Kings 16:7). It is not unlikely that a smaller state such as Judah would request the protection of a larger state such as 
Assyria in regional conflicts, and that this might be seen by smaller states as a beneficial consequence of being an 
Assyrian vassal state (see 6.3.1). For a more recent work arguing that the Syro-Ephraimite war was a local conflict, 
see Oded (1972).   
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against an international power seeking to bring about the subjugation of Syria-Palestine and a 
causal-relationship was established between Assyrian campaigning and alliance formation in the 
West during the 9
th
 and 8
th
 centuries BC (Ikeda 1999, pp. 271-302; Irvine 1990; Kuan 1995; 
Lanfranchi 1997, pp.81-87; Na‘aman 1991, pp. 80-98; Tadmor 1961, pp. 232-271).  
 
The notion of anti-Assyrian coalitions was subsequently injected into Assyriological studies by 
Tadmor in an article published in 1961 titled ―Azriyau of Yaudi‖. Although the article focused on 
the somewhat contentious debate surrounding the identification of one Azriyau, the proposed leader 
of an anti-Assyrian coalition
118
, Tadmor also introduced the concept of coalitions which specifically 
pursued anti-Assyrian policies in the West and discussed the influence of these political formations 
on Syro-Palestinian politics during the 9
th
 and 8
th
 centuries. Yet, the problem still remained that 
although coalitions of this period sometimes came in conflict with Assyria, it is clear from the 
evidence that these alliances were also utilised in disputes against other Syro-Palestinian states.  
 
Na‘aman attempted to overcome this inconsistency in an article titled ―Forced Participation in 
Alliances in the Course of the Assyrian Campaigns to the West‖, where he argued that in cases 
where coalitions engaged in conflicts against other local states, this was an attempt by the coalition 
to force the participation of non-member states into anti-Assyrian alliances. He reasoned: ―Since 
cooperation was the only way to retain independence, it is clear that an all-inclusive participation in 
the alliances was essential for their members. No wonder that refusal to participate was not 
acceptable and may have been regarded even as an act of hostility‖ (1991, p. 81). Thus, the same 
case which had been made years earlier for the cause of the Syro-Ephraimite war was now taken up 
and applied to other conflicts involving coalitions and local states in the West. Where coalitions 
engaged in armed conflict against states other than Assyria, this was not taken as evidence for a 
                                                 
118
  For an overview of the historical debate surrounding the identification of Azriyau and his nation-state, see Kuan 
(1995, n. 57, pp. 149-150).  
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local dispute between coalitions and other states, but was rather interpreted as part of a wider 
strategy against Assyria.    
 
5.3 The Literary Context of ―Anti-Assyrian‖ Coalitions 
 
The ARI were never intended to serve as an unbiased history of events, but were rather, composed 
for the purpose of glorifying the heroic deeds of the Assyrian king and legitimising his right to    
rule
119
. In Chapter 2, it was stated that the ARI were composed according to a standard set of 
literary conventions and themes. Military battles, in particular, proved an especially popular theme 
and provided effective subject material for conveying the heroic qualities of the Assyrian king, such 
as his superior skills of stratagem, physical endurance and martial prowess. Coalitions, by 
extension, proved greater still for promoting the Assyrian king‘s heroic image and were a useful 
theme for illustrating the superior strength of the Assyrian army. Since alliances often comprised a 
number of enemy states and controlled significant numbers of troops, the Assyrian sources 
presented such political formations as forming only from the direct realisation that Assyria‘s 
military power was so great that no individual state could stand alone against it. The Assyrian view 
of alliance formations in the West, however, omits the fact that local alliances probably did not 
make any distinction between threats originating from local or international powers, and that a local 
coalition might mobilise in defence of an allied state against Assyria as it would against a threat 
from another local state. The fact that there was no attempt made by the Assyrian sources to 
accurately identify the objectives of alliance formations reflects the preoccupation of the ARI with 
conveying imperial ideology, particularly the belief that the Assyrian king had a legitimate and 
proper claim to conquer and rule over all foreign territories. Any state which refused to submit to or 
recognise Assyrian authority, or indeed aided an enemy state by mobilising against Assyria in a 
coalition formation, was considered guilty of denying Assyria its rightful claim to rule and was 
                                                 
119
 For a discussion of the literary aspects of the Assyrian royal inscriptions, see Tadmor (1997; 1999) and Oded (1992).  
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presented as hostile to Assyria. Consequently, the ARI convey only a single perspective of alliance 
formation, interpreting any opposition provided by such alliances as decidedly hostile to Assyria or 
―anti-Assyrian‖. Thus, although the ARI may be useful in providing some historical background to 
the activities of coalitions where they came into contact with Assyria, they are not a reliable source 
for providing an accurate picture of the policies and objectives of coalitions in the West during our 
period. 
 
5.4 Historical Examples of Coalitions Attested in the West Prior to the Reign of Tiglath-pileser III 
 
5.4.1 The Qarqar Alliance from the Reign of Shalmaneser III 
 
From Shalmaneser III‘s reign comes evidence of the only coalition which might be classified as 
―anti-Assyrian‖ in this period. This coalition, hereafter referred to as the ―Qarqar‖ alliance, mounted 
repeated opposition against Shalmaneser III‘s efforts at western expansion in the years 853, 849, 
848 and 845 BC. It is not merely the persistent mobilisation of this alliance in direct response to 
Assyrian campaigning which firmly points to the anti-Assyrian character of this alliance, it is also 
the coalition‘s composition which suggests that the coalition represents a determined effort to 
oppose Assyrian expansion in this area. The Qarqar alliance was comprised of a large number of 
states drawn from a vast geographical area and included forces from various states in Syria and 
Palestine, as well as Egypt. The cooperation of so many states in a single coalition suggests that no 
single state commanded the alliance
120
 and that cooperation was likely secured on the basis that 
                                                 
120
  Although some scholars have argued that Aram-Damascus led this coalition alone (Kuan 1995, p. 34), or that this 
command was held in conjunction with Hamath, (Dion 1995, p. 483; Grayson 2004, p. 4 & 1982, p. 261; Ikeda 
1999, p. 277), neither of these assertions is supported by the evidence. Although the Assyrian accounts make it clear 
that Aram-Damascus and Hamath contributed more forces than any other states at Qarqar, the example of Egypt 
which contributed a mere 1000 troops and 10 chariots, suggests that the number of troops raised by each state was 
not a direct representation of the military capabilities of a state, as has sometimes been assumed (see, for example, 
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Assyria presented a common threat to the autonomy or collective interests of participating states
121
. 
The coalition is best known from the Kurkh Monolith Inscription, where a comprehensive 
description of the participants is given along with the forces they commanded
122
:  
 
89)  . . . URUar-ga-na-a at-tu-muš a-na URUqar-qa-ra aq-tí-rib  
90) URUqar-qa-ra URU MAN-ti-ia ap-púl aq-qur ina IZI.MEŠ áš-ru-up DIŠ LIM 
       MIN ME GIŠ.GIGIR.MEŠ DIŠ LIM MIN ME pit-ḫal-lu NIŠ LIM [. . .] ša   
           m
IŠKUR-’i-id-ri  
91)  […] ANŠE-šú IMIN ME GIŠ.GIGIR.MEŠ IMIN ME pit-ḫal-lu U LIM ÉRIN.MEŠ  
        šá 
m
ir-hu-le-e-ni KUR a-māt-a-a MIN LIM GIŠ.GIGIR.MEŠ U LIM ÉRIN.MEŠ šá  
            m
a-ḫa-ab-bu  
92) KUR sir-’a-la-a-a IÁ ME ÉRIŠ.MEŠ ša gu-<bal>-a-a123 DIŠ LIM ÉRIN.MEŠ ša 
      KUR mu-uṣ-ra-a-a124 U GIŠ.GIGIR.MEŠ U LIM ÉRIN.MEŠ ša KUR ir-qa-na-ta-ai125  
                                                                                                                                                                  
Dion 1995, p. 483, Grayson 2004, p. 4 & 1982, p. 261; Ikeda 1999, p. 277;  Pitard 1987, p. 128). It is more likely 
that the force contributed by each member state was based on each state‘s individual assessment of the threat posed 
by Assyria to either their interests or autonomy. Indeed, Irhuleni of Hamath's large contribution of military forces at 
Qarqar can easily be explained on the basis that Shalmaneser III was already ravaging Hamath at the time of the 
coalition‘s mobilisation, and therefore posed the greatest immediate threat to this state.   
121
 Tadmor suggests that the alliance was probably based on pre-existing economic relationships (1975, p. 39). 
122
  Other translations of this text may be found in the following works: Yamada (2000, ii 78b-81a; ii 87b-90a; ii 90b-   
       95a; 96b-102, pp. 150-163), Grayson (1996, A.0.102.2, pp. 11-24), and Kuan (1995, ii 78-101, pp. 27-31). 
123
 Note that the city was earlier identified with the Anatolian kingdom of Que (Kuan 1995, n. 95, p. 33). However, 
Tadmor‘s argument to emend the text from gu-a-a to gu-bal-a-a, reading ―Byblos‖ (1961, pp. 144-5), has been 
generally accepted by scholars such as Grayson (1996, p. 23), Kuan (1995, p. 33), and Yamada (2000, pp. 157-158).  
124
 Tadmor (1961, pp. 144-5) equates Muṣri here with Egypt rather than the Anatolian kingdom of the same name, a 
reading only made plausible through the reading of Byblos above. For the connection between the participation of 
Egypt and Byblos, see Kuan (1995, pp. 33-34).  
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93) MIN ME ÉRIN.MEŠ ša 
m
ma-ti-nu-ba-’a-li URUar-ma-da-a-a MIN ME  ÉRIN.MEŠ  
       ša KUR ú-sa-na-ad-a-a EŠ GIŠ.GIGIR.MEŠ U LIM ÉRIN.MEŠ 
94) šá 
m
a-du-nu-ba-’a-li KUR ši-a-na-a-a DIŠ ANŠE gam-ma-lu ša  
m
gi-in-di-bu-’u KUR  
      ar-ba-a-a [. . . . . .] ME ÉRIN.MEŠ 
95)  ša 
m
ba-’a-ša DUMU ru-hu-bi KUR a-ma-na-a-a U MIN MAN.MEŠ-ni an-nu-ti ana   
       ma ÉRIN.TAH-ti-šú il-qa-a-a [. . . . . . . .] 
 
“I set out from the city of Argana and approached the city of Qarqar. I demolished, pulled 
down, and burned the city of Qarqar, his (Irhuleni’s) royal city. 1,200 chariots, 1,200 cavalry, 
20,000 troops of Adad-idri, the Aram-Damascene, 700 chariots, 700 cavalry, 10,000 troops 
of Irhuleni, the Hamathite, 2000 chariots, 10,000 troops of Ahab, the Israelite, 500 troops of 
Byblos, 1,000 troops of Egypt, 10 chariots, 10,000 troops of Irqata, 200 troops of Matinu-
ba’al of the city of Arvad, 200 troops of the land of Usanāta, 30 chariots, [. .],000 troops of 
Adunu-ba’al of the city of Šianu, 1,000 camels of Gindibu of the Arabs, [. .]00 troops of 
Ba’asa the son of Bit-Ruhubi the Ammonite― these twelve kings came to his aid.”  
 
 
Table 7 – The Composition of Allied Forces at Qarqar 
 
State Chariots Cavalry Troops Camels Total 
Aram-Damascus 1200 1200 20,000 - 22,400 
Hamath 700 700 10,000 - 11,400 
Israel 2,000 - 10,000 - 12,000 
Byblos - - 500 - 500 
Egypt - - 1,000 - 1,000 
Irqata 10 - 10,000 - 10,010 
Arvad - - 200 - 200 
Usanu - - 200 - 200 
Šianu 30 - [x],000 - ? 
Arab - - - 1,000 1,000 
Ammon - - [x]00 or [x],000  - ? 
 
Though Shalmaneser claims to have successfully crushed the Qarqar coalition in 853 BC, stating in 
                                                                                                                                                                  
125
 Tadmor emends ‗Irqanata‘ to ‗Irqata‘ or ‗Irqa‘ (1961, n. 49, p. 245). 
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his annals that he defeated the coalition ―from the city of Qarqar as far as the city of Gilzau‖ 
(Grayson 1996, p. 23), the fact that he chose to concentrate his campaign efforts elsewhere in the 
years immediately following this campaign and that the coalition continued to mobilise in 
opposition to Shalmaneser‘s campaigns in subsequent years, has suggested to scholars that the 
battle may have resulted in an Assyrian setback or even a defeat (Dion 1995, p. 482 ff.; Elat 1975, 
pp. 25-35; Kuan 1995, p. 46; Yamada 2000, p. 163). Although the alliance ultimately dissolved 
before the Assyrian threat had passed
126, the coalition‘s dissolution is generally attributed to the 
change of leadership in Aram-Damascus at this time, when Hazael replaced Ben-Hadad on the 
throne
 
(Grayson 2004; Kuan 1995, p. 53). Nevertheless, this alliance is perhaps the only example 
where a clear anti-Assyrian policy can be noted in the nature and activities of the coalition.     
 
5.4.2 The Hatti Coalition from the Reign of Adad-nirari III  
 
In 805 BC Adad-nirari III undertook his first campaign to the West where he fought a coalition 
comprising Arpad and a number of North-Syrian and South-Anatolian states at the city of 
Paqiraḫubuna, pertaining to Kummuh127. Most scholars have identified this coalition as anti-
Assyrian and attributed the cause of the conflict to the coalition’s attempt to force Kummuh into an 
anti-Assyrian alliance (Kuan 1998, p. 91; Na’aman 1991, pp. 84-85). However, the Assyrian 
accounts give conflicting reasons for Adad-nirari III’s campaign against the coalition forces. In the 
ARI, Adad-nirari‘s campaign against the alliance is justified as an effort to re-subjugate states which 
had rebelled from Assyria under Adad-nirari‘s predecessor, Shamshi-Adad V. This is illustrated in 
one of Adad-nirari III‘s summary inscriptions where the following description of the coalition states 
                                                 
126
 The coalition was noticeably absent in 841 BC when Shalmaneser successfully campaigned to subdue Aram-
Damascus. 
127
 For the dating of this episode, see Kuan (1995, p. 93). 
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is given
128: ―...[who] bore the yoke of lordship … who [had rebelled and revolted] in the time of 
Šamši-[Adad my father, and caused] the rulers of the Eup[hrates to rebel with him,] ...‖ (Kuan 1995, 
pp. 88-89)
129
. Yet, according to the Pazarcik inscription, the cause of Adad-nirari III‘s initial 
intervention in the West was a border conflict between Kummuh, an Assyrian vassal, and the 
neighbouring state of Gurgum
130
: 
 
7)  . . . AŠ u-me 
m
uš-pi-lu-lu-me  
8)  šar 
URU
ku-mu-ḫa-a-a a-na 
m
10-ÉRIN-TÁḪ šar 
KUR
aš-šur 
9)  
SAL
sa-am-mu-ra-mat MUNUS.É.GAL 
10) ÍD pu-rat-tú ú-še-bi-ru-u-ni  
11) 
m
a-tar-šum-ki A 
m
ad-ra-a-me 
URU
ár-pa-da-a-a 
12) a-di 8 MAN.MEŠ-ni šá KI-šú AŠ 
URU
pa-qira-ḫu-bu-na 
13) si-dir-ta-šú-nu KI-šú-nu am-taḫ-iṣ  uš-ma-na-šú-nu 
14) e-kim-šu-nu-ti a-na šu-zu-ub ZI.MEŠ-šú-nu  
15) e-li-ú AŠ MU.AN.NA šá-a-te 
16) ta-hu-mu šú-a-tú AŠ bir-ti 
m
uš-pi-lu-lu-me 
17) šar 
URU
ku-mu-ha-a-a AŠ bir-ti 
m
qa-al-pa-ru-da 
18) A mpa-la-lam šar URUgúr-gu-ma-a-a ú-še-lu-ni  
                                                 
128
 This claim is also made in a stele from Dūr-Katlimmu published by Grayson (1996, A.0.104.5, p. 207). Note that 
while line 5 of this text identifying the name of this town is fragmentary, this clearly refers to Paqaraḫubunu. See 
Grayson (1996, n. 5, p. 207).  
129
 Elsewhere, in the Tell Sheikh Hammad Stela, only Arpad is said to have rebelled (Kuan 1995, pp. 87-88), while in 
the Saba‘a Stela the more general term ―land of Hatti‖ is used to refer to the states that had rebelled and withheld 
tribute (Kuan 1995, pp. 85-86).  
130
  For a copy of this inscription, see Donbaz (1990, pp. 8-9).  
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―At that time, Ushpilulume, king of Kummuh, caused me Adad-nirari, king of Assyria, and 
Sammu-ramat, the palace woman, to cross the Euphrates. Atarshumki, son of Adramu of the 
city of Arpad, together with the eight kings who were with him at Paqiraḫubuna. I fought a 
pitched battle with them. I deprived them of their military camp. To save their lives they 
moved upwards (into upper land?)
131
. In this year, this boundary between Ushpilulume, the 
king of Kummuh, and between Qalparuda, the son of Palalam, king of Gurgum, was 
determined.‖ 
 
There are several reasons to believe that the Pazarcik inscriptions provides a more accurate and 
reliable account of the cause of the conflict between Adad-nirari III and the coalition army. Unlike 
the royal inscriptions which might distort historical information in the interests of glorifying the 
heroic feats of the Assyrian king, the Pazarcik inscription was a boundary stone, intended to mark 
for future rulers the border agreement made between Kummuh and Gurgum which had been 
determined as a result of the battle at Paqiraḫubuna. Although the inscription does glorify Adad-
nirari’s defeat of the coalition army, the cause of Assyria’s intervention in this conflict is not 
attributed to a rebellion, but rather, to Kummuh’s request for aid against the coalition in what 
appears to have been a local territorial dispute with Gurgum. Although these states may once have 
been held as Assyrian tributary states in the distant past, the absence of any direct reference to a 
rebellion of these states in the Pazarcik inscription suggests the charge of rebellion made against 
these states was largely the invention of scribes who composed the ARI and sought to integrate this 
event into the wider ideology of the inscriptions. If the coalition states had once been Assyrian 
                                                 
131
  Although the word ―dispersed‖ here might provide a better translation, this would require the use of the Gt stem 
(see Black et al. 2000, p.71). It may be considered that the G stem was used to convey the meaning that the 
Gurgumite army had retreated back to higher ground rather than simply moving off. If this understanding of the text 
is correct, than Assyria‘s victory over the coalition may not have been decisive.    
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tributary states lost during Shamshi-Adad V‘s reign, as the ARI suggest, then Adad-nirari‘s claim to 
have restored these territories to Assyrian control was evidence that Adad-nirari III had fulfilled his 
kingship duties to expand the empire and to restore territory lost during a preceding period of 
weakness. 
 
Thus, it is more likely that Adad-nirari III’s confrontation with the coalition army at in 805 BC 
represented no more than a local territorial dispute between Kummuh and Gurgum, in which 
Assyria intervened on behalf of Kummuh, a vassal-state
132
. This follows the conclusion already 
made by Galil (1992, p. 58). That Adad-nirari III subsequently used this incident as a platform to 
carry out further conquest of this area is perhaps testimony to the flexibility and changing nature of 
Assyrian policy in this region, as well as to Assyria’s willingness to take advantage of political and 
military circumstances favourable to imperial expansion. The fact that Assyria intervened in this 
local dispute on behalf of its vassal also points to the reciprocal nature of Assyrian vassal-
relationships and to the benefits of Assyrian rule, most recently drawn attention to by Lanfranchi 
(1997) and Fales (2008). Smaller states such as Kummuh which were situated in areas surrounded 
by rival states might have benefitted greatly from their incorporation into the empire where they 
were afforded some protection against other local rival states in return for their loyalty
133
.      
 
5.4.3 The Zakkur Inscription Alliance from the Reign of Adad-nirari III  
 
A further coalition known from the reign of Adad-nirari III comes from an inscription written in Old 
                                                 
132
  It is interesting to note that the reverse of the inscription was re-inscribed during the reign of Shalmaneser IV (782-
773 BC) when Assyria settled a further border dispute between the two nations. The stela was therefore used to 
reaffirm this border ruling made as a result of the campaign against Gurgum and the coalition army during the reign 
of Adad-nirari III.  
133
 For more on this topic, see the article by Lanfranchi (1997).  
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Aramaic known as the Zakkur inscription
134
. The coalition described in this text comprised Aram-
Damascus, Arpad, Que, Umq, Gurgum, Sam’al, Melid, two other states whose names are missing 
due to lacunas, and seven other kings, presumably pertaining to only minor kingdoms
135
. The 
inscription records an incident where Zakkur of Hamath was besieged by the coalition army, 
probably following Hamath‘s seizure of the throne of Lu‘ash136, a kingdom whose location remains 
uncertain
137
. Lines one to ten of this inscription give us some insight into the nature of this incident 
involving the coalition army. It may be noted that a complete narrative of this episode has not 
survived due to the poor preservation of the text.  
    
―The stele which Zakkur, king of Hamath and Lu‘ash, placed for Ilwer, [his lord]. I am 
Zakkur, king of Hamath and Lu‘ash, a humble138 man was I, and Balšamayn [delivered] me, 
and stood with me, and Balshamayn made me king of Hazrak. Barhadad, son of Hazael, 
king of Aram united against me [six]teen kings― Barhadad and his army, Bar-Gush139 and 
his army, the king of Que and his army, the king of Umq and his army, the king of Gurgum 
                                                 
134
 For the Zakkur inscription and its language features, see Gibson 1975, pp. 6-17; Lipínski 2000, p. 254- 255; Noegel 
2006, p. 307 ff.  
135
 While there is some doubt over the exact number of kings involved in the coalition (see Gibson 1975, n. 8), there is 
good reason to believe that there were sixteen participants in the coalition. Although two of the king‘s names are 
missing from the text due to lacunas, it seems certain from the repetitive use of the formula ―X and his army‖ that 
there was only enough room in these lacunas to include the names of two more kings. Kahn (2007, p. 72) postulates 
that the missing states are Carchemish and Kummuh, though this is not certain.  
136
  The date of the siege is a matter of debate among scholars. A rough estimate would place it somewhere between the 
end of the 9
th
 year and the beginning of the 8
th
 during the reign of Adad-nirari III (Gibson 1975, pp. 6-7).   
137
  For the suggestion that Lu‘aš lies directly north of Hamath, see Hawkins (1995, p. 96).  
138
  For this translation, see Rosenthal (1967, p. 6). Note that although the translation given here of ―humble‖ follows 
the conventional translation, Millard (1990) has more recently shown that these signs should more likely be taken as 
reference to Zakkur‘s homeland (see n. 156).     
139
  Ie. Arpad 
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and his army, the king of Sam‘al and his army, the king of Melid and his army, the king of [ . 
. . .] and his army, the king of [ . . . . ] and his army, and seven others, they and their armies. 
All these kings laid siege upon Hadrach and raised a rampart higher then the rampart of 
Hazrak, and dug a trench deeper than its moat.‖   
 
On the basis of this inscription and a relief showing a tribute bearer bearing the name za-ku-[ri] in 
cuneiform (cf. Reade 1981, p. 151 & Pl. XX), scholars have widely identified this alliance as anti-
Assyrian and explained the attack on Hamath as motivated by the pro-Assyrian policies of this 
Syrian state and an attempt to force Zakkur into an anti-Assyrian coalition (Kuan 1995, pp. 91-93; 
Lipínski 2000, p. 302; Na‘aman 1991, pp. 84-86; Smith 1925, p. 28)140. Kuan, in particular, even 
suggests that this was the same coalition, more or less, which confronted Adad-nirari III at 
Paqiraḫubuna (1995, p. 92), even though seven of the eight states which participated in this 
coalition are not named in the Pazarcik inscription. While it is not possible to give an exact date for 
this event, scholars have generally sought to identify the siege of Hadrach with Assyrian 
campaigning in the area
141, and Na‘aman further suggests that Hamath‘s deliverance from the 
                                                 
140
  For this view, see also Kuan (1995, pp. 91-92) and Millard (1973, pp.163-164), following Smith (1925, p. 28).  
141
  Smith (1925, p. 28) assigned an approximate date of between 805 and 802 BC, while Na’aman (1991, p. 85) and 
Millard and Tadmor (1973, p. 60) have dated this incident to 804/803 BCE after the defeat of the Hatti coalition at 
Paqirahubuna. Note also the works of Jepsen (1941-1945, p. 170), Lipiński (1971, pp. 397-399), and Ikeda (1999, p. 
282) who alternatively associate this incident with Adad-nirari’s 796 BCE campaign. For an overview of the 
evidence linking the liberation of Zakkur with an Assyrian campaign, see Noegel (2006, 309 ff.). It should also be 
noted that this thesis is connected with the view that Zakkur refers to himself in the inscription as a ―man of ‗Āna‖ , 
a town which it is theorised might be located on the Euphrates within Assyria‘s orbit of control (see Millard1990, p. 
49 ff.). The implication of this thesis being that Zakkur was a usurper who at the very least held Assyrian sympathies 
(Millard 1990, p. 52). Nevertheless, there is no direct evidence that Zakkur‘s foreign policy was directed by 
Assyrian policy or that Assyria might intervene in a local dispute on behalf of an independent state even if this state 
were sympathetic to Assyria‘s interests.         
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coalition army should be credited not to the god Balšamayn142 but to Assyrian intervention (1991, 
pp. 85-86)
143
. However, given the complete lack of evidence for any of these assertions it is difficult 
to justify the thesis that the coalition‘s attack on Hadrach was linked with a wider anti-Assyrian 
policy in the West. Although the lack of any direct reference to Assyria in the inscription could be 
attributed to the broken state of the inscription, which does not give any clue as to how the conflict 
was resolved, it cannot be ignored that the incident lacks a clear historical context. Thus, while it is 
tempting to view this incident as related to Assyrian imperial expansion, a more likely conclusion is 
that this was a local dispute between Syro-Anatolian states which had nothing to do with Assyria. 
An alternate possibility is that the conflict had resulted from Hamath‘s own pursuit of an imperial 
policy, notably Zakkur‘s seizure of the neighbouring kingdom of Lu‘ash144. Kahn has more recently 
suggested that the involvement of both Bit-Agusi and Aram-Damascus in the alliance suggests that 
we are dealing with two coalitions, not one, in which Aram-Damascus had sought common cause 
with a northern coalition led by Bit-Agusi against a common enemy (2007, p. 73). This, Kahn 
reasons, results from the notion that Aram-Damascus could not have exerted hegemonic control 
over such a vast array of states. However, there is no reason to assume that alliances may only have 
                                                 
142
  Pitard (1987, p. 174) notes that it was not uncommon for sieges to be unsuccessful. Zakkur‘s claim that his success 
should be attributed to divine deliverance could indicate some other unforeseen event like plague. Alternatively, 
Millard has suggested the possibility that the dispersal of the coalition army could be attributed to a quarrel among 
the allies (1973, p. 163). Although these theories are merely possibilities for which no ‗hard‘ evidence exists, it may 
be pointed out that they are just as plausible as the theory postulating Assyrian intervention in the conflict, for which 
no real evidence exists also.          
143
 This assertion follows one already made by Smith (1925, p. 28) and is based on evidence from the Antakya stela, an 
inscription describing the settling of a border dispute between Zakkur of Hamath and Atarshumki of Arpad which 
indicates that Arpad and Hamath had at one point been tributary states under Adad-nirari III. For this text, see Kuan 
(1995, pp. 76-77). Note, however, that the date of this incident is difficult to determine, particularly given that 
Shamshi-ilu, the official responsible for erecting the stela, continued to hold the position of turtānu under Adad-
nirari‘s successors, Shalmaneser IV and Ashur-dan III.  
144
  Following Gibson (1975, p. 6). 
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been organised under the leadership of one hegemonic state. Given the lack of evidence to connect 
the conflict mentioned in the inscription with Assyria, the Zakkur inscription should, at best, only 
be taken as evidence for the volatility of political relations between states at this time, and the use of 
coalitions as a mechanism for resolving local conflicts.  
 
5.5 Discussion: Coalitions in the West Prior to the Reign of Tiglath-pileser III and the Anti-   
      Assyrian Coalition Theory. 
 
The current view that alliances formed in the west during the 9
th
 and 8
th
 centuries strictly as a 
response to Assyrian expansion does not sufficiently account for the trend of coalition formation 
common to this area during the 9
th
 and 8
th
 centuries. One of the main issues of contention here with 
this single model of alliance formation lies with the fact that the ARI, our main source of 
information on coalition armies in the west during this period, do not provide a complete or wholly 
trustworthy representation of the objectives or political dynamics of alliances during this period. 
Like the narratives concerning armies of single enemy states or peoples that faced the onslaught of 
the Assyrian army, the ARI always present the objectives of coalition armies from an entirely 
Assyrian perspective, which was largely a reflection of state ideology. The ARI do not provide 
details of the political or military objectives of coalition armies or indeed adequately justify a 
coalition‘s decision to engage in a military confrontation against Assyria. The states which 
participated in the Hatti coalition during the reign of Adad-nirari III, for example, are said in the 
ARI simply to have ―rebelled‖ during the reign of Shamshi-Adad V, and it is a logical conclusion to 
draw from this statement that the coalition army engaged Adad-nirari‘s forces at Paqiraḫubuna in 
805 BC in an effort to prevent their re-incorporation into the Assyrian empire. However, the 
Pazarcik inscription presents an alternate perspective of these events. While there is no reason to 
doubt the accuracy of Adad-nirari‘s claim that the coalition of states had formerly paid tribute to 
Assyria, even if this was some time before Adad-nirari‘s reign, the Pazarcik inscription suggests that 
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the direct cause of Adad-nirari‘s campaign during this year was the pressing need to intervene in a 
local conflict involving Kummuh, an Assyrian vassal, and the neighbouring state of Gurgum which 
was aided by a coalition of states. It is interesting to note here that without the Pazarcik inscription 
we would struggle to understand the cause of the conflict from the ARI alone, which says nothing of 
these affairs. If anything, this incident stresses the importance of having access to sources outside of 
the ARI when reconstructing historical events involving coalitions, even if those sources are still 
Assyrian in origin. While the ARI do present the objectives of coalitions, like other enemy armies, 
as ―anti-Assyrian‖, historians must consider the literary context of these claims and whether the 
―anti-Assyrian‖ actions of a coalition army in the west represent deliberate and concerted efforts by 
states to resist Assyrian expansion in this area or are simply the result of military actions directed 
against Assyrian intervention in local conflicts.  
 
A further problem associated with applying the anti-Assyrian coalition theory to all instances of 
coalition formation in the west during the 9
th
 and 8
th
 centuries concerns the fact that not all 
coalitions are known to have engaged the Assyrian army in battle. The Zakkur coalition is not 
known from Assyrian sources and although attempts have been made to connect this alliance with 
Assyria, there is little evidence to support this claim. While some coalitions attested in this area may 
have pursued anti-Assyrian policies, the example of the Zakkur coalition demonstrates that some 
alliances were certainly formed with the intention of pursuing local rather than international 
policies. Even where evidence does exist for conflict between Assyria and western alliances during 
this period, there is no reason why this should be taken as evidence that an alliance was formed with 
a strict anti-Assyrian policy. It is doubtful that an alliance formed for mutual defensive purposes 
would even make the distinction between a local or international threat, let alone be formed only 
with the intention of members banding together should the Assyrian king choose to concentrate his 
campaign efforts in the west in any given year. In the event that Assyria threatened a state who was 
a member of an alliance, coalitions were likely to mobilise on the basis of existing treaty 
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agreements, even if there was some acknowledgement that Assyria posed a mutual threat to all 
coalition states. The Pazarcik inscription alliance was likely such an example of a local coalition 
which mobilised in response to treaty obligations rather than as a coordinated and deliberate effort 
to resist Assyrian expansion. Thus, the Assyrian image of organised imperial conquest presented in 
the ARI was probably, in reality, more often than not ad hoc expansion brought about by the seizure 
of favourable military or political opportunities. Where a number of states were defeated on the 
battlefield together, as with coalition armies, Assyria could claim in the ARI to have defeated a large 
number of states simultaneously. Even if this defeat did not represent the formal incorporation of a 
state or states into the empire, or constitute regular tribute payments, the defeat of a coalition army 
nevertheless served to support one of the primary themes of the ARI, which was the heroic image of 
the Assyrian king.       
 
5.6 The Arpad Alliance of 743 BC 
 
Tiglath-pileser‘s annals indicate that Assyria‘s earliest intervention in the West came in 743 BC as a 
response to a rebellion by Mati‘il, the ruler of Arpad. According to the Assyrian source, the 
coalition mobilised against Assyria at the request of Mati‘il: 
 
―In my third palû, Mati‘il, [the son of A]taršumqa (Attar-šumkī), fomented a rebellious insurrection 
against Assyria and violated (his loyalty oath). [He sent] hostile messages about Assyria [to] the 
kings who …to the … of the land Hatti (Syria-Palestine) (and) … the land Urarṭu and (thus) caused 
en[mity] in all (of those) lands. Sarduri of the land Urarṭu, [Sulam]al of the land Me[lid], (and) 
Tarhularu (Tarḫularu) of the land of Gurgum [came] to [his] aid. [Between] the lands Kištan and 
Ḫalpi, districts of the land of Kummuḫu, [they] trusted in [one another’s strength and] drew up a 
battle array‖ (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 35, i 21‘-27‘a, p. 84). 
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Evidence from the Assyrian sources suggests that Arpad was the primary target of Tiglath-pileser‘s 
military operations during this period and that the defeat of the coalition was a consequence of 
Tiglath-pileser‘s efforts to re-subjugate Arpad. This assertion is supported by the entries made in the 
Eponym Chronicle for the years 743 to 740 BC which identify Arpad as the primary target of 
Assyrian campaign operations during this period (Millard 1994, p. 59)
145
:  
 
743    in Arpad; defeat of Urartu made 
742    to Arpad 
741    to Arpad, within three years taken.  
740    to Arpad.  
 
That the confrontation between Assyrian and coalition forces took place in territory pertaining to 
Kummuh should probably be taken as an indication that Tiglath-pileser had confronted the coalition 
on route to lend support to Arpad which was, by now, already under Assyrian siege
 146
. This is 
favoured over the now untenable suggestion that the coalition‘s presence in Kummuh‘s territory 
indicates that the alliance was attempting to force Kummuh, an Assyrian vassal-state, into an anti-
Assyrian coalition
147
. Tiglath-pileser‘s decision to confront the coalition army here rather than allow 
                                                 
145
  See also Tadmor & Yamada‘s translation (2011, pp. 12-13).  
146
 Following Astour (1979, p. 15). According to Astour (1979, p. 15), the only road available to Sarduri, who was 
marching from a north-easterly direction through Melid and the Taurus passes, passed through Kummuh on route to 
Arpad. 
147
 The current evidence suggests that Kummuh was also a participant in the coalition. Although Tadmor‘s earlier 
translation of the fragmentary summary inscription  (K 3751 (Tadmor 1994, pp. 154-175) suggested that Kummuh 
was under attack by coalition forces at the time of the military confrontation with Assyria: ―[Sarduri of U]rartu, 
Sulumal of Melid, Tarhula[ra of Gurgum, (against?)], Kuštashpi of Kummuh, (they conspired) to capture and 
despoil [Assyrian territory . . .] between the lands of Kishtan and Halpi, the districts of Kummuh . . . I defeated 
them.]‖, this interpretation of the text was possible only through reading ―against‖ in the lacuna at the beginning of 
91 
 
it to move further south into Arpad‘s territory makes good tactical sense. If Arpad was already under 
siege, Tiglath-pileser would have sought to prevent reinforcements from reaching the city. The 
arrival of coalition forces at Arpad could have been dire for the Assyrian army stationed there, 
which would have been positioned for a tactical siege and vulnerable to attack from a mobile 
invading army. Should coalition forces have been able to continue south into Arpad‘s territory, the 
Assyrian army positioned there may have subsequently been flanked by the invading army and 
forced into a retreat.   
 
Although we cannot always accept the claims made by Assyrian kings in their annals, the 
accusation made in Tiglath-pileser‘s annals that Arpad had revolted against Assyrian control is 
probably correct. An earlier treaty inscription between Mati‘il, the ruler of Arpad, and Ashur-nerari 
V indicates that Arpad had earlier been an Assyrian tributary state under Tiglath-pileser‘s 
predecessor, Ashur-nirari V (754-745 BC) (Parpola and Watanabe 1988, pp. 8-13)
148. Arpad‘s 
                                                                                                                                                                  
line forty-six, a reconstruction which is not supported in any of the duplicate texts. The latest translation of the text 
which appears in Tadmor and Yamada (2011, No. 47, 45-47, p. 122) omits this reading and correctly identifies 
Kummuh as a participant in this alliance: ―[(As for) Sarduri of U]rarṭu, Sulumal of Melid, Tarḫula[ra of Gurgum, 
…] Kuštashpi of Kummuḫu, [they (Sarduri and allies) ….] to capture and plunderl [Assyrian territory . . . Be]tween 
the lands of Kishtan and Halpi, the districts of Kummuḫu , I (utterly) defeated them and ….‖. Note also that the 
suggested reading of ―(they conspired)‖ has also been omitted from the more recent version. The participation of 
Kummuh in the coalition also fits with the Urartian evidence, which indicates that Sardurri had launched a 
successful campaign against Kummuh sometime priot to these events in 743 BC (see Salvini 1995, p. 52).      
148
  Note that the Sefire treaty, a bilingual inscription written in both Assyrian and Aramaic (see Fitzmyer 1995), has 
often been cited as evidence of Arpad‘s vassalage to Assyria at this time. However, this argument relies on the now 
disputed view that this inscription represents a vassal treaty (see Altman 2008, pp. 26 ff.) and the identification of 
the kingdom of KTK, the dominant party mentioned in the treaty inscription, with Assyria (for this view, see Parpola 
& Watanabe (1988, p. XXVII); Liverani (2000, p. 60), a notion for which there is no concrete proof. It may be noted 
that the identification of the kingdom of KTK remains a contentious issue in scholarship. Some scholars, such as 
Ikeda have gone so far as to identify Bar-gaʾya, the king of KTK, as none other than the turtānu Shamshi-ilu (1999, 
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rebellion, however, probably did not take place during Tiglath-pileser‘s own reign and should, more 
likely, be dated to the preceding period when Assyria was in decline
149
. Sarduri II, whose precise 
reign length remains uncertain, but who was definitely already on the Urartian throne during the 
reign of Ashur-nirari V (see Grekyan 2015, p. 99; Salvini 2011, p.93), records in one of his 
inscriptions that he had defeated Assyria in battle at Arpad (see Radner 2011b, p. 739; Salvini 1995, 
p. 52). The Urartian inscription mentions king Ashur-nerari V and that this defeat occurred two 
years after Sarduri had ascended the throne of Urartu (Salvini 1995, p. 52). Radner (2011b, p. 739) 
and Salvini (1995, p. 52) both date this event to 754 BC when the Eponym Chronicle records the 
entry ―to Arpad‖ (Millard 1994, p. 59), however this is far from certain150. Salvini admits that a 
given accession date of 756 BC for Sardurri II could potentially be off by a year (1995, p. 52), and 
assigning a date of 754BC for the Assyrian defeat on the basis of evidence from the Eponym 
Chronicle relies on the premise that the chronicle recorded every battle fought by the Assyrian 
army, which may not have been the case
151
. The Urartian inscriptions report that it was after this 
battle that Mati‘il made a treaty with Sarduri II (Salvini 1995, p. 52). Ashur-nerari V‘s failure to 
report on this battle in any of his insciptions suggests that the Urartian version of events which 
present the battle as resulting in an Assyrian defeat is probably accurate. Given that Ashir-nerari V 
did not venture west again during his reign, we may assume that the treaty Ashur-nerari V made 
with Mati‘il pre-dated Sarduri‘s campaign and ceased to be binding on Arpad after this time.  
                                                                                                                                                                  
p. 287), while others, such as Na‘aman, have identified KTK as a local Syrian political entity, specifically the 
combined kingdoms of Hamath and Hadrach (1978). 
149
  Given that so few campaigns were under taken by Assyria during Ashur-nerari‘s reign, it is difficult to know exactly 
when this revolt from Assyrian rule took place. 
150
 Astour assigns a date of 753 or 752 BC (1979, p. 4, but see 2.3 ʻThe Eponym Chronicleʼ. 
151
 This question relates to the issue of the precise meaning of the Eponym Chronicle entries and the question of 
whether the Assyrian army only campaigned once every campaign season. Tiglath-pileser‘s annals indicate that by 
this period the Assyrian king need not lead the army on every campaign mission, however it is not certain if this was 
the case in the previous period. See the discussion on this issue in Chapter 7. 
93 
 
Despite the claim made in the Urartian annals that Sarduri had defeated Ashur-nerari‘s army in 
battle, it is interesting to note that it was not only Assyria that avoided this area of contention in 
subsequent years. According to Salvini, Sarduri largely chose to concentrate his efforts elsewhere 
during the next decade, conducting campaigns against Malatya in the west, against Qulḫa in the 
north and Puluadi in the east (1995, p. 52; Fig. 1), perhaps suggesting that Sarduri‘s triumph over 
Ashur-nerari V‘s forces had taken a significant toll on Urartu‘s military capabilities. During this 
time, Kahn argues that Arpad seized the opportunity to expand its territory. This is supported by 
evidence that in the west Arpad incorporated land formerly under Umqi‘s control into its borders, 
and in the east it encroached on territory formerly belonging to Bit-Agusi (Kahn 2007, p. 76). 
Arpad‘s expansion, according to Kahn, saw the state emerge as the dominant power in the west in 
the middle of the 8
th
 century (2007, pp. 76 ff.). While Kahn may be somewhat overstating Arpad‘s 
power at this time, one wonders whether Arpad continued to pay regular tribute payments to Sarduri 
over the next decade or whether the receipt of tribute received by Sardurri from Mati‘il following 
the defeat of Ashur-nerari V‘s forces represented ‗spot tribute‘, or a one-off payment to bring about 
the withdrawel of Urartian forces from Arpad‘s territory. A subsequent campaign by Sarduri against 
Arme and three of Kummuh‘s cities, including Uita, Ḫalpa, and Parala152, may suggest that Urartu 
still retained a presence in this area. However, this incident is difficult to assign a date to and most 
scholars have sought, on the basis of very little evidence, to connect these events with 743 BC and 
therefore, to provide a probable cause for Tiglath-pileser‘s campaign against Urartu and the 
coalition in this year
153
. However, even Astour admits that there is no evidence that Sarduri ever 
managed to establish any long-term control over Arme (1979, p. 5), and there is no evidence that 
Kummuh was subsequently made an Urartian vassal as a result of this campaign (contra Kahn 
2007, p. 83). Indeed, the tribute which Sarduri received from Kushtashpi of Kummuh was likely 
                                                 
152
 For the location of these cities, see Astour (1979). 
153
 Astour (1979, p. 5) for example assigns a date of 746 or 745 BC while Salvini dates it just before 743 BC or in the 
same year (1995, p. 52) 
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also ―spot‖ tribute and did not constitute the incorporation of Kummuh as an Urartian vassal state.  
 
Still, the involvement of Urartu in the coalition and the Eponym Chronicle‘ entry for the year 743 
BC ―defeat of Urartu made‖ warrants comment and has led some to interpret Urartu‘s participation 
in the alliance as an indication of Sardurri‘s hegemony over the alliance (see Astour 1979, p. 6.). 
However, while it is clear from Urartian sources that Arpad and Kummuh were either conquered by 
or submitted to Urartu sometime during the decade preceding Tiglath-pileser‘s advance on the west, 
there are clearly problems with this model owing to a lack of other evidence. Urartu‘s receipt of 
tribute from Arpad and Kummuh in this period may not have consistituted the regular tribute 
payments that served as the basis of a sovereign-vassal relationship, and perhaps more importantly, 
there is no evidence that any of the other members of the alliance were tributary states of Urartu in 
this period. Indeed, the question of Urartu‘s real strength during this period was essentially 
answered in the conflict of 743 BC. The Assyrian annals present the clash between Assyrian and 
Urartian forces in 743 BC as a small skirmish, from which Sarduri made a quick retreat, and was 
certainly not the level of opposition one would expect from a rival power. From the report of the 
battle given in the ARI and the Eponym Chronicle entry for the year 743 BC which records ―a 
defeat of Urartu was made‖, it is more than likely that Urartu‘s participation in the alliance ended in 
743 BC when Sarduri fled the battlefield. Tiglath-pileser‘s success in this battle might solely be 
credited to the manoeuvrability of the Assyrian cavalry which were especially useful when fighting 
in mountainous terrain and could be effectively utilised to chase down fleeing armies (Dezső 2012a, 
pp. 45-48). However, given that Urartu was not able to launch any further counter-offensives to 
prevent Assyria‘s northern expansion during Tiglath-pileser‘s reign, reasoning would suggest that 
Urartu was prevented from any further military aggression by its inability to match Assyria‘s 
military power during this period. A later campaign by Tiglath-pileser III to Urartu in 735 BC 
resulted, according to the ARI (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 41, 21‘b-26‘, p. 103), in Sarduri‘s 
confinement to his capital Ṭurušpâ. Although Tiglath-pileser did not capture the city, probably due 
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to its location situated deep in the mountains in terrain difficult for an army to traverse, further 
evidence of Urartian decline during this period is given by Tiglath-pileser‘s report to have marched 
unopposed throughout the land of Urartu. Rather than support the image of a powerful hegemonic 
nation which dominated a coalition of north-Syrian states, this episode suggests that Urartu‘s 
military capabilities were already waining in 743 BC and that Urartu was likely in no position to 
assert a hegemonic leadership role over a coalition of north-Syrian states. Although Sarduri had 
managed to bring about an Assyrian defeat at the beginning of his reign, Sarduri‘s almost complete 
absence from north-Syria in subsequent years and Tiglath-pileser‘s crushing victory over Sarduri‘s 
forces in 743 BC suggest that Urartu was already in a state of decline when Tiglath-pileser marched 
west in 743 BC. 
 
If this is correct, then we might question the view put forward by scholars such as Astour (1979), 
Radner (2011a; 2010, p. 29), and Salvini (1995) that Assyrian expansion in this area was aimed at 
countering the growth of Urartian influence and expansion. Indeed, the Eponym Chronicle makes it 
clear that it was Arpad, not Urartu, which represented Assyria‘s primary target for conquest. 
Urartu‘s inability to effectively respond to Assyrian campaigning in this area must therefore be 
recognised for what is was ‒ a factor which contributed to the creation of conditions which favoured 
imperial expansion in this area, conditions which Tiglath-pileser must certainly have been aware of. 
In light of this, Tiglath-pileser‘s creation of a western empire was thus more likely to have resulted 
from seized opportunity rather than planned imperial conquest, and was, in part, dependent on the 
decline of Urartu during this period. While there were certainly economic and strategic reasons to 
attempt a conquest of Arpad
154
, these reasons should not be viewed in isolation from other 
                                                 
154
 Arpad was the capital of Bit-Agusi, a territory located in north Syria which was positioned at a juncture between   
      roads leading north into Anatolia, south towards south Syria and Palestine, and east towards Assyria and beyond.  
      Control over this region would have been highly prized both for its strategic significance and economic value.  
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contributing factors. Assyria had a history of defeat and weakness in the west which had earlier 
defined the reign of Tiglath-pileser‘s predecessor. When Tiglath-pileser III came to the throne in 
745 BC Assyria‘s defeat at Arpad by Urartian forces during the reign of Ashur-nerari V was not an 
event of the distant past. Tiglath-pileser had ascended the throne in a time of great internal 
instability when civil strife was threatening Assyrian cities, and it was likely that Tiglath-pileser‘s 
early campaign efforts were aimed at curbing these internal problems. With rebellion threatening a 
number of Assyrian cities, Assyrian campaigns during these early years may have served to divert 
both men of fighting age and professional soldiers capable of serving as mercenaries away from the 
Assyrian cities. Moreover, Assyrian victories not only resulted in the influx of tribute and booty to 
Assyria (see Elat 1982), but could also serve to reduce discontent among the population and the 
elites after Assyria had suffered through such a long period of decline. From an ideological 
perspective, Tiglath-pileser III‘s efforts to re-establish Assyrian control over Arpad, the setting of a 
recent Assyrian defeat, followed one of the basic principles of Assyrian foreign policy which sought 
the re-establishment of Assyrian control over lost territorial holdings. The recovery of lost territorial 
holdings represented one of the primary objectives of Assyrian campaigning during the 9
th
 century, 
when Assyrian kings sought to restore the traditional borders of the empire established under their 
predecessors in the 11
th
 and 10
th
 centuries largely lost due to the encroachment of Aramaean tribes 
in the 10
th
 century (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, p. 1; Liverani 2004). The re-subjugation of revolting 
vassal-states, moreover, was a primary duty of kingship, along with the further expansion of the 
empire‘s borders155. The recovery of a territory lost during the preceding period of weakness would 
not only provide confirmation of the empire‘s restoration during this period, it was a demonstration 
of Tiglath-pileser‘s fitness to rule156. Though the eventual subjugation of this area did present 
                                                 
155
 See Tadmor (1997;1999).  
156
 This goal was probably also responsible for inciting Tiglath-pileser‘s earlier campaign to the east where Assyria had 
lost a number of territorial holdings under Adad-nerari III (Diakonoff 1991, pp. 14-15. 
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Assyria with a number of economic and strategic advantages
157
, there is no indication from the 
evidence that Tiglath-pileser‘s initial intervention in this area was aimed at the conquest and 
annexation of the greater west, as some scholars suggest (Parker 2001, pp. 218-219; Radner 2010, 
p. 29; Tadmor and Yamada 2011, pp. 1-2). Further, the sources do not support the conclusion that 
the alliance which mobilised against Tiglath-pileser III in 743 BC was specifically ―anti-Assyrian‖, 
that is formed as a coordinated effort to resist Assyrian expansion. It is clear from the Assyrian 
annals that the coalition of states mobilised in 743 BC at the request of Arpad rather than in defence 
of their own autonomy, and it is likely that this mobilisation was based on existing treaty 
agreements or obligations. If we consider the historical context of Tiglath-pileser‘s campaigns then 
there seems little reason to suggest that this coalition would mobilise to oppose Assyria‘s efforts at 
imperial expansion at this time. Assyria had not actively been a threat to the western states since the 
days of Ashur-dan III (771-754 BC), and even then Assyrian military power had been in decline. 
Tiglath-pileser‘s campaigns prior to this point had also largely resembled raids, rather than 
organised imperial conquest, and there was certainly no precedent for Tiglath-pileser‘s sweeping 
conquest and annexation of this area which might encourage states to take a definitive stand against 
Assyria.  
 
5.7 Conclusion: 
 
                                                 
157
  The subjugation of this area not only allowed Tiglath-pileser to establish control over the rich trade networks which 
traversed this region and connected countries situated further inland, such as Babylonia and Iran, with the 
Mediterranean, it was also strategically valuable. The establishment of Assyrian control over this area would 
ultimately allow Tiglath-pileser to remove Urartu‘s ally base in North Syria and thus limit its ability to wield power 
and influence in the region. Assyria‘s annexation of this area would also provide a platform from which further 
campaign operations could be carried out northwards against Urartu in 735 BC, and into Syria-Palestine from 734-
732 BC. For the view that the 743 BC campaign was a response to Urartian expansion in this region, see Astour 
(1979 p. 6), Grayson (1998, p. 135) & Na‘aman (1991, pp. 90-91).   
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If we examine the Arpad coalition in the wider context of alliance formation in the west, it can be 
seen that there is strong reason to doubt the accuracy of the wider anti-Assyrian coalition theory, 
which attributes coalition formation in this area during the 9
th
 and 8
th
 centuries solely as a response 
to Assyrian campaigning and efforts at imperial expansion. The authors of the Assyrian sources 
presented coalitions as decidedly hostile to Assyrian interests
158
, yet, it is clear from the evidence 
that not all alliances attested in this period solely pursued anti-Assyrian policies. Alliances were an 
effective means by which local states could be protect and further pursue their own interests. Some 
alliances are reported in conflicts not with Assyria but with other local states, suggesting that 
coalitions might pursue local as well as international policies. This is not to say that anti-Assyrian 
                                                 
158
 Military encounters were used, in particular, to emphasise the king‘s military prowess and to present the king as one 
worthy of the Assyrian throne. This literary aspect of the Assyrian annals is discussed in 2.2.1. Given this, it is not 
surprising that coalition armies and their defeat were a popular theme in the ARI, since it was perceived that they 
were generally of a larger size than single-state armies. This impression is given in the description of the Qarqar 
alliance, which faced Shalmaneser III in 853 BC. In the Kurkh Monolith Stele, scribes not only gave the names of 
participating states but also the number of forces each state contributed (see 5.2.1). The purpose in providing this 
detail was almost certainly to impress onto the audience the considerable large size of opposition forces faced by the 
Assyrian king. The consequence of this being that there was a perception, at least among those composing the 
annals, that coalitions posed a greater challenge to Assyrian kings than did conventional armies comprised of only 
one state‘s forces. On this point, note that the scribes who composed Tiglath-pileser‘s annals often detailed the 
names of enemy states which faced Assyria alone or as part of a coalition, but do not give any fixed numbers on the 
size of enemy forces. Figures were, on occasion, given for the number of captives taken or deportees settled in 
foreign lands (see, for example, Tadmor and Yamada, 2011, No. 13, 11a-12b, 16b-18a, pp. 43-44), however, none 
are ever given for enemy forces faced in military encounters. I suspect that the absence of these figures relates to the 
relative weakened state of many of Tiglath-pileser‘s opponents who were not able, for one reason or another, to 
mount any effective resistance to Assyrian expansion at this time. This would account for why scribes placed so 
much emphasis on reporting the names of Tiglath-pileser‘s adversaries rather than the size of enemy forces, and 
possibly why so many individual Aramaean tribes are listed as subjugated peoples in the annals, a number of which 
are not found in Assyrian sources for any other time period either before or after Tiglath-pileser‘s reign. For a 
discussion of these tribes and their location, see Frame (2013).    
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coalitions did not exist in the West during this period, but rather, that alliance formation was 
common to this area and that its causes were probably varied. Of all the alliances examined above 
dating to the 9
th
 and 8
th
 centuries, only the Qarqar coalition can be considered an alliance likely 
formed in response to intensive Assyrian campaign efforts. Although alliances may have served to 
strengthen economic ties between states, most alliances were probably formed in response to strong 
regional rivalries which existed between states in this area.  
 
A re-assessment of the evidence for Tiglath-pileser‘s 743 BC campaign against North Syria shows 
that Tiglath-pileser‘s military activities here between the years 743 and 740 appear primarily 
directed against Arpad, rather than greater Syria, which drew the involvement of a local coalition of 
North-Syrian states. The re-subjugation of Arpad following its loss during the reign of Ashur-nerari 
V was likely pursued by Tiglath-pileser III because it represented territory lost during the earlier 
period of Assyrian decline. Though there is no denying that Tiglath-pileser‘s subsequent rapid 
conquest of the west was, in part, strategically dependent on the earlier subjugation of north-Syria, 
there is no reason to assume that the 743 BC campaign against Arpad had originally comprised part 
of a wider plan to conquer the west. If anything, Tiglath-pileser‘s subsequent thrust into Syria and 
Palestine was opportunistic, and likely brought about by the favourable political and military 
conditions that had taken hold here, the most significant being the decline of Urartu. 
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CHAPTER 6      Assyrian Imperial Policies and the Role of the            
Provincial System in the Growth of Empire 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The development of the province system in the 9
th
 century marked a turning point in the history of 
the Assyrian empire. The direct incorporation of foreign territory into the empire forced Assyrian 
kings not only to adapt their imperial policies, but also to negotiate a number of considerable 
administrative and military challenges resulting from this dramatic shift in policy. The incorporation 
of large tracts of annexed territory into the Assyrian empire requiring permanent garrisoning and 
administrative structures was far more costly than the vassal system, where Assyrian control was 
largely maintained through threat of force alone (see Parker 2001, pp. 250-251 & pp. 259-260 ). 
The establishment of permanent garrisons in annexed territory, however, was necessary not only to 
guard against possible uprisings, but also because the expansion of the ―land of (the god) Aššur‖ 
had established clear definable perimeters for the outer borders of the empire which required 
defending against foreign invaders (Postgate 1991). Since it was not possible to provide for the 
defence and security of these territories and to carry out further expeditionary campaigns using 
soldiers drawn from Assyria‘s ‗home‘ provinces alone, it became necessary from this period 
onwards to draw on foreign troops either through corvée service or as mercenaries to bolster 
numbers in the army. However, though foreign troops now appear regularly in the service of the 
army, it is clear that Assyria was still largely dependent on a local reserve of forces drawn from the 
Assyrian home provinces to sustain troop numbers during the 9
th
 century. The tremendous burden of 
supplying a steady stream of troops to the armed forces could explain why revolt is so frequently 
recorded in Assyrian cities during the 9
th
 and first half of the 8
th
 centuries
159
, and why Assyria was 
                                                 
159
 The revolts recorded in the Eponym Chronicle for the final few years of Shalmaneser III‘s reign (826-823 BC) 
(Millard 1994, p. 57), for example, have puzzled historians considering this period is marked by an intensive period 
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unable to sustain several surges of imperial expansion during this period. Under these conditions, 
Assyrian kings were faced with the challenge of maintaining the delicate balance between the 
increased military demands of the empire for manpower and retaining the continued support and 
loyalty of the home provinces, which still supplied the bulk of the army‘s military forces. From the 
reign of Tiglath-pileser III this situation was remedied through a series of military reforms. Greater 
numbers of foreign soldiers were now incorporated into the army, curbing the army‘s dependency 
on Assyrian cities to provide the bulk of the manpower for the army, and troops stationed in 
provincial territories were greater utilised, not only as expeditionary forces but also to provide 
logistical support to armies campaigning on the outer fringes of the empire. Campaigns were no 
longer initiated solely from the capital territory in Assyria but could now be deployed from 
anywhere in the empire, enabling Assyria to quickly respond to incidents of revolt and to carry out 
multiple campaign operations simultaneously. While it was probably the introduction of these 
reforms by Tiglath-pileser which were responsible for stabilising Assyria‘s domestic situation, by 
minimising the army‘s dependency on the home provinces to supply military forces, these reforms 
had a much larger impact on the growth of empire during this period, effectively removing the 
military constraints which had earlier bound Assyria and the limits of its imperial expansion. 
 
This chapter aims to provide an alternate framework from the economic model typically used to 
account for Assyria‘s transition to a territorial-based empire, which began in the 9th century and 
                                                                                                                                                                  
of successful imperial expansion, witnessing a substantial growth in Assyrian power and, what must have been, a 
vast increase in the wealth accumulated in Assyrian cities (Yamada 2000, pp. 225-271). The revolts recorded in the 
final years of Shalmaneser‘s reign show that Assyria‘s domestic uprisings during the 9th and first half of the 8th 
centuries were not isolated to the reigns of weak Assyrian rulers, and therefore cannot strictly be accounted for as a 
domestic reaction to the recession of the empire‘s borders. Shalmaneser III campaigned almost every year of his 
thirty-five year reign, and thus the internal strife noted in Assyrian cities at the end of his reign could have been a 
reaction to the military burden imposed on Assyrian cities during this period for maintaining and extending the 
empire. 
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culminated with the massive expansion of the province system carried out under Tiglath-pileser III. 
It must be stressed, however, that the theory proposed here, which seeks to explain this transition as 
resulting largely from the military needs of the empire, does not seek to challenge other 
explanations for Assyria‘s transition to a territorial based empire. Rather, the hope is that this 
discussion will add a further dimension to this debate by drawing attention to the military 
implications and advantages resulting from Assyria‘s pursuit of this imperial policy, which must 
ultimately be viewed as originating from the convergence of a number of different, often competing 
interests, such as ideological considerations, the demand for resources and manpower, and strategy, 
security and defence.  
 
6.2 Theories of Empire 
 
6.2.1  A Definition of Empire 
 
Doyle defines ―empire‖ as simply ―effective political sovereignty of another political society‖, 
whether formal or informal, and imperialism as the policy of establishing or sustaining empire 
(1986, p. 45). Formal control is achieved through annexation and the appointment of a governor to 
rule over the subordinate state with the cooperation of local elites, while informal control is 
maintained through local rulers who remain legally autonomous but politically dependent on the 
dominant state (Doyle 1985, p. 130). This definition of empire offered by Doyle is preferred over 
others because it avoids incorporating any disputed notions of the sources or motives behind empire 
creation. I stress this since most studies focusing on the history of the Neo-Assyrian empire tend to 
incorporate these notions into a definition of empire, a problem recently illustrated by Parker who 
states, ―most scholars would agree that empires are expansionist states that hold dominion over 
diverse subject polities of varying scope and complexity, and that these states are largely concerned 
with channelling resources from their subject territories to the core polity for economic benefit and 
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political perpetuation of a limited segment of the population‖ (2001, n. 29, p. 12)160, and hence  
presupposes that imperial expansion is the direct product of economic policy perpetuated for the 
sole benefit of the ruling classes. Though empires do characteristically exploit the economies of 
subjugated polities, the motive behind this exploitation is not always assured. Is the economic 
exploitation of conquered territories the chief purpose behind a state‘s imperial expansion, or is this 
merely a probable consequence of this expansion? The influence of economic policy on theories of 
imperialism is further discussed below in 6.2.3. 
 
6.2.2 The ―Network Model‖ Empire 
 
A very debated model of Assyrian imperialism proposed in more recent years is undoubtedly 
Liverani‘s ―Network Model‖. In the article titled ―The Growth of the Assyrian Empire in the 
Habur/Middle Euphrates Area: A New Paradigm‖ (1988), Liverani argued against the conventional 
territorial model or ―oil stain‖ pattern of Assyrian imperial expansion which views expansion as 
taking place through the conquest and physical incorporation of continuous areas of land into the 
Assyria empire. Rather, he suggests that Assyrian expansion took place through a process of 
establishing ―islands‖ of Assyrian occupied zones connected through a ―network of 
communications over which goods are carried‖ (1987, p. 86). According to Liverani, areas between 
Assyrian centres of control were occupied by vassal states, as well as enemy zones where local 
kings ruled independent of Assyrian control. Successive Assyrian campaigning and conquest, 
however, eventually consolidated territories through a gradual ―thickening‖ of networks which 
thereby resulted in an extension of Assyrian control (1987, pp. 85-86)
161. Though Liverani‘s model 
                                                 
160
 Note that this definition is similar to that offered by Adams (1979,  p. 59).  
161
  Note that the theory postulated by Liverani is applied by him only to the 9
th
 century, specifically from the reign of  
  Adad-nerari II (911-891 BC) to Ashur-nasirpal II (883-859), but theorised as a pattern of expansion continuing up  
 until the beginning of the reign of Tiglath-pileser III (Liverani 1987, pp. 91-2). 
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sought only to provide a paradigm for Assyrian expansion in the Habur/Middle Euphrates area for 
the reigns of Adad-nirari II, Tukulti-Ninurta II and Ashurnasirpal, the model has since been applied 
by other scholars, such as Parker
162
 and Bernbeck
163
, to other areas of the empire and viewed as a 
general model by which the extension of Assyrian authority and control can be understood. 
 
Postgate has criticised Liverani‘s primary thesis largely on the basis that this model misrepresents 
the manner in which Assyrian control was extended throughout administered territories. He argues 
that direct control of foreign administered territory will inevitably resemble a ―network‖ and not an 
―oil stain‖ because human habitation is not evenly distributed across a landscape. Assyria need not 
have assumed direct control over every parcel of land in a territory, so long as control was 
maintained over the major civic centres to which surrounding agricultural land was attached and 
linked through a communication network. Thus, in territories where Assyria maintained a 
permanent presence, there is no reason to assume that Assyrian control was not existent or waned 
between centres of occupation (1991, p. 255). Rather, Postgate envisions an imperial system where 
                                                 
162
 Parker‘s study of Assyrian expansion in the Upper Tigris River region of south-eastern Turkey, for example,  
 combined both the theories of Liverani (1988) and D'Altroy (1992) to explain the dynamics of Assyrian expansion  
in this area. Following Liverani (1988), Parker also views the empire as consisting primarily of a network of  
 ―communication and transportation corridors‖ (2001, p. 255) which were gradually thickened over time. He further  
 argues that Assyria established direct imperial control only over a select few agricultural areas in the Upper Tigris  
 which were economically and strategically valuable (2001, p. 255).  
163
 Bernbeck has more recently offered an alternate perspective of the network empire in the context of Assyrian  
expansion. Bernbeck agrees that the Assyrian empire took the form of a network model empire, however, disagrees 
with Liverani and Parker that this formed part of a deliberate policy aimed at territorial expansion. Rather, he      
 suggests that this model emerged as a result of Assyria‘s inability to exert significant military or political influence 
beyond the immediate periphery of Assyrian centres. He further argues against the identification of areas outside of   
 imperial control as ―buffer zones‖, or neutral areas located in contested areas between two rival powers, suggesting   
 that these peripheral areas were simply beyond the reach of Assyrian control and that Assyria never showed any  
 interest in administering them even after the reforms of Tiglath-pileser III (2010, pp. 152-153).  
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Assyrian control was tightly maintained and evenly distributed throughout provincial territories, 
suggesting that Liverani‘s network model is better applied to vassal states164 where Assyrian control 
need not have extended beyond the immediate periphery of the capital or seat of the local ruler in 
order to effectively enforce Assyrian control and authority
165
.  
 
Though Parker has argued that the Neo-Assyrian empire in the Upper Tigris River area 
predominately took the form of a ―Network Empire‖ rather than a continuous area of occupied 
territory, there is considerable evidence to show that Assyrian control was extended beyond the core 
centres in these territories. The existence of village managers, officials appointed to oversee local 
villages in provincial territories (Postgate 1979, p. 216), in particular, provides firm evidence 
against the network model empire and supports Postgate‘s theory that Assyrian control extended 
beyond the immediate periphery of major urban centres in occupied territory. In a letter from 
Tušhan (Lanfranchi and Parpola 1990, No. 21), drought has forced village managers to come down 
from the mountains to purchase straw for their respective communities. The official writing to the 
                                                 
164
 Note that Postgate prefers the term ―client‖ on the basis that the term ―vassal‖ holds feudal connotations (1991, p. 
252).  
165
 Postgate further suggests that where surrounding areas continued to be occupied by local autonomous rulers, this 
should not be interpreted as weakness in the imperial system, but rather a feature of Assyrian policy which was 
flexible and allowed local polities to co-exist where they were willing to cooperate with Assyria (1991: 256). It 
might further be pointed out that part of Liverani's argument is dependent on the notion that Assyrian kings during 
this period repeatedly utilised the same campaign trail along the Habur and Euphrates rivers, which he argues was an 
attempt to ―thicken‖ pre-existing networks of control (Liverani 1987, pp. 86-87). However, there are a number of 
other explanations which could account for why this area was repeatedly targeted by Assyrian kings during this  
 period. The fact that it was often necessary for Assyrian kings to mount campaigns in this area in order to collect  
  tribute raises the possibility that this revenue could be identified as spot tribute rather than annual tribute, 
suggesting that none of the cities situated in this area were regular tribute-paying states. Another possibility is that 
the states located in this area were regular tribute-paying states but frequently refused to pay this, forcing Assyrian 
kings to conduct regular campaigns in this area.  
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king makes it clear that it is his responsibility to ensure adequate provisions reach these village 
communities, stating ―They have sold (them) whatever harbu (straw) there was‖. Though this letter 
does not indicate whether these managers were local or Assyrian, it is clear from another letter, 
(Lanfranchi and Parpola 1990, No. 291, r. 5-6, p. 206), that village managers were under state 
control where they are designated rab ālāni ša šarri or ―royal village managers‖166. Indeed village 
managers appear to have formed only one part of a hierarchy of officials appointed to control and 
administer occupied territories. Another letter from the Nimrud corpus (ND. 2618) lists a number of 
villages or towns under the control of an appointed official (see Parker 1961, pp. 37-38). The 
official referred to in this text must have acted as an intermediary between the province's central 
administration and the lower-ranked village managers who managed the individual villages or 
towns. Thus, the evidence supports Postgate‘s thesis that Assyrian control penetrated beyond the 
immediate peripheries of major urban centres through a hierarchy of officials which formed part of 
a provinces administrative system.   
  
A further argument against the network model concerns the origins of this theory, which lay in 
modern examples of imperialism
167
, particularly that of the United States
168
 which has purposefully  
pursued informal empire in order to avoid territorial commitments. In the modern world-system, 
territorial commitments are typically viewed as burdensome and a largely unworkable model for 
                                                 
166
 Reference to ―village managers‖ is also made in several letters from the reign of Sargon II (Lanfranchi and Parpola 
1990, No. 3, r.3-9; No. 152, 15; No. 179: r.6).  
167
 See for example, Smith (2005, pp. 838 ff.; 2003) and Wilkinson (2003).   
168
 Bernbeck (2010) however, attempts to overcome the problems associated with comparing ancient and modern 
imperial systems in his discussion on the similarities between Assyria and the United States. In agreement with 
Liverani, Bernbeck views Assyria as essentially functioning as a network empire, which he compares with the 
modern example of the United States. In contrast to Assyria, however, which utilised urban centres and forts as 
―nodes‖, the nodes of the network empire created by the United States is predominately comprised of military bases 
(2010, pp. 143-144).    
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imperial expansion (Thompson and Zuk 1986, p. 251). This is explained by Thompson and Zuk, 
who state of territorial commitments, that ―there is an increased need for land-based armies (and 
their associated expenses) first to conquer the new territories, then to defend them against rivals, 
and, inevitably, to suppress/police subsequent tendencies toward revolt, unrest and disintegration. 
The territorial expansion of empire, while seemingly a ‗sun- never-setting‘ hallmark of politico-
economic success in the world system, can become a quagmire of world power‖ (1986, p. 250).  
Though some modern states may purposefully pursue a network model of empire because existing 
political and military conditions make it impossible for them to pursue a traditional territorial-based 
empire, it is important to remember that ancient empires were not subject to these same conditions 
which have given rise to alternate models of empire in more recent times. The 20
th
 century saw 
numerous conflicts, including two World Wars, the development of nuclear weapons, and the 
formation of the United Nations which has sought to put in place diplomatic processes and legal 
measures to prevent the use of force in the resolution of conflicts between nation-states. Following 
World War II, the United Nations further pushed for the ―decolonisation‖ of numerous occupied 
territories, a process and, in doing so, discouraged the creation of territorial empires. While the 
decolonisation of some territories has not always occurred peacefully, as the example of East Timor 
shows
169
, states which today seek to pursue territorial empires by violating the sovereignty of other 
nations face significant international pressure to withdraw and may even have sanctions imposed on 
them as a result
170
. States in the ancient world were not governed by these same circumstances 
which today actively seek to prevent and discourage states from pursuing a territorial empire, and 
                                                 
169
 East Timor was occupied and annexed by Indonesia in 1975 only nine days after declaring independence from 
Portugal. Following several decades of violent occupation, Indonesia finally surrendered control over east Timor in 
1999 under pressure from the United Nations. Clark concluded that Indonesia violated international law in its 
occupation of East Timor (1980), but has since not been held accountable for these violations by the international 
community. 
170
  The UN, for example, imposed significant economic sanctions on Iraq in August 1990 following Iraq‘s invasion of 
neighbouring Kuwait. However, see n. 169 on Indonesia‘s violations in East Timor.  
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thus often had no need to pursue alternate models of empire such as a network model empire. 
 
6.2.3 Economics: The Primary Driver of Assyrian Imperialism? 
 
The theory of economic imperialism views imperial conquest, resulting in either direct or indirect 
control, as motivated predominantly by a desire to establish control over the natural resources 
and/or wealth of other polities (Dmitriev 2009). It originated in the late 19
th
 century and was 
inspired by what was perceived as the formative policies of British colonial expansion and the 
influence of ―capitalism‖ on industrial societies (Dmitriev 2009, pp. 785-786). According to 
Dmitriev, the theory largely declined from the beginning of the 20
th
 century as a model used to 
account for the imperial policies of ancient empires, particularly that of ancient Rome, for a number 
of reasons (2009, pp. 785-790). The theory not only presupposes that ancient economies functioned 
as capitalist systems
171
, it was based on the idea that imposing imperial control over a subordinate 
polity in the ancient world required a formal organisation, which it did not (2009, p. 787). 
Economics continues to be put forward as the primary explanation for ancient imperial policies 
(see, for example, Adams (1979, p. 59); Eisenstadt (1979, pp. 21 & 25); Ekholm and Friedman 
(1979)
172
; Gurney 1979, p. 163); Parker (2001), and has remained the focus of discussions on the 
imperial policies of the Neo-Assyrian empire. It is common in discussions on Assyrian imperialism 
for scholars to suggest that expansion was pursued in some areas because they supported vital 
networks along major trade routes that Assyria sought to control
173
, or where annexation was 
                                                 
171
 Though capitalist production and markets existed in ancient economies, capitalist institutions, whereby traders and 
producers exercised power within existing political systems, did not emerge until the 16
th
 century (Chase-Dunn & 
Sokolovsky 1983, pp. 358-359). See, however, the objections of Ekholm and Friedman to maintaining a clear 
distinction between pre-capitalist and capitalist societies (1979).  
172
 Ekholm and Friedman go so far as to view imperialism as the necessary consequence of economic processes aimed 
at capital accumulation (1979, pp. 44-46).  
173
 This theory is particularly argued for Babylonia and the Levant, both incorporated into the empire during the reign 
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pursued, that Assyrian territorial control was aimed at the direct exploitation of the economies of 
subjugated states
174
. Rather than view economic exploitation as one possible motivation behind 
imperial policies
175
, these theories take the economic result of expansion as the very reason for the 
existence of imperial policies.  
 
There are several reasons to doubt the notion that Assyrian imperial policy, particularly the move 
towards the territorial annexation of subject polities, was shaped solely by economic interests. 
Firstly, there is no evidence to show that a definitive link existed between Assyrian campaigning 
and trade routes
176
, nor is there any evidence to support the notion that the primary aim of territorial 
expansion was to take control of the economies of conquered nations, though it is clear that the 
empire's operation and continued expansion was dependent on a continuous supply of resources and 
manpower
177
. While the Assyrian elite certainly did benefit from the pursuit of imperial policies 
through the proportionate distribution of booty and tribute
178
 (Elat 1982, p. 244), it is also clear that 
it was necessary to redirect a substantial proportion of resources back into the empire in order to 
pay officials, support the army, build infrastructure, and generally ensure the continuing operation 
of the empire (Elat 1982, p. 245; Postgate 1979, pp. 202-205). Without this support from taxation, 
                                                                                                                                                                  
of Tiglath-pileser III. For Babylonia, see the works of Brinkman (1968, pp. 228) and Cole (1996, pp. 69 ff.), in 
particular. In regard to the Levant, this view is particularly expressed by Bennet (1978: 165), Ehrlich (1991, pp.54), 
Ephʻal (1984, pp. 146-151), and Tadmor (1966, pp. 87, 90 & 91).   
174
 For the role of economic exploitation in imperial policy, see, for example, the works of Brown (1986, pp. 109-112), 
Gitin (1997), and Parker (2001). For the theory that Assyrian imperial policy was motivated by both a desire to 
control trade routes and to exploit the  natural resources of conquered territories, see Bedford (2009, pp. 44 and 48).  
175
 Doyle notes that though exploitation presupposes political control, it does not always result from the imposition of 
that control (1986, p. 33).  
176
 See the reservations expressed by Grayson on this issue (1976, p. 135).  
177
 For this, see Postgate (1974). 
178
 Identified here as governors, military commanders and high-ranking officials employed in the various civil and 
military administrative systems of state.   
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the empire could simply not have functioned
179
, and thus the empire operated largely as a 
redistributive model (Fig. 3) rather than as a one-way economic model, simply absorbing wealth 
and resources from the periphery to the core centre (Fig. 2)
180
.  
 
Figure 2 – A One-Way Economic Model    
       
                                                              
 
       
 
 
 
 
→ = manufactured goods, raw materials and other forms of wealth from taxation 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
179
  Reservations regarding the economic motives of Roman expansion have likewise been expressed by Dmitriev: 
―Roman taxes and levies went either to feed the city of Rome or to maintain armies along the borders. At least 
during the imperial period, therefore, the Roman military machine required more money than it could possibly bring 
in, which allows one to question the economic motive behind Roman military policy‖ (2009, pp. 793-794).  
180
 This is not the say that Assyria did not likely absorb a large bulk of the wealth from the annexed territories, but that 
it was necessary to re-distribute some of these resources and wealth back to the annexed territories as a means of 
promoting their operation and to redistribute some of the wealth back to the elites and high-ranking officials which 
resided in these territories (see Elat 1982).    
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Figure 3 – A Redistributive Economic Model 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
→ = manufactured goods, raw materials and other forms of wealth from taxation 
 
A further argument against an economic motive for Assyrian territorial expansion is the fact that 
Assyria was able to gain effective control over the economy of subjugated states already through 
the vassal system (see 6.3.1), and while annexation may have facilitated this in some ways, the 
decision to impose direct territorial rule in areas of the empire cannot be understood through 
economic policy alone where military and ideological considerations also provided strong 
incentives for the imposition of direct territorial control. Indeed, it is clear that some areas annexed 
to Assyrian control must inevitably have incurred an economic loss, where the cost to Assyria of 
imposing and maintaining direct rule was much higher than the sum total of taxes and resources 
directly extracted from the territory. The Zagros Mountains, an area which formed a natural border 
for Assyria to the east and north-east, is one such example of an area of the empire where Assyria's 
annexation policy was more likely governed by issues of security and defence than economic 
policy. This area was inhabited by polities which largely supported a pastoral economy, and where 
the chief commodities acquired by Assyrian kings during the course of their campaigns were horses, 
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cattle and sheep. Although economic
181
 and even ideological considerations
182
 have been proposed 
as possible reasons for Assyrian campaigning here, this area formed Assyria‘s vulnerable eastern 
and north-eastern borders and was occupied by mountainous terrain both difficult to traverse and 
defend. Assyria‘s annexation policy therefore, while probably being shaped by other economic and 
ideological factors, can be viewed as resulting largely from the need to provide for the security and 
defence of Assyria proper, particularly against Urartu in the north, which Tiglath-pileser had not yet 
defeated in battle when he begun his expansion into this area
183
. It is no wonder that parts of the 
Zagros were already subject to Assyrian annexation even before the reign of Tiglath-pileser III
184
. 
Tiglath-pileser‘s further penetration of the eastern frontier, deep into Median territory, was probably 
pursued as a reaction Urartu‘s earlier campaigning in this area185  and was also an effort to 
                                                 
181
 Brown has attributed Assyrian campaigning here to a desire to control agricultural lands (Brown 1986, pp. 109 ff.), 
while Jankowska and Reade have both argued that this area was used to supply the state with a regular source of 
horses (Jankowska 1967, p. 266; Reade 1979, p. 329). 
182
 Lanfranchi has noted that the Medes retained a reputation among the Assyrians for being uncivilised and barbaric on 
the one hand, but also fierce and strong warriors whose conquest might pose a challenge to Assyrian rulers and serve 
to promote their heroic image (2003, pp. 85-92). This image is evident in the inscriptions of Tiglath-pileser III where 
the Medes are repeatedly referred to as ― the mighty Medes‖, KUR Madai dannūte (see Tadmor 1994, Summ. 1, 18; 
Summ 3, 13‘; Summ. 7, 32 & 36; Summ. 6, 15). Lanfranchi notes further evidence for this portrayal of the Medes 
from letters and inscriptions dating to the reign of Sargon II (2003, p. 90).     
183
 Lanfranchi argues that Assyrian expansion into this area was primarily strategically driven, aimed at gaining military 
supremacy over rival powers, such as Elam and Urartu, and depriving them of valuable allies in this region who 
could supply them with troops, horses and aid (2003, pp. 98-99). While Urartu‘s military weakness was made 
apparent in 743 BC when Tiglath-pileser defeated Sarduri in battle, along with a number of North Syrian states, 
Urartu would have been perceieved as a very real threat to Assyria when Tiglath-pileser ascended the throne in 745 
BC following Assyria‘s defeat by Urartian forces sometime during the reign of Tiglath-pileser‘s predecessor (see 
Chapter 5).  
184
 Mazamua/Zamua is a case in point. 
185
 See Lanfranchi (2003, pp. 98-99). Note, however, the objections of Brown (1986, pp. 109 ff.) and Reade (1979, p. 
329) to this thesis who both propose economic explanations for Assyrian expansion in this area.     
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reconquer those regions lost in the preceding period of weakness. 
 
6.2.4 Agricultural Exploitation: A Current Trend in Theories of Economic Imperialism 
 
Assyria‘s dependence on foreign supplies of agricultural staples was first emphasised by Oates who 
concluded that the agricultural land of Assyria proper was not able to support the population of the 
chief major urban centres of Nineveh and Calah, which exceeded the subsistence capabilities of 
surrounding agricultural land by at least half (1968, p. 45; see also Reade 1978). Postgate further 
noted that this coincided with an increasingly urbanised population which had moved away from 
subsistence occupations, forcing the government to seek out alternative supplies of staples from 
foreign sources to ensure an interruption in supply from one area did not threaten the overall food 
supply (1974, pp. 201-202). From this, some scholars have argued that Assyrian territorial 
expansion in some areas was chiefly motivated by the desire to exploit the agricultural potential of 
these territories and to safeguard these areas against rival powers, in effect providing ―food 
security‖ to the Assyrian core territory (Parker 2001; Brown 1986). However, Radner (2000) has 
questioned the validity of this view that Assyria proper was as inhospitable to agricultural 
production during the Neo-Assyrian period as previously thought, despite being largely comprised 
of steppe
186
. She argues that during the Neo-Assyrian period Assyrian kings actively sought to 
increase the agricultural potential of their land in Assyria proper through irrigation projects (Radner 
2001, p. 237-8). Indeed, Ur argues that the irrigation projects undertaken by the Neo-Assyrian kings 
in northern Mesopotamia would have significantly boosted the agricultural potential of Assyria 
proper, making this area less dependent on rainfall and allowing for the increased production of 
winter crops, and perhaps also of summer crops which required substantially more water (2005, p. 
                                                 
186
  It is generally considered that only those areas on the Upper Tigris and Habur Basin such as Nineveh, Kalhu, Dur-
Sharrukin, and Arbela received enough rainfall to support rainfed agriculture (Harmanşah 2012, p. 61; Kühne 2000, 
p. 272; Novák 2005, p. 178; Radner 2000, p. 236). 
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343). These projects, combined with the fact that Assyria, outside of the few major urban centres, 
was largely rural and capable of maintaining some degree of self-sufficency without having to rely 
exclusively on grain imports from outside sources. Nevertheless, some historians have continued to 
argue that food security represents the leading reason behind Assyria‘s push for territorial expansion 
during this period.    
 
In his study of the dynamics of Assyrian imperial expansion in the northern empire, Parker argues 
that Assyrian territorial expansion in the Cizre Plain and Upper Tigris River Valley was largely 
motivated by the agricultural potential of these areas which served as vital ―agricultural supply 
zones‖ for Assyria proper187. In Parker‘s view, it was not merely the need to procure these resources 
which led to an annexation policy in this region, it was also the necessity of safeguarding the supply 
of these goods and ensuring that a steady stream of staples continued to flow into the Assyrian 
heartland, which drove territorial expansion (2001, pp. 80-102 & 206-247). For Parker, strategic 
concerns aimed at limiting Urartian expansion were secondary to Assyria‘s primary motivation of 
exploiting the agricultural potential in the Upper Tigris River region, at least. However, the textual 
evidence cited by Parker for Assyria‘s agricultural exploitation of these areas is extremely limited. 
For the Upper Tigris River area, letters discussed are predominantly concerned with provincial 
administration, military matters and timber supplies (Parker 2001, pp. 227-230), with specific 
mention of agricultural goods limited to a report on the supply of straw to local villages and the 
movement of oxen and sheep (Lanfranchi and Parpola 1990, No. 21), as well the supply of red wool 
to the palace (Lanfranchi and Parpola 1990, No. 28) during the reign of Sargon II (Parker 2001, p. 
230). For the Cizre Plain, only one letter is presented by Parker which concerns grain exports 
                                                 
187
 Note, however, that Parker views the imposition of different models of Assyrian control in the Cizre Plain, including 
vassal-states (Kummuh) and buffer-states (Ukku), as a reflection of the zone‘s geographical location bordering on 
the state of Urartu, and thus asserts that Assyrian expansion here was also determined by the strategic importance of 
this area (2001, p. 101).    
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(Parker 2001, p. 87), and interestingly enough, this refers to a shortage of grain in the Mašennu 
province, and an explanation by an Assyrian official as to why grain was taken from the grain tax to 
feed hungry troops stationed here (see Lanfranchi and Parpola 1990, No. 289, pp. 202-203). This 
letter emphasises the very important point that a considerable portion of agricultural produce drawn 
from provinces was needed to feed troops and facilitate the operation of provincial territories, and 
that much of the agricultural resources extracted from these territories would never have reached the 
core centre in Assyria. This notion that a significant portion of food stuffs produced in provinces 
were required to support the local administration stationed there is confirmed in SAA V 225 where 
a local official in Mazamua by the name of Adad-issiya complains to the king that the quota of 
1,000 homers of grain demanded by the central government exceeds the agricultural capabilities of 
his province compared with other neighbouring provinces which had ample surplus not only to feed 
the bureaucracy stationed there, but also animals and to sow (Lanfranchi & Parpola 1990). Indeed, 
the bulk of agricultural produce drawn from provincial territories was more than likely retained and 
consumed locally, not only because it was needed to support the military and bureaucratic 
population and their families residing there, but also because long-distance transport of food staples 
via land routes was incredibly expensive (Lattimore 1979, p. 37). Though the high cost of transport 
might be substantially reduced by the use of river transport, which Parker suggests was a major 
factor influencing Assyria‘s decision to expand into the Cizre Plain (2001, p. 81), there still remains 
a distinct lack of direct evidence that Assyria exploited the agricultural potential of these regions 
overwhelmingly for the benefit of the core Assyrian centre
188
.  
 
A similar thesis was proposed by Brown (1986, pp. 109-112) for the northern and central Zagros, 
                                                 
188
 Note, however, the objection of Harmanşah who argues that Parker‘s thesis of ―agricultural colonisation‖ is largely          
      based on Assyrian evidence for deportations and that the survey evidence cited by Parker might alternatively be               
      interpreted as evidence of a response by the local population of this area to renewed settlement in the region brought         
      on by Assyrian expansion (2012, p. 61).    
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who asserts that Assyrian expansion here, at least before the mid-7
th
 century, was aimed at bringing 
the rich agricultural valley regions under Assyrian control (1986, pp. 109-110) and tapping into the 
trade networks which passed through this area (1986, p. 112). According to Brown, Assyrian 
involvement here from the 9
th
 century coincided with the changes in the Assyrian economy outlined 
above (1986, pp. 111-112)
189
. As with Parker, Brown views economic considerations as the primary 
driver of Assyrian imperial expansion, asserting that Assyria's annexation of the Kermanshah area 
in the late 8
th
 century could not have been motivated by strategic interests, given that Urartu had 
ceased to be a threat by this period. However this assertion is highly questionable, and indeed, the 
annexation of this area from 716 BC under Sargon II did, in fact, coincide with Assyrian military 
offensives against Urartu further north. Though this period witnessed some dynastic instability and 
open rebellion in Urartu against Rusa, the Urartian king, one letter (Parpola 1987, 8) reports that 
Urartu had launched several offensives against Mannea around this time, capturing a number of 
Mannean forts (715) and assuming direct control of the Mannean province of Wišdiš (714) 
(Lanfranchi and Parpola 1990, p. XIX). Indeed, Lanfranchi and Parpola suggest that on the basis of 
Assyrian letters, it is clear that Sargon conducted military operations against Urartu for most of his 
reign (1990, n. 3 & p. XV). Given this, it is more likely that annexations in this area were carried 
out in an attempt to limit Urartian expansion further south, which was clearly, still very much a 
threat to Assyrian interests in this area.  
 
Although recent research has cast doubt on the theory that food security for the Assyrian core was a 
leading driver of Assyrian territorial expansion, we may still aknowledge that the need to secure 
Assyria‘s access to staples, such as food, played at least some role in encouraging Assyria‘s 
territorial expansion even if it was not the primary driver of imperial expansion.  
                                                 
189
 The agricultural exploitation of this region for a core market is not likely given the vast distance between this area 
and Assyria proper. Lattimore states that historically grain ceased to be profitable when transported beyond 100 
miles from steppe-frontier-areas due to high transportation costs (1979, p. 35).   
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6.3 Military Campaigning and the Army 
 
6.3.1 The Purpose of Assyrian Campaigning  
 
From the very beginning of the Assyrian empire, military campaigning had served the fundamental 
purpose of maintaining defence and security, a purpose which continued up until the fall of the 
Assyrian empire (Grayson 1976, p. 135; Saggs 1984, p. 246). However, the Assyrian annals never 
distinguish absolutely between offensive and defensive military actions, and most justifications for 
war centre around the need to provide offensive military action (see Oded 1992). Since we can be 
certain that it was necessary at times for Assyria to carry out defensive campaigns, either to secure 
Assyrian interests or to defend Assyrian territory against incursions from foreign powers, we may 
conclude that the image of warfare portrayed in the annals results from the tendency of the annals to 
only promote themes which support the heroic image of the Assyrian king. As Oded concludes, 
justifications for war are centred very much on supporting the royal ideology of the state (1992, p. 
179), and thus a distinction between offensive and defensive campaigns is never fully made in the 
annals.  
 
In the absence of security concerns, military campaigning was the primary tool employed by 
Assyria in the creation and extension of empire. With the incorporation of vassal-states and annexed 
territories under Assyrian rule, campaigning served to ensure the loyalty of subjugated states and 
was used to suppress rebellions, to force payment of tribute where it had been withheld and to 
reassert Assyrian control over disloyal subjects. Regular campaigning aided in perpetuating an 
image of the Assyrian army as a fierce and unrelenting war-machine, which served not only to deter 
rebellion but also to encourage states to surrender to Assyria without the need for armed conflict. 
Although it is clear that Assyria also utilised other mechanisms to promote the loyalty of its subjects 
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and to gain the acceptance of subjugated people to Assyrian control (Lanfranchi 1997), warfare was 
the primary instrument of Assyrian control and the ultimate source of Assyria‘s power.    
 
Through regular campaigning the state was sustained through a regular supply of commodities, 
including valuable items, raw materials and staples sourced from subjugated nations and peoples 
taken as booty. Spoil supplied the state with most of the materials and commodities needed for the 
operation of the empire, including the supply of the army
190
. Perishables very likely never found 
their way to Assyrian centres, being consumed immediately by the army, while horses and other 
equipment seized were used to outfit troops (Grayson 1976, p. 135). Elat has noted that tribute, by 
contrast, was primarily comprised of luxury items, fewer in quantity, and of less overall value than 
booty. Tribute, thus, did not make as large a contribution to the imperial economy as booty. Its 
purpose, according to Elat, was to supply the ruling elite with luxury items and to reconfirm the 
loyalty of vassal states (1982, p. 245), made known through a very public ceremonial display which 
served as a visual reconfirmation of Assyrian power firmly integrated into the ideology of the 
empire
191
. Given the importance of booty to the imperial economy, Grayson subsequently argues 
that it was the pursuit of booty which served as the primary objective of Assyrian campaigning, at 
least in the 9
th
 century (1976, p. 135). Yet, we must consider that the acquisition of commodities 
continued as a major economic objective of campaigning even during the reign of Tiglath-pileser III 
when scholars typically stress that campaigning was carried out predominately to facilitate Assyria‘s 
                                                 
190
 Indeed, Grayson has argued that during the 9
th
 century Assyria was still largely dependent on the king‘s annual 
military campaign to source much of the state‘s raw materials and labour (Grayson 1976, p. 135). Yamada‘s analysis 
of the goods obtained by Shalmaneser III during the course of his campaigning as either booty or tribute supports 
this notion where significant quantities of horses, livestock, metal and metal objects, textiles, ivory, wood, and wine 
are recorded (Yamada 2000, pp. 259-71).  
191
 Ashurnaṣirpal II makes specific reference in one inscription to the public display of tribute-bearers, stating that he 
had purposefully gathered all the people of his land to witness tribute-bearers making their annual tribute payment in 
Calah (see Wallis Budge and King 1902, No. 76, IV: 17-22, 47-50, p. 201 and pp. 203-204)   
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imperial expansion.   
 
Before we consider the evidence for this, it is first necessary to distinguish a further source of  
revenue derived from Assyrian campaigning – that of ―spot tribute‖. In addition to booty or spoil 
seized from defeated opponents, goods were also obtained by Assyria through campaigning as ―spot 
tribute‖192, distinguished from the traditional tribute or madattu received on an annual basis in the 
Assyrian capital from existing Assyrian vassal-states (see Postgate 1974, pp. 119ff.). Spot tribute 
was received during the course of a military campaign from a subjugated state either to avoid 
military conflict or as a sign of submission by a subjugated state or people following a military 
defeat
193
. However, this payment did not necessarily indicate that a prior hegemonic relationship 
had existed between Assyria and the subjugated state/people, nor that the states/peoples which paid 
spot tribute continued to make this payment once the Assyrian army had withdrawn. In contrast to 
annual tribute, spot tribute was entirely dependent on military campaigning for its acquisition, 
represented a larger sum than did annual tribute, and was received outside of Assyria proper in the 
context of Assyrian military campaigning as a sign of the submission of a local ruler under threat of 
force or continued military aggression (Yamada 2000, p. 239). Though the Assyrian inscriptions 
never make any attempt to differentiate between the two types of tribute (Yamada 2000, n. 21, p. 
237), spot tribute constituted a major source of revenue for the empire, was akin to booty in its 
source and acquisition, and should not be confused with conventional ‗tribute‘.     
 
The following table provides a detailed list of the booty and spot tribute acquired by Tiglath-pileser 
                                                 
192
 The term ―spot tribute‖ was coined by Yamada (2000, pp. 236-241), but this type of payment was originally referred 
to by Elat as ―tribute of surrender‖ (1986, p. 244).  
193
 Following Elat (1982, pp. 245 and 249 n. 9) and more recently Yamada (2000, pp. 236-241). Note that some 
distinction was already acknowledged by Postgate in Taxation and Conscription in the Assyrian Empire (1974, p. 
122).   
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III during the course of his campaigns. Although the list is not complete, being limited by the 
fragmentary remains of the Assyrian annals
194
, the aim of this table is to show that though many of 
the areas targeted by Tiglath-pileser III were subsequently annexed, the booty and spot tribute 
acquired during the course of this campaigning also represented a significant economic objective 
for military campaigning during this period.  
 
Table 8 – Booty and Spot Tribute Acquired by Tiglath-pileser III195 
Geographical Area (I),  
Year (II) 
Contents of Booty or ―Spot‖ 
Tribute 
Place (I) and Context (II) Text  
(I) Babylonia 
 
(II) 745 and 731-729 BC 
  
Unidentified amount of 
spoil taken  
I) Aramaean tribes situated 
in Babylonia ―by the banks 
of the Tigris, Euphrates and 
Surappi rivers, up to the 
Uqnu river by the shore of 
the Lower Sea‖ 
 
II) Taken as booty 
Summ. 7, 5-9 (No. 47)  
(I) Namri 
 
(II) 744 
An unidentified number of 
Bit-Kapsi, Bit-Sangi, Bit-
Urzakki: Unidentified 
number of Bactrian camels, 
cattle, sheep, and craftmen. 
 
Araziash: unidentified 
number of horses, cattle, 
sheep, and lapis lazuli.  
 
Bit-Abdadani: 300 talents of 
lapis lazuli
196
 and other 
goods, including bronze 
(Ann. 12 is damaged here)     
 Ann. 11, 1-8 (No. 7) 
                                                 
194
 Due to the fragmentary nature of the annals I have found it necessary to rely in part on data found in the summary  
 texts. Despite the fact that these texts lack any firm chronological framework, the value of these texts in informing 
us of the contents of Assyrian booty/spot tribute during this period far outweighs the negative aspects of including 
this data here. Thus, though the inclusion of these texts makes it impossible to draw specific conclusions regarding 
the nature of individual campaigns, the information on booty/spot tribute provided by these texts does show  
 that a definitive link existed between Assyrian campaigning and booty during our period. Dates are provided where 
possible, however, the data is overall arranged in geographical order as per the arrangement of these texts.   
195
 Texts cited for specific campaigns are those determined by Tadmor (1994, pp. 232-237, ―Supplementary Study A‖).  
196
 Note that Tadmor (1994, n. 10, p. 50) questions the reading of ‗lapis lazuli‘ here given the huge quantity cited.  
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Arpad 
 
743-740
197
 
Urartu: Horses, craftsmen 
without number 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kummuh, Tyre, Que, 
Carchemish, and Gurgum:  
Unidentified sum of iron, 
elephant hides, ivory, red-
purple and blue purple 
wool, multi-coloured 
garments, linen garments, 
weapons and spindle-shaped 
implements. 
 
Damascus: unknown 
quantity of gold (text 
broken), 300 talents of 
silver, 200 talents of an 
unknown commodity (text 
broken), 20 talents of 
Ladanun, as well as other 
items unknown due to text 
break.   
 
 
Unqi: 300 talents of silver, 
100 talents of an unknown 
commodity (text broken), 
weapons, multi-coloured 
garments, linen garments, 
herbs and furniture from the 
palace of Tutammu, the king 
of Unqi.  
 
It is clear from the text these 
goods were taken only from 
a raid conducted on 
Sarduri‘s camp. It is unclear 
whether the craftsmen were 
attached to Sarduri's camp 
or were inhabitants of the 
mountains where the 
military confrontation had 
taken place.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Received as spot tribute in 
740 from Damascus 
following the defeat a 
coalition of forces, 
comprising Kummuh, Tyre, 
Que, Carchemish, and 
Gurgum
198
, and the 
successful conquest of 
Arpad.   
 
 
Campaign undertaken in 
740 during the final year of 
the siege against Arpad.  
Ann. 17, 10'-14' (No. 9). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ann.21, 7‘-10‘ (No. 11); 
Ann. 25, 1‘-2‘ (No. 12). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ann.21, 4‘-6‘ (No. 11) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ann. 25, 3‘-10‘ (No. 12) 
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 Due to the fragmentary state of the annals pertaining to Tiglath-pileser‘s campaigns against Arpad and the coalition 
of Anatolian states, for which the annals are fragmentary (No. 9/Annal 17, No. 10/ Annal 20, No. 11/Annal 21, and 
No. 12/Annal 25 in Tadmor and Yamada 2011), it is necessary here to draw on data from the summary inscriptions 
concerning the nature of the booty sourced during this campaign.   
198
 Melid is not mentioned here but may have offerred tribute along with his coalition partners following the defeat of 
the coalition forces. The text is too broken, however, to know for certain. See Tadmor and Yamada (2011, No. 11, 1'-
10', p. 38). 
122 
 
Ulluba 
 
739 
 
None noted. The annalistic 
text pertaining to this 
campaign is extremely 
fragmentary.  
                     
— 
 
Ann. 20, 1‘-8‘ (No. 10); 
R.R, 16-46
199
 (No. 
Syria. 
 
 
738 
 
 
 
 
* Three minor campaigns 
were also conducted in this 
year north-east of the Tigris 
river by Assyrian governors 
 
 
The dating of a list of 
tribute bearers from Ann. 
13-14
200
 may be dated to 
this year, though this is 
contentious.  
 
 
 
The booty claimed 
comprised large quantities 
of captives, as well as 
livestock.  
I) North Syria is subjugated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A separate campaign was 
also carried out this year by 
Assyrian governors against 
Aramaeans tribes situated 
on the Zab river and several 
cities located in the vicinity 
of Der.  
Ann. 19 (No. 13), 13 (No. 
14), 14, 1-5
201
 (No. 15).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ann 19, 13-20 (No. 13); 
Ann. 13, 1-9 (No. 14).  
Media 
 
737 
 
 
No booty is recorded for 
this year in the annals
202
.    
  
 
Ann. 14, 5-12 (No. 15); 15 
(No. 16), 16
203
 (No. 17). 
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 = The Mila Mergi Rock Relief, a text whose latest publication appears in in Tadmor and Yamada (2011,  No. 37, pp. 
89-92. 
200
 Note that part of the list has been reconstructed using the duplicate annal No. 32 (see Tadmor and Yamada 2011, pp. 
76-78). For a discussion of the issues surrounding this list, see Tadmor (1994, pp. 265-268, ―Supplementary Study 
D‖). 
201
  Texts 30, 31, 32 have been identified as duplicates of these annals (Tadmor and Yamada 2011). 
202
 This is not surprising since it is likely that Tiglath-pileser‘s continued presence in Syria during this year was aimed   
 at the consolidation of Assyrian control over this area and not at further conquest. If this assertion is correct then it   
 is more likely that commodities received by Assyria from subjugated nations represented tribute rather than spoil. 
The list of tribute bearers recorded in text Nos. 14-15 from the cities of Anatolia as far north as Tabal, Central and 
Southern Syria, as well as the coast of Philistia may be indicative of this, though the dating of this text, as well as the 
tribute list from the Iran stele (No. 35) citing many of the same tributary states, are problematic (see Tadmor and 
Yamada 2011). The ruler of the coastal city of Tyre is given as Hiram in the annals and Tub'ail in the Iran stele. A 
further problem concerns the omission of Hamath from the Iran Stele (No. 35), see Tadmor (1994, pp. 265-268, 
―Supplementary Study D‖). Tadmor concludes, following Cogan (1973, pp. 97-98) and Na‘aman (1978: 229-230), 
that the annalistic texts date to 738 BC while the Iran stele (No. 35) dates earlier, probably to 740 BC, and make use 
of an earlier source when Tub'ail was still king of Tyre. The omission of Hamath from the Iran stele (No. 35), 
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735 BC Captives, mules, horses, 
asses, cattle, sheep. Total 
number uncertain due to 
fragmentary nature of texts.  
I) Urartu 
 
II) Taken as booty 
Ann. 5 (No. 18). 
734 BC Gold, silver, multi-coloured 
garments, linen garments, 
horses. 
I) Gaza.  
 
II) It is unclear whether the 
contents should be 
identified as booty or spot 
tribute
204
.   
Summ 4: 8‘-10‘ (No. 48).  
734 BC 10 talents of gold, X talents 
of silver, and an unidentified 
sum of property 
I) Israel  
 
II) Received as spot tribute 
following a military 
confrontation with Israel 
and the replacement of the 
city‘s ruler, Peqah, with 
Hosea.  
Summ 4: 15‘-19‘ (No. 42). 
734 BC 1,000 captives
205
, 30,000 
camels, 20,000 cattle, 5,000 
(pouches) of spices, and an 
unidentified sum of 
property, including idol 
statues 
I) Samsi, queen of the Arabs 
at Mount Saqurri 
 
II) Taken as booty 
Summ. 4: 19‘-22‘ 
734 BC Gold, silver, camels, she-
camels, and spices 
I) Tribes of Masa, Tema, 
Saba, Hayappa, Badanu, 
Hatte, Idiba‘ilu 
 
II) Received as spot tribute, 
possibly following the 
subjugation of Samsi, queen 
of the Arabs during the 
course of Tiglath-pileser's 
campaign to Syria-Palestine. 
Summ. 4, 27‘-33‘ 
733 BC Damascus: 800 people with 
their possessions, cattle and 
sheep. 
 
I) Damascus 
 
II) Taken as booty 
Anns. 23, 18/24
206
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
however, remains a mystery which not likely be solved until further evidence is uncovered surrounding the political 
and military circumstances of Assyria‘s war in Syria between 740 and 739 BC.   
203
 Text No. 28: 3-7 is the duplicate of these texts (Tadmor and Yamada 2011). 
204
 Tiglath-pileser states in his inscriptions that he despoiled the property of Hanun, as well as his gods (Tadmor and 
Yamada 2011, No. 42, 10‘, p. 105), yet he further states that after he had returned Hanun to his former position he 
received the goods identified above (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 42, 12‘-15‘, p. 106). It is not clear whether 
these goods represent spot tribute or constituted the spoil originally taken from Hanun.  
205
 See Tadmor‘s note regarding the exact reading of the number of captives taken in line 20' of text No. 42 (Summary 
Inscription 4) (1994, p. 142).  
206
 These two duplicate texts are too fragmentary to include in the analysis of booty given.  
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Districts of Damascus: 
Kuruṣṣa and Sama: 750 
captives 
Metuna: 550 captives 
731-729 BC  
 
Sarrabanu: 55,000 captives 
together with their 
possessions, and an 
unidentified sum of spoil, 
property and goods 
belonging to Nabu-
ushabshi, ruler of Bit-
Shilani, including his wife, 
sons, daughters and gods.  
 
Tarbaṣu and Yaballu: 30,000 
people together with their 
possessions, their property, 
their goods and gods. 
 
 
Dur-Balihaya: 40,500 
people with their 
possessions, spoil, property 
and goods, as well as the 
wife, sons, daughters and 
gods belonging to Zaqiru, 
the ruler of Bit-Sha'alli 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bit-Dakkuri and Larak: 
silver, gold and precious 
stones of an unidentified 
quantity.  
 
Bit-Yakin: various products 
made of gold, pearls, beams 
of ebony wood, medicinal 
plants, multi-coloured 
garments, spices cattle and 
sheep.   
Chaldean tribes:  
 
I) Bit-Shilani, specifically 
the cities of Sarrabanu, 
Tarbaṣu and Yaballu. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
II) Booty taken during the 
course of Tiglath-pileser‘s 
campaign against Babylonia 
 
 
 
I) Bit-Sha'alli, specifically 
the cities of Dur-Balihaya 
and Amlilatu 
 
 
 
 
 
II) Booty taken during the 
course of Tiglath-pileser‘s 
campaign against Babylonia 
 
 
I ) Bit-Dakkuri, Larak and 
Bit-Yakin 
 
 
 
II) Spot tribute. Probably 
offered to avoid a military 
confrontation following the 
defeat of Bit-Amukkani. 
This is suggested by the fact 
that Tiglath-pileser received 
the tribute of Merodach-
baladan in Sapiya, the 
former capital of Bit-
Amukkani.    
  
Anns. 7 & 8
207
 
 
Summ. 7, 15-18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summ 7, 19-22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summ. 7, 26-28 
 
As Table 8 shows, booty as well as spot tribute constituted a major source of revenue for the 
Assyrian empire during the reign of Tiglath-pileser III
208
. The vast majority of references made in 
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 These are too fragmentary to include here in this analysis.   
208
 Even if we do not accept that the figures given in the ARI are wholly accurate (for a discussion of this issue see De 
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Tiglath-pileser‘s inscriptions to tribute constitute ‗spot tribute‘ rather than ‗annual tribute‘ received 
from existing Assyrian vassal-states, which must have been recorded elsewhere. That Tiglath-
pileser III continued to receive these payments annually from a number of subjugated nations is 
clearly articulated in a commemorative inscription from Iran which, following an extensive list of 
subjugated states, remarks, ―(tribute that) I am to receive annually in Assyria‖ (Tadmor and Yamada 
2011, No. 35, iii 30, p. 87). Table 8 further shows that booty and spot tribute provided substantial 
incentives for military campaigning, particularly against nomadic peoples which did not possess 
defendable cities and thus constituted easy targets for the Assyrian army. The subjugation of Samsi, 
queen of the Arabs by Tiglath-pileser III during the course of his 734 BC campaign (Tadmor and 
Yamada 2011, No. 43, 19‘b-27‘a, pp. 106-107) was almost certainly motivated by the economic 
quest for commodities, and Tiglath-pileser‘s annals specifically make mention of the fact that this 
tribe did not possess any defendable structures which might offer protection in the face of an 
Assyrian assault). In contrast to annual tribute which served to reconfirm the loyalty of vassal-
states, spot tribute like booty may have also served to supply the army with regular staples. In 738 
BC, for example, booty and spot tribute sourced from campaign operations carried out by Assyrian 
governors east of the Tigris, was transported (presumably along with the army sent on campaign 
here) to Syria where Tiglath-pileser‘s other forces were stationed rather than the Assyrian capital 
centre (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 13, 12b-14a, p. 43 & 16b-18a, p. 44), suggesting that like 
booty, spot tribute served to provide the empire with much of the commodities required for its 
operation.  
 
In addition to the quest for commodities, it is clear that annual campaigning was also motivated by 
ideological factors. Military campaigning served to legitimise the Assyrian king‘s position as head 
of state and was an explicit duty of kingship closely connected with the king‘s responsibility to 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Odorico 1995; Fouts (1994; Millard 1991) we may still conclude on the basis of the frequencies of reference to 
booty and spot tribute in the ARI that this constituted a significant form of revenue for Assyria.  
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extend the borders of the empire (Tadmor 1999, p. 55). To this end, military campaigning was 
pursued almost single-mindedly by Assyrian kings, where the extent to which the borders of the 
empire were expanded became a measure determining the overall success of an Assyrian king‘s 
reign (Grayson 1976, p. 135). The king‘s heroic attributes, particularly those which highlighted his 
strength, endurance, and military skill, were as a result strongly emphasised in the ARI, and 
illustrated in relief sculpture which adorned the walls of royal palaces (Fuchs 2011, pp. 381-383; 
Tadmor 1997, pp. 326-327)
209
. This preoccupation with conquest is clearly evident in the adoption 
of such titles as ―king of the universe‖, ―king of the four quarters‖ and ―ruler over all‖ by the king 
in the inscriptions of Tiglath-pileser III (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 39, 1-3, p. 96) and in the 
content of the royal inscriptions which emphasise the value of military conquest, often describing 
the violent nature of military conquest in explicit detail in an effort to emphasise the strength and 
power of the Assyrian king. Text No. 39, 8-11a (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, pp. 96 ff.) provides such 
an example from Tiglath-pileser‘s annals, describing the conquest of Bit-Shilani, as follows: ―I 
smashed the land Bit-Šilāni in its entirety like a pot. I destroyed the city Sarrabānu, its (text: ―their‖) 
great royal city, (making it) like a tell after the Deluge and I [plun]dered it. I impaled Nabû-ušabši, 
their king, before the gate of his city <while making> (the people of) his land <watch>. I carried off 
his wife, his sons, his daughters, his possessions, (and) the treasures of his palace‖.   
 
6.3.2 The Assyrian Army          
 
Manitius addressed the issue of the composition of the Assyrian army in several articles published 
in the early 20
th
 century (1910), and his conclusions have remained largely uncontested by scholars 
even today (Saggs 1963, p. 145; Postgate 2000, p. 89). Nevertheless, the presence of new evidence 
and the possibility of alternate interpretations of the existing body of evidence has continued to 
produce a number of significant works on the Assyrian army (Dezsὅ 2006; Dubovský 2004; Fales 
                                                 
209
 See Oded on the typical heroic feats performed by the Assyrian king (1992, pp. 155-157). 
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2010; Fuchs 2011; Malbran-Labat 1982; Mayer 1995; Postgate 2000, 2007; Reade 1972; Saggs 
1963). There is no need to add much to the discussion concerning the constitution of the Assyrian 
army, but rather mean to address the broader issue of the operation of the army and the roles played 
by the various military bodies in the maintenance and extension of empire in the later Neo-Assyrian 
period. The aim of this discussion is to note, in particular, the changes made to the operation of the 
military system during our period which might have assisted Tiglath-pileser III in expanding the 
borders of the empire and asserting Assyrian authority over conquered territories. Due to the lack of 
evidence from the time of Tiglath-pileser III, it is necessary to examine the army with respect to the 
greater Neo-Assyrian period and to make use of evidence pertaining to the later period, particularly 
that of Sargon II‘s reign for which a greater abundance of evidence exists.  
 
The Assyrian army of the Neo-Assyrian period was comprised of forces drawn from both Assyria 
and, increasingly from the 9
th
 century, conquered territories from which soldiers were largely 
incorporated into the army through the state‘s ilku-system (see Postgate 1974, pp. 218-226). These 
forces lacked a standard structure and varied in size, ethnic composition, and what Fuchs defines as 
‗combat value‘ (2011, pp. 387-388). Assyrian210 and foreign soldiers served in a number of different 
capacities in the armed forces, and possessed varying skill-sets. In addition to officers, the army 
included cavalry, chariotry, slingers
211
, spearmen, archers, and a range of infantry-men equipped 
with various weapons, many specific to their own country of origin
212
. Assyrian sources attest to the 
existence of two main military bodies during our period: the kiṣir šarrūti or ―royal cohort‖213  which 
                                                 
210
 I use this term for forces drawn from the home provinces recognising that these troops were likely comprised of a 
number of different ethnic groups absorbed from throughout the empire and were thus not all, strictly speaking, 
―Assyrian‖.  
211
 The term adopted for nāš kabābi by Reade (1972, p.104). 
212
 For the specific roles of these soldiers, see in particular the works of Dezsὅ (2006), Fales (2010); Postgate (2000), 
and Reade (1972).  
213
 Following Postgate (2007, p.17).  
128 
 
was stationed in the capital and fell under the direct command of the Assyrian king
214
 (Postgate 
2007, pp. 348-349), and the ṣab šarri or ―king‘s men‖ which operated in the provincial territories 
under the authority of the governors (Postgate 1974, pp. 219-223). The precise role played by each 
unit in the operation of empire, as well as their individual status, is problematic and difficult to 
determine on the basis of the available evidence (see Fales 2010, pp. 140 ff.).  While it may be 
tempting to view the kiṣir šarrūti as comprising the core forces of the army and the ṣab šarri as 
simply reinforcements (see Fuchs 2011, p. 387), the evidence, particularly from the reign of Tiglath-
pileser III onwards, does not support this conclusion and reveals that the organisation and operation 
of Assyria‘s forces was far more complicated.    
 
The kiṣir šarrūti is typically referred to as ―the standing army‖ by Saggs (1963) and others (Mattila 
2000, p. 5; Reade 1972, p. 101), following Manitius (1910, pp. 114-117)
 
who asserted that though 
the army was largely comprised of conscripted soldiers, it also included professional soldiers which 
served in a permanent capacity in the armed forces from the 8
th
 century (Saggs 1963, p. 145). The 
term ―standing army‖, however, has more recently been criticised by Postgate, who questions the 
notion of permanence as it relates to both kiṣir šarrūti and ṣab šarri forces. He argues that this term  
is misleading, since it suggests that only the kiṣir šarrūti were battle-ready year round, when in fact 
the ṣab šarri was also, technically speaking, a ―standing army‖, since it too operated on a 
permanent basis year-round (2007, p. 351). Yet, most troops were conscripted under the ilku-system 
from both Assyria and the provincial territories on a temporary basis and thus were not strictly-
speaking a ―standing army‖, since they only operated seasonally (Postgate 1974, pp. 223-224). 
However, it is clear from the evidence that some soldiers, both Assyrian and foreign, served in the 
army in a more permanent capacity (2007, p. 346 & n. 29, p. 347)
215
. We thus cannot systematically 
                                                 
214
 These were stationed in one of the Assyrian capital cities and housed in permanent barracks called ekal masharti. 
These barracks are first attested during the reign of Shalmaneser III (858-824) (Saggs 1984, p. 252).                                                                                                       
215
 Units of Ituʼaeans, Gurraeans and Hallateans appear to have served in a long-term capacity in the army (Postgate  
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differentiate between the kiṣir šarrūti and the ṣab šarri by the terms under which soldiers served, 
nor can we distinguish between them on the basis of whether they employed solely Assyrian or 
foreign troops
216
. 
 
In addition to expeditionary forces, the kiṣir šarrūti was also comprised of the king‘s internal 
security forces. The organisation of this military body is reconstructed by Mattila as follows on the 
basis of evidence from ―The Horse Lists‖217 dated to the reign of Sargon II (2000, p. 153):  
 
kiṣir šarrūti 
qurubtu – personal forces of the king 
           - ša qurbūti, ‗royal bodyguard‘ 
            - ša šēpē, ‗personal guard‘ 
ekalli, under the rab ša-rēši 
            city units 
            of Assur 
            of Arrapha 
            Arameans 
            of Arzuhina 
            of Arbela 
                                                                                                                                                                  
 2007, p. 351). These units were each presided over by a prefect, suggesting that they represented elite units which 
served in a permanent capacity in the army (SAA VII No. 5, No. 11, No. 20 & No. 38, Fales and Postgate 1992, pp. 
8-9; SAA VII No.11, r.2, Fales and Postgate 1992, pp. 20-21). That the Itu'aeans certainly comprised part of ṣab 
šarri forces is clearly shown in the list of ṣab šarri forces given for the province of Mazamua in SAA V No. 215 
(Lanfranchi and Parpola 1990).  
216
 For the recruitment of foreign soldiers into the Assyrian army during Tiglath-pileser III‘s reign, see Kaplan (2008).   
217
 Documents referring to military personnel in the cavalry and chariotry of the Assyrian army discovered at Nimrud in 
a building dubbed ―Fort Shalmaneser‖. The texts were more recently published by Dalley and Postgate (1984).   
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            deportee unit   
 
Very little is known about the organisation and composition of these forces due to a lack of 
evidence. It is known that these troops fell under the direct command of the king rather than the 
provincial governors (Postgate 2007, pp. 348-349) and, as the Horse Lists suggest, cohorts appear 
to have been organised on the basis of where troops were drafted from, such as Assur and Arrapha. 
Yet, other sources indicate that the king could also form a cohort or kiṣru from foreign soldiers (see 
Postgate 2007, p. 347) and thus the kiṣir šarrūti was not just formed from soldiers drawn from 
Assyrian cities. The actual number of troops included in the kiṣir šarrūti is not known. Postgate 
remarks that this could not have amounted to a force of any considerable size purely on the basis of 
logistics, noting, ―No administration will take kindly to feeding and housing a large body of idle 
troops‖ (2007, p. 351). Indeed, though the kiṣir šarrūti supported units of foreign troops these were 
probably not large units by the later Neo-Assyrian period
218 
when conquered peoples were 
predominantly incorporated into the army as ṣab šarri219 troops via the provincial system. These 
forces acted almost as independent units under the authority of the provincial governor with each 
providing for their own upkeep (Fuchs 2011, p. 387)
220
.  
 
                                                 
218
 Dalley and Postgate (1984, p. 36) note that the Assyrian unit was by far the largest of the units, in terms of cavalry 
and chariotry, at least. However, this reflects only the military organisation of the kiṣir šarrūti under Sargon II‘s 
reign and thus may not provide an accurate representation of the size or composition of these forces in the 9
th
 and 
first half of the 8
th
 century prior to the military reforms of Tiglath-pileser III.   
219
 Though the existence of an Aramaean unit in these forces could be identified as a specialised elite fighting unit 
within the army, the inclusion of this unit, along with a deportee unit, is more likely the result of the historical 
circumstances surrounding the development of the army (see Dalley and Postgate 1984, pp. 36-37). 
220
  Fuchs argues that this independence had resulted from the absence of a central administrative structure capable of 
managing every aspect of the day to day running of these forces. This would have included keeping track of 
payments made to army personelle, as well as the provision of housing, food, equipment etc. (2012, p. 387). 
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Though there is substantial evidence available for the employment of ṣab šarri forces in campaign 
operations from the middle of the 8
th
 century onwards, there is little evidence attested for the use of 
these troops as expeditionary forces during the 9
th
 century, largely because fewer provincial 
territories existed from which to draw regular units of troops. One indirect reference to the 
employment of ṣab šarri troops is made in letters TH 9 and TH 3, dated to the reign of Adad-nirari 
III, which concern orders given to the governor of Guzana to contribute troops (presumably ṣab 
šarri) to the army of the turtānu for a campaign (see Mattila 2000, p. 123). There is also reference 
made to Aramaean units serving in the army during the 9
th
 century
221
, which are probably also to be 
identified as ṣab šarri troops222. Though evidence from sources outside the ARI is not extensive for 
this period, the limited evidence available nonetheless suggests that provincial forces were not 
frequently employed in expeditionary campaigns during the 9
th
 century and probably served 
predominantly in annexed territories as immobile security forces. This, however, does not 
necessarily indicate that Assyria did not make extensive use of troops drawn from conquered 
territory in expeditionary campaigns. It is clear that some vassal-states had military obligations 
imposed upon them and were required to supply troops to the army, firmly indicated by 
Shalmaneser III‘s statement that he was able to muster the kings of Hatti for a campaign against 
Que in 839 BC (Grayson 1996, A.0.102.10, iv 22-23, p. 55)
223
. However, there is also evidence that 
                                                 
221
 Postgate cites evidence for the employment of Aramaean groups in the Assyrian army during the 9
th
 century, 
including the Itu‘aeans, Ruqahaeans, Hallataeans, Habinu, and Hamataeans (2000, ns. 68 & 69, p. 101). 
222
 SAA XVII No. 75 is a letter from Nabû-šar-ahhešu, an officer on duty in Borsippa, who refers to the stationing of 
Itu‘a, Iaduqu and Rihiqu as troops ―whom the king, my lord, stationed for the guard with me‖, suggesting that the 
Itu'a were stationed in Borsippa as ṣab šarri forces. The identification of Itu'a troops as ṣab šarri is definitively 
made, however, in Nimrud Letter 89 (SAA V No. 215), see below.  
223
 Note, also, that Sargon II later remarks of Assyrians settled in Hamath, that he ―imposed upon them tax and tribute,    
 corvée work and the obligation to join expeditions as the kings, my forefathers had imposed on Irhuleni of Hamath‖  
 (Yamada 2000, n. 367, p. 182). While we may question Sargon‘s claim that Assyria had retained Hamath as a vassal 
state on a continuous basis from at least the 9
th
 century when earlier Assyrian kings had campaigned in this region, it 
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foreign troops were incorporated into the army during earlier times through deportation which 
resulted in the resettlement of subjugated enemy troops in Assyria proper. Tiglath-pileser I (1114-
1076) states for example, ―with the support of Aššur, my lord, [I defeated] 12,000 troops of the 
extensive Mušku. [The remaining] troops I uprooted (and) brought down into my land‖ (Grayson 
1991, A.0.87.2 18-20, p. 33). The term―my land‖ is probably referring to Assyria here, a view 
supported by the fact that later texts report on large numbers of subjugated enemy troops being 
deported and resettled in Assyrian capital cities during the reigns of Ashurnasirpal II (883-859)
224
 
and Shalmaneser III (858-824)
225. In reference to the conquest and subjugation of Bīt-Adini in 855 
BC, Shalmaneser III states: ―I uprooted (and transported) 17,500 of his troops. I took for myself 
Aḫunu together with his troops, gods, chariots, (and) horses, brought (them) to my city Aššur, (and) 
regarded (them) as people of my land (Grayson 1996, A.0.102.5 iii 5-6, pp. 29-30)
226
, suggesting 
that large numbers of troops were acquired by Assyria in this way. Although no figures are given for 
the number of troops removed from their lands, specific reference to the deportation and 
resettlement of enemy troops in Assyria is also found in the ARI in connection with Shalmaneser‘s 
campaign against Namri in 843 BC (Grayson 1996, A.0.102.14, 93b-95, p. 67) and against Bīt-
Ḫaban in 835 BC (Grayson 1996, A.0.102.14, 125-126a, p. 68). The resettlement of foreign troops 
                                                                                                                                                                  
is likely that there is some truth to this claim that when Hamath served as an Assyrian vassal state it was subject to 
military obligations under the terms of this agreement.    
224
 For the reign of Ashurnasirpal II, see Grayson 1991, A.0.101.1, ii 31-33; iii 43-44; iii 45-46; iii 53-54, pp. 193-223).     
225
 References found in Assyrian texts to the capture of enemy soldiers following their defeat probably also refers to 
this practice of using soldiers from subjugated armies to replenish troops numbers in the Assyrian army. These 
troops were probably absorbed into the Assyrian army on the spot. Following the completion of the campaign, these 
troops were likely re-settled in Assyrian lands where they could later be called up for military service along with 
other men performing their state service.   
226
 Note that in text A.0.102.10: i 48b-ii 6a the figure given for the number of troops resettled in Assyria from Bīt-Adini 
is given as 22,000 (Grayson 1996, p. 52).    
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in Assyria proper was clearly aimed at bolstering troop numbers in the Assyrian army
227
, which 
would have been subject to significant depletion over time as a consequence of aggressive 
expansionist policies which saw warfare carried out on an almost continuous basis. Given that 
campaigns were launched from the Assyrian capital centres during this period
228
 where the army 
was mobilised in preparation for the commencement of a campaign, it would have been necessary 
to settle soldiers in Assyria proper so that these troops could be conscripted along with local 
soldiers to perform their ilku-service. These foreign troops are probably to be connected with the 
―Deportee Unit‖, noted later as part of the ―City Units‖ of the kiṣir šarrūti in the Horse Lists of 
Sargon II (Dalley and Postgate 1984, p. 37). Despite the continued presence of these foreign troops 
in the kiṣir šarrūti under Sargon II, the incorporation of foreign troops into the army via this means 
was not very efficient. Since Assyrian centres were required to support these troops, the number of 
foreign troops incorporated into the army in this way could not exceed the capacity of Assyrian 
centres to support them, and thus Assyria was limited in the number of foreign troops that could be 
directly incorporated in the army in this period. Under Tiglath-pileser III, the bulk of Assyria‘s 
fighting forces, comprising both professional soldiers as well as soldiers conscripted from both 
Assyrian and external provincial territories, were stationed outside of Assyria and thus the burden of 
                                                 
227
 Although Reade notes that Assyrian sculptures of the 9
th
 century rarely depict foreigners serving as soldiers in the 
army (1972, pp. 101-107), this is more likely an indication that foreign troops resettled in Assyria were absorbed   
 into the local Assyrian population than it was that they did not serve in the army at all. The fact that foreigners are 
only found regularly depicted as soldiers serving in the army on illustrative reliefs from the reign of Tiglath-pileser  
 III onwards (1972, pp. 101-107), indicates that the reforms made to the organisation of the army during this period, 
where conscription was initiated directly through the annexed territories, made it no longer necessary to transport    
 and resettle foreign troops in Assyria proper for their incorporation into the army.    
228
 Ashurnasirpal II launched campaigns early in his reign from Nineveh (Grayson 1991, A.0.101.1, i 69b-70a, p. 198), 
but then from Calah following the city's restoration (Grayson 1991, A.0.101.1, iii 1, p. 212; A.0.101.1, iii 26b-028, 
p. 214; A.0.101.1, iii 50b, p. 216; A.0.101.1, iii 56b, p. 216; A.0.101.1, A.0.101.1, iii 92-93, p. 219). Shalmaneser III 
is noted as launching campaigns from Nineveh (Grayson 1996, A.0.102.2, i 29b, p. 15; A.0.102.2, ii30b, p. 19; 
A.0.102.2, ii 78b, p. 22).  
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supporting these troops was redirected away from Assyria proper and distributed more evenly 
throughout the empire. The evidence for this re-organisation of the army from the reign of Tiglath-
pileser III will now be presented.   
 
From the middle of the 8
th
 century, troops drawn from subjugated states and peoples were 
predominantly incorporated into the army as ṣab šarri troops, and with the expansion of this corps 
came significant changes in regard to the military operation of the empire. ṣab šarri forces stationed 
in the provincial territories now increasingly assumed responsibility for the defence and extension 
of the empire under the command of Assyrian officials and provincial governors
229
. Evidence for 
the employment of ṣab šarri forces in campaign operations during the 8th and 7th centuries is 
summarised in the following table
230
: 
 
Table 9 – Evidence Pertaining to the Use of ṣab šarri Troops in Campaign Operations 
Date  Evidence 
738 BC – The reign of 
Tiglath-pileser III 
The annals refer to three different campaign operations
231
 conducted by the governor of the 
land of the Lullumaeans (Mazamua), the governor of Na‘iri, and one unknown official whose 
name is missing due to the fragmentary condition of the text. These operations were conducted 
independent of the Assyrian king while he was occupied in Hatti (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, 
No. 13, 18b-20b, p. 44 & No. 14, 1-3a, pp. 45-46). The forces involved in this separate 
military operation were undoubtedly ṣab šarri troops pertaining to each governor's respective 
provincial territory.  
                                                 
229
 Postgate has already noted the frequency with which ṣab šarri were employed in campaign operations (1974, pp. 
219-220; 2007, pp. 334 & 345-346 ). 
230
 Most of this evidence comes from letters, however, the annals also indirectly refer to the employment of ṣab šarri in 
campaign operations where they refer to campaign operations led by the provincial governors. It is assumed here 
that where the annals refer to campaigns conducted by Assyrian governors, they are directly attesting to the use of 
ṣab šarri as expeditionary forces.    
231
 See below for the argument that three different campaign operations are reported in the text.  
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Exact date unknown – 
The reign of Tiglath-
pileser III 
Letter NL 65 contains a report to the king on the combined military action of the governor of 
Arrapha and the turtānu232 against a rebellion in Babylonia. The the governor of Arrapha is 
presumably in command of ṣab šarri troops which have been combined with kiṣir šarrūti 
forces.   
Exact date unknown – 
The reign of Sargon II 
A letter? specifically refers to the deployment of  kiṣir šarrūti to aid a governor with a local 
campaign in Kummuh.  
Exact date unknown- 
The reign of Sargon II 
Several letters from the reign of Sargon II specifically make reference to the use of provincial 
forces on campaign. SAA V No. 199 refers to an enquiry made by the king asking the 
governor of Mazamua why he did not wait for the governor of Arrapha before deploying his 
troops to Parsua (Lanfranchi and Parpola 1990). It is possible that troops were called upon to 
assemble here from various provincial territories for an expedition. SAA V No. 200 refers to 
the assembling of troops from Mazamua for an expedition. This text also suggests that the 
campaign was to be conducted outside of Mazamua and forces were deployed from here for 
this purpose, ―The troops are assembled, and I am going up to Sumbi, making a detour to […], 
[then descending] to Bit-Hamban‖ (Lanfranchi and Parpola 1990, pp. 14-18). It is possible that 
the reviews ordered as to troop numbers in the provinces, like the lists found in SAA V No. 
215 and SAA No. 251, were part of preparations for campaign operations (Lanfranchi and 
Parpola 1990). However, it is more probable that these enquiries were simply part of the 
imperial administration‘s record keeping and therefore cannot be included here as evidence for 
the involvement of provincial forces in expeditionary campaigns. SAA V No. 215 (ND 2631) 
provides a comprehensive list of ―king's men‖ available in the province of Mazamua. The king 
has enquired as to the number of troops available, presumably in readiness so that they could 
be deployed elsewhere into battle.  
The reign of 
Sennacherib  
The annals refers to a similar instance where kiṣir šarrūti were sent to various provinces for 
this same purpose (Babylonia RINAP3 01: 8 (Luckenbill 1924, 61 II. 69-71 (Cilicia); 62 II: 6-
8 (Tilgarimmu) and 87 II 29-30 (Elam). [  
667 BC – The reign of 
Ashurbanipal 
The combination of kiṣir šarrūti and ṣab šarri forces (as well as troops contributed by vassal 
                                                 
232
 The turtānu was the commander of the armed forces who was also charged with leading the king‘s magnates on  
  campaigns, particularly when the king was not in attendance (see Mattila 2000, pp. 123-125 & 165).  
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kings) is referred to in the account given of the 667 BC campaign to Egypt against Tarqu, in 
which the king states: ―The rab ša-rēši233, the governors, the kings of Ebir-nari, all my loyal 
servants, with their forces and their ships‖ (Mattila 2000: 75) 
  
As Table 9 indicates, while campaign operations could now be conducted by Assyrian officials who 
lead the army where the king was unable to perform his royal duty
234
, this change had further 
tactical advantages, since it also allowed Assyria to conduct more than a single campaign operation 
each year. In 738 BC, for example, Tiglath-pileser III ordered three different campaign operations 
east of the Tigris while he was stationed with his forces in Syria. The eastern campaigns were each 
conducted by one of Tiglath-pileser‘s officials, including the governor of the land of the 
Lullumaeans
235
 and the governor of Na‘iri236 (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 13, 18b-20b, p. 44 & 
No. 14, 1-3a, pp. 45-46)
237
, whose contingents must have been comprised of ṣab šarri forces. The 
                                                 
233
 The rab ša-rēši commanded the forces of the kiṣir šarrūti under the turtānu (Mattila 2000, p. 153, see also n. 8). 
Note, however, Tadmor‘s argument that the position of rab ša-rēši was elevated in the later Neo-Assyrian period 
above that of the turtānu, effectively replacing the ‗commander-in-chief‘ (Mattila 2000, n. 9, p. 153)   
234
 This occurred alongside other changes to the administrative operation of the empire which saw Assyrian officials  
 take an increasingly active role in the administrative and military operation of the state. Grayson (1993; 1999), 
followed by others (Ikeda 1996, pp. 281 ff.), has argued that this body of elites actively challenged the authority and 
power of the monarchy during this period. However, while it is true that these officials occupied powerful positions 
in the Assyrian bureaucracy, some being exceedingly wealthy, and often controlling extensive territories outside of 
Assyria which were free from taxation (Grayson 1996, p. 261), it is important to remember that by the 9
th
 century 
the empire had taken on a new complexity with the introduction of the province system which simply could not have 
functioned without the assistance of an extensive bureaucracy and hierarchy of officials. 
235
 Perhaps to be identified with the governor of Mazamua  (see Tadmor 1994: 65, n. 18).  
236
 Note that one other commander is mentioned in the annals, though his name is not preserved in the fragmentary 
remains of Tiglath-pileser‘s annals (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 13, 13-18, pp. 43-44).    
237
 It must be considered that the need for an annual campaign conducted by the Assyrian king must have largely 
dwindled in importance by this period, though its symbolic significance must not be underestimated. That it was  
 firmly accepted in Assyrian society that the king was not required to personally lead military operations  is firmly 
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kiṣir šarrūti declined in importance from the reign of Tiglath-pileser III, as Assyria grew ever more 
dependent on reserves of ṣab šarri troops stationed throughout the empire to conduct campaign 
operations and to provide for the defence of the empire
238
. By the reign of Sargon II most campaign 
operations were now launched from the outer borders of the empire, either in response to external 
threats or to expand the empire, and it was simply no longer possible to maintain such a vast empire 
using a centrally-based army alone
239
.      
 
The main tactical advantage in utilising ṣab šarri as expeditionary fighting forces was that these 
units were already mobilised and could be quickly deployed to meet close-range threats. In an 
empire characterised predominately by annexed territory, such as that which emerged under Tiglath-
pileser III, where provinces existed side-by side as a continuous stretch of land in many areas, an 
                                                                                                                                                                  
illustrated in a letter dated to the reign of Esarhaddon, in which an unknown official writes to the king, saying: 
―Give [orders to] your magnates and station their […]! The king, my lord, should not advance [to the b]attle. [Just 
a]s your royal fathers have done, st[ay] on the hill, and [let] your [ma]gnates [do] the bat[tle]‖ (Luukko and Van 
Buylaere 2002, SAA XVI No. 77, 3-8). The increasing role of governors and other high officials in military 
operations was surely responsible for expanding the role played by ṣab šarri forces in maintaining the security and 
continued expansion of the empire.  
238
 Though the number of troops raised may have varied between provinces, it is clear that Assyrian governors were 
able to raise significant numbers of ṣab šarri troops from their respective provinces. Manitius (1910: 129) estimated 
that each province could raise as many as 1,500 cavalry and 20,000 archers.   
239
 Prior to the middle of the 8
th
 century, the main army had deployed directly from Assyria proper on expeditionary 
campaigns or to quash a rebellions in subject states. Forces would deploy from one of the Assyrian capital centres, 
typically only once per year, and march sometimes several hundred kilometres from Assyria proper to engage a 
target. There is little doubt that this was not only slow, it was also not a wholly effective method for maintaining 
imperial control over subject states, especially where Assyria's failure to respond quickly to incidents of revolt might 
encourage other vassals to rebel. There was also significant difficulty in responding to threats where they emerged in 
different areas of the empire simultaneously. Although there is some evidence for Assyrian officials leading 
campaign operations independently during the 9
th
 century (see Mattila 2000), this is not extensive and is indicative 
that Assyria‘s military system was already in transition during this period.  
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army of considerable size could be raised using only the forces drawn from a few  neighbouring 
provinces in any given area. These forces could then be deployed as a much larger military force 
against an emerging threat close-by or used to suppress a rebellion in a nearby region of the empire. 
In SAA V No. 21 an Assyrian official, possibly the governor of Tidu
240
 (Lanfranchi and Parpola 
1990, p. 243), complains that 500 of his Ituʼean troops (ṣab šarri) had been deployed to Guzana 
instead of being left to secure his province against a nearby threat (Lanfranchi and Parpola 1990, p. 
18). While the Assyrian official in this letter felt that the central administration's tactical 
manoeuvring of his provincial troops, which saw troops depleted from his province and moved to 
another territory where the threat was much greater, was not just, this episode illustrates a primary 
tactical advantage held by provincial armies which could be rapidly deployed from one area to 
another to meet emerging threats like chess pieces on a board
241
.  
 
From the reign of Tiglath-pileser III, provincial forces held dual roles in the imperial system, being 
required not only to maintain the internal security of provincial territories, but also to act as mobile 
armies involved in the defence and expansion of the empire. While the deployment of provincial 
forces on campaign risked leaving the provinces they were stationed in vulnerable to attack or 
rebellion, SAA V No. 21 (Lanfranchi and Parpola 1990, p. 18) suggest that provinces were not 
completely depleted of all their military resources and that some troops were left to secure the 
                                                 
240
 A fortress in Tušhan. See Parpola and Porter (2001, Map 3, D3). 
241
 Dezső asserts that ṣab šarri were retained for use exclusively by the governors from the provinces where they   
      were raised (2012b, pp. 76-77). However, the two letters cited by Dezső to support this theory concern  
     complaints made to the king concerning provincial governors who would not lend ṣab šarri troops (see  
     Lanfranchi & Parpola 1990, 200; Parpola 1987, 149), which would seem to suggest that since the senders of the     
     letters clearly felt justified in making such a complaint to the king, the practice of troop lending was routinely          
     observed where troops were not required in their home province.  
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provincial territory when campaign operations were in progress
242
. With Assyria now maintaining 
its imperial security largely through its provincial forces, the army positioned in the home territory 
now assumed a more specialised tactical role. Though the turtānu had formerly assumed the role of 
chief commander of the army during the 9
th
 and for most of the 8
th
 century, leading campaigns in 
the king‘s absence and commanding an army presumably comprised of both state and provincial  
forces
243
, from the reign of Sargon II there was a division in the leadership of kiṣir šarrūti and ṣab 
šarri forces (see Mattila 2000, pp. 152-153)244. The rab ša-rēši came to act as head of the kiṣir 
šarrūti245, while the turtānu now commanded the provincial ṣab šarri forces (Manitius 1910, pp. 
                                                 
242
 The advantage of using provincial forces in the strategic defence of the empire was later recognised by Rome, which  
 could not possibly retain control over its vast empire using a single army centrally-based in Italy. Luttwak posited 
that Rome attempted to overcome the problem of the dual roles played by provincial troops by employing a new 
‗defence in depth‘ strategy which introduced central field armies or highly mobile military forces that could 
manoeuvre between one area and another to meet emerging threats (1976, pp. 182-188). While the basis of 
Luttwak‘s ‗defence in depth‘ strategy has largely been rejected (see Kagan 2006, pp. 337-338), the deployment of 
forces from one province to another to meet emerging threats has been recognised as playing a fundamental role in 
the defence and maintenance of the Roman empire, even though it did require a delicate balancing of the allocation 
of military resources (Kagan 2006, pp. 355-361). Indeed, Luttwak had already noted the inherent problems of 
deploying forces from one region to another in his original study, which could leave some areas depleted of military 
forces and therefore vulnerable to attack from outside forces or insurrection (1976, pp. 188-190). 
      
243
  For the reign of Shalmaneser III, the turtānu Daian-Aššur, led several campaign operations in the king‘s stead,  
  particularly towards the end of Shalmaneser‘s reign. For the 832 BC campaign, Shalmaneser explicitly states, ―I  
  issued orders, and sent Daian-Aššur, the turtānu, chief of my extensive army, at the head of my troops against  
  Urartu‖ (Mattila 2000, p. 123), suggesting that the army led by Daian-Aššur was identical in composition to the    
  king‘s normal expeditionary forces (see Yamada 2000, pp. 221-224).  
244
 The rab ša-rēši is barely attested in the sources for the 9th century and seems to have only risen to prominence under  
  Sargon II, where the Horse Lists detailing the state's military administration during this period associate the rab ša- 
  rēši with the cavalry as head of the equestrian units of the kiṣir šarrūti (Mattila 2000, esp. 152-153 & pp.  
  61-76).  
245
 See Mattila (2000, n. 8, p. 153).  
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199-209). The division of the army‘s leadership in this period and the subsequent emergence of the 
rab ša-rēši as the leader of the home forces has attracted several different explanations246. Of note 
here, however, is the connection between the rab ša-rēši and the equestrian units, as noted by 
Mattila (2000, p. 153) and indicated by ―The Horse Lists‖ (Dalley and Postgate 1984, pp. 36-37). 
That the equestrian units would now assume a new importance in the kiṣir šarrūti is not surprising 
given the structural changes made to the operation of the empire's military system from the middle 
of the 8
th
 century. Cavalry could move at rates double that of infantry units
247
, and thus it was ideal 
to station large units of cavalry in the core Assyrian territory which could overcome logistical 
constraints that might hamper the deployment of large infantry forces from here to distant parts of 
the empire.    
 
On a final note, it is interesting that much of our evidence for the deployment of  ṣab šarri in 
expeditionary operations during the Neo-Assyrian period comes from letters and not from official 
inscriptions, and this raises the question of the reliability of the ARI in providing an accurate picture 
of Assyrian military activity. Scholarly discussion has in recent years focused on the reliability of 
the ARI, which are thought to distort historical events, particularly with regard to the outcome of 
military encounters where they did not support the prevailing political-ideology of the state. While I 
agree with Brinkman‘s statement that we need not doubt the accuracy of information provided in 
the annals regarding the basic details of a military encounter, such as where and when a battle took 
place and against whom, only its result (Brinkman 1968, p. 25), evidence from Assyrian letters 
                                                 
246
 Tadmor has argued that the office of rab ša-rēši rose to prominence during this period because it held by a eunuch  
 and therefore was more trusted by the king because this office was appointed and not made hereditary (1986, p. 
208). However Mattila (2000, p. 153), following Noble (1990, p. 61), has argued that the elevated status of this 
office in the Sargonid period was a direct result of changes made to the structure of the army, specifically the 
increasing use of cavalry forces as tactical units in the army. 
247
 Luttwak remarks that cavalry could travel approximately 50 miles per day, while infantry could only cover distances 
of approximately 25 miles per day (1976, p. 186).  
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suggests that many more military operations were conducted than what are reported in the ARI. 
Letters from Sargon II‘s reign concerning the northern frontier region, for example, report on a 
great many military operations conducted against Urartu, particularly from Mazamua, by Assyrian 
officials and military commanders which are not recorded in any of the official inscriptions. 
Lanfranchi and Parpola go so far as to suggest that military operations were conducted in the north 
against Urartu almost every year of  Sargon‘s reign, though campaigns are only officially recorded 
here for the years 715 and 714  BC (Lanfranchi & Parpola 1990, p. XV & n. 3). This evidence may 
suggest that military operations were likely not restricted to the king‘s annual campaign by this 
period, and may now have been carried out on a regular basis in many parts of the empire by 
Assyrian officials using provincial forces. One conclusion which might be drawn from this is that 
though the king‘s annual campaign continued to hold significant political and ideological 
importance, from the middle of the 8
th
 century its importance from a military and strategic 
standpoint had diminished considerably as a consequence of the role that Assyrian officials now 
assumed in the maintenance, defence and extension of empire.              
 
6.4 Assyria‘s Annexation Policy 
 
6.4.1 The Province and Vassal Systems 
 
Tiglath-pileser‘s empire was based on the province system, a network of directly administered 
territories politically and economically incorporated into the Assyrian state. Annexed territories 
were stripped of their political and economic independence and placed under the control of an 
Assyrian governor. The workings of the territory, including matters of economy and trade, building 
and maintenance of infrastructure, security and defence, and communications with the central 
government were placed under the control of the governor (Oded 1979, p. 182). Deportations were 
carried out in the newly annexed territory to remove any local opposition to Assyrian rule, and new 
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settlers were brought into the territory to repopulate areas depleted through war (Oded 1979, p. 
183). The inhabitants of provincial territories were expected to contribute taxes in the form of a 
labour tax (ilku), a tax on agricultural produce (šībšu ‒ nusāhē) and a tax on finished products and 
sheep which applied to craftsmen and shepherds only (iškāru) (Postgate 1974). Assyria was also 
free to exploit the natural resources of annexed territories, which along with labour sourced from 
the provinces, were utilised in state building projects. Provinces also provided a source of 
conscripted men for the army and supported the military forces stationed in their territories 
(Postgate 1974).  
 
In addition to annexed territory, Assyria also maintained a number of semi-autonomous vassal states 
during this period, and hence was not strictly a ―territorial empire‖. Vassal-states differed 
principally from provinces in that they were governed indirectly by Assyria through local rulers 
subject to Assyrian influence and authority. It is clear that Assyria exercised control over the 
external relations of vassals
248
, but the extent to which Assyria also maintained control over the 
domestic operation of these states is not known with certainty
249
.  
 
Though the evidence is not extensive, we can be sure that vassal-states were subject to military 
conscription, and like annexed territories contributed military forces to the army. Hamath, a city-
state located in southern Syria, is known to have provided conscripted men for military service 
                                                 
248
 A good example of this is Tiglath-pileser‘s order to the king of Tyre not to sell timber to the Egyptians or the 
Palestinians noted in ND2715 (Saggs 2001, pp. 156-157). 
249
 There is evidence suggesting Assyrian officials were stationed in vassal-states permanently, possibly along with a  
 cohort of cavalry (see Parker 2001, p. 251), but what is not clear is whether these officials were simply appointed to  
 keep watch over the vassal-state and ensure Assyrian interests were upheld, or were expected to intervene in the 
day-to-day operation of the state. On this point, Na‘aman also notes that during the reign of Esarhaddon the ruler of 
Tyre, Ba‗al, was forbidden from reading a letter unless the Assyrian qēpu (an appointed Assyrian official) was 
present (1979, n. 22).  
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during the reign of Sargon II, an obligation said to have dated back to the 9
th
 century (see Yamada 
2000, n. 367, p. 182). A letter, also from Sargon II‘s reign, reports that troops of local vassal ruler 
(―city lords‖) had assembled in Mannea, along with the rest of Assyria‘s forces, probably in 
preparation for a conflict with Urartu (Lanfranchi and Parpola 1990, 217, pp. 154-155). Reference 
to conscription of men from vassal-states is also found later from the reign of Ashurbanipal where 
men are said to have been conscripted from the Philistine vassal-states to serve in a campaign 
against Egypt and Ethiopia
250
. There is also further evidence that the territories pertaining to vassal-
states could be utilised in campaign operations. One letter from Kumme, dated to the reign of 
Sargon II, reports on the use of Kumme‘s territory by Assyrian troops involved in the war against 
Urartu (Lanfranchi & Parpola 1990, 97, p.78). Although this letter poses questions of the continued 
sovereignty of vassal-states, it clearly indicates that vassal-states could be subject to a range of 
military obligations depending on the immediate needs of the empire.   
 
Vassal states were also, obviously, subject to a range of economic obligations, the foremost being 
the payment of a sum of tribute to be made annually in Assyria. Beyond this basic payment vassal-
states could be subject to a number of different economic obligations, many not dissimilar from 
those imposed on annexed territory, which might have been determined on a case-by-case basis. 
One Assyrian letter (ND 2715) dated to the reign of Tiglath-pileser III, from an Assyrian official 
named Qurdi-aššur-lamur, indicates that Tyre was taxed on wood brought down from Mount 
Lebanon and Sidon was required to pay taxes in custom houses, presumably on traded goods. A 
translation of the first part of this letter (lines 3-29) which concerns Tyre is reproduced here for 
convenience, and is taken from Saggs‘ translation in CTN (2001, pp. 156-157): 
 
                                                 
250
 The participation of vassals in military campaigns is attested earlier only for the reigns of Shalmaneser III and  
  Ashurnasirpal II. See Yamada (2000, p. 307 & n. 33 & 34).  
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―Concerning the ruler of Tyre, about whom the king said: ‗Talk nicely to him‘, all the wharves are 
at their disposal. His subjects enter and leave the warehouses at will, and trade. The Lebanon range 
is accessible to him; they go up and down at will and bring lumber down. On the lumber they bring 
down I impose a tax. I have appointed tax inspectors over the customs (houses) of the entire 
Lebanon range, (and) they keep the watch on the harbour. I appointed a tax-inspector (for those 
who) were going down into the custom houses which are in Sidon, (but) the Sidonians chased him 
away. Thereupon I sent the Itu‘a contingent into the Lebanon range. They terrified the people, (so 
that) afterwards they sent a message and fetched the Tax Inspector (and) brought (him) into Sidon. I 
spoke to them in these terms: ‗Bring down lumber, do your work on it, (but) do not deliver it to the 
Egyptians or Palestinians, or I shall not let you go up to the mountains…‖ 
 
This letter has been dated by Yamada (2008, p. 300-301) to 734-732 BC on the basis that the letter 
describes the situation after Tyre‘s subjugation and involvement in the so-called revolt led by 
Damascus. ND 2715 has suggested to scholars that in addition to tribute payments, where Assyrian 
kārus were established Assyria also collected taxes directly from Assyrian controlled ports and 
quays through custom houses (Na‘aman 1979, p. 84; Oded 1974, p. 48; Postgate 1974, p. 131; 
Tadmor 1966, p. 88; Yamada 2005, p. 69)
251
. A later treaty between king Esarhaddon and Baal, king 
                                                 
251
  Yamada further notes that ND 2715 further indicates that Assyria also controlled custom houses set up around 
Mount Lebanon and in Sidon which were controlled by Tyre at this time (2005, 69). It may also be noted that despite 
the apparent economic sanctions placed on Tyre, as indicated by this letter, the phrase ―spoke kindly to him‖ has 
been interpreted by Fales as evidence of the use of political persuasion by Assyrian officials in the creation and 
maintenance of empire. The fact that the inhabitants of Tyre were free to conduct business, access all the ports of the 
Mediterranean, use the custom house, and go up and down Mount Lebanon as they wished suggests that despite its 
reduction to vassal status, Tyre received significant economic rewards as a result of its incorporation into the 
Assyrian empire (Fales 2008, pp. 29-30). Further evidence of the benefits received by Tyre comes from a later treaty 
of Esarhaddon with Baal, king of Tyre, which although contentituous suggests that Tyrian traders were granted 
certain protections to trade safely in those cities subject to Assyrian control (Yamada 2005, p. 73). In this way, 
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of Tyre, also suggests that profit could be earned from these centres through confiscated shipwrecks 
(Yamada 2005, p. 73). While it is not certain whether this condition was typical of the stipulations 
imposed upon vassal-states where Assyrian kārus were established, it might suggest that Assyria 
regularly imposed additional forms of taxation on tribute-paying states which were determined on a 
case-by-case basis depending on the economic situation of the individual state involved. 
Esarhaddon‘s inscriptions, for example, attest to the obligation imposed upon Gaza, Ashkelon, 
Ekron, and Ashdod to pledge materials for the construction of his new palace at Nineveh (Pritchard 
1969, p. 291). There is also evidence for the direct economic exploitation of territory pertaining to 
vassal-states. SAAV No. 111, a letter dated to the reign of Sargon II, suggests that Assyria was able 
to exploit timber directly from Kummean territory (Lanfranchi and Parpola 1990, p. 87)
252
, and 
another, ND 2683 (Saggs 1959, pp. 175-176), is poorly preserved but refers to the transport of large 
numbers of cattle, sheep and horses from Tabal by Assyrian officials who were possibly involved in 
exploitative activities here. It is also clear that vassals could be expected to haul raw materials 
through their territories from the place of exploitation to Assyrian depots (Lanfranchi and Parpola 
1990, 117, p. 92)
253
. Thus, beyond the annual payment of tribute, Assyrian vassal-states could be 
subject to further military and economic obligations. It seems likely that these obligations were 
determined individually and according to the economic capacity of vassal-states, as well as the 
immediate resource demands of Assyria.     
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
although vassal states could be subject to severe economic restrictions, some states would certainly have benefitted 
under the empire.  
252
 The acquisition of timber beams from Kumme is also attested to in SAAV No. 117 where an official writes to the 
king explaining why timber beams have been delivered late (Lanfranchi and Parpola 1990, p. 92).  
253
 The term ―city lords‖ in the letter was used to denote local vassal rulers in Assyrian correspondence of this period 
(Lanfranchi and Parpola 1990, p. XXII). It is not clear whether the timber beams referred to in this letter were 
sourced directly from the territories of the vassals referred to, or if they were merely responsible for their transport.    
146 
 
6.4.2 The Purpose of Provinces and Assyria‘s Annexation Policy 
 
The ARI often give the impression that annexation was utilised as a form of punishment for vassals 
that had violated their loyalty oaths and rebelled
254
. However, the inconsistency with which this 
approach was applied suggests that Assyria‘s annexation policy was motivated by wider interests 
beyond that of mere punitive measures against disloyal subjects
255
, and were governed by military, 
economic and strategic considerations specific to individual areas. While it is sometimes purported 
that provinces contributed more revenue to the empire than did vassal-states
256
, it is not possible to 
make this kind of assessment on the basis of the current evidence available, since it is clear that 
Assyria also imposed additional economic contributions on vassal-states, the full extent of which 
remains unknown. Vassal-states could be subject to extensive economic taxation outside of the 
single tribute payment made annually in Assyria, and were sometimes even subject to direct 
economic exploitation by Assyria. While the full extent to which vassal-states were taxed, in terms 
of trade, raw materials, and labour, may never be known with certainty, if nothing else, the frequent 
reports from Assyrian sources of revolt by vassal rulers do suggest that the economic obligations 
they were forced to pay under Assyrian rule were burdensome, and should not be under-
estimated
257
.   
                                                 
254
 See, for example, Donner (1977, p. 419). 
255
 Note, however, that some scholars have attempted to identify a standard process by which states were formally 
incorporated into the province system, typically through a succession of steps whereby the state was gradually 
stripped of its independence, invariably following an act of disloyalty or open rebellion. For an outline of these 
views, see Mattingly (1979, pp. 50-51).   
256
 Pečírková, for instance, states that the taxes ―owed for each province is not known, nor is it possible to determine 
what proportion of the taxes remained in the province and what went to the central government. As far as tribute and 
taxes are concerned, it can safely be said that the income from the provincial taxes was greater than that of tribute‖. 
(1987, p. 169) 
257
 See also Parker (2001, p. 91), who suggests that this is the cause of uprisings in Kumme.  Note, however, that some 
states certainly enjoyed some benefits from Assyrian rule, see n. 249. 
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It is clear that where vassals could be sufficiently controlled, vassalage represented a preferred form 
of Assyrian governance to annexation, allowing Assyria to reap substantial economic rewards using 
significantly fewer resources
258
. Directly administered territories were incredibly expensive to 
establish and maintain (Parker 2001, pp. 14-15; Radner 2011a, p. 327), a reality which could 
counter any economic benefits gained from the annexation of conquered territory
259
. In contrast to 
vassal-states which utilised existing political and economic structures, territories converted into 
Assyrian provinces required a substantial amount of new infrastructure be built, including Assyrian 
palaces, administrative and economic buildings, official residences, roads, canals and forts etc
260
. 
Provinces were also run by a vast body of Assyrian officials, whose housing and maintenance was 
also brought to bear directly on the state through ―gifts‖ and land grants which acted as a form of 
salary for state employees. One letter from the Nimrud corpus (ND. 2440), provides a detailed 
inventory of government employees, including their families, domestic servants and animals. 
Though the state employees referred to in this list are ―guards of the wall‖, and hence of a 
considerably low-status in the Assyrian military hierarchy, the text gives us some idea of the 
number of people supported by the state in the provincial territories, since this number also included 
                                                 
258
  Yamada argues that the establishment of vassal states supporting Assyrian kārus were preferred in areas ―whose 
geographical extent was vast, lying beyond the control of the Assyrian provincial administration‖ (Yamada 2005, p. 
77). However, it may be that annexation was never pursued in places where Assyrian kārus were established because 
the Assyrian administration alternatively put in place a significant rewards system designed to discourage rebellion 
through the provision of economic incentives. For the evidence relating to Tyre on this point, see n. 249.   
259
  Note here that Radner‘s assertion that this expense was largely sustained only during the foundation stages of a 
province‘s creation (2014, p. 103; 2011, p. 327) does not take into account the cost of maintaining infrastructure 
long-term, or the administrative and military expenses involved in governing a province.  
260
  Roads and garrisons established throughout annexed territories represented vital infrastructure. Roads, in particular, 
were needed to provide for an effective communication network (Mattingly 1979: 51-2), while garrisons were 
established in strategic areas, as well as along roads to allow for the safe movement of troops (see Pečírková 1987, 
pp. 170-171).  
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dependants of state employees (Parker 1961, pp. 25-26). Land could also, in some cases, be exempt 
from taxation (see Postgate 1974: 240-241), which would have considerably reduced the earning 
capacity of state-held lands, particularly in fertile areas where farming and pastoral activities 
represented a considerably profitable industry. Thus, though the province system provided the 
means by which the empire could sustain its civil and military operation
261
, the system also 
represented a significant drain on state resources and could, in some cases, limit the capacity of the 
state to profit directly from the system. In some areas which were positioned in rich agricultural 
areas or on the centre of trading hubs this did not present a problem, but in others, the high cost of 
direct provincial administration may have countered many of the economic benefits of territorial 
expansion. 
 
Though it is often stressed that provinces served a fundamental role in supplying the core with 
much needed agricultural products and labour (Parker 2001; Pečírková 1987, p. 169), according to 
Postgate, the primary economic objective of provincial territories was the support of the army 
(1979, pp. 202-203). In addition to the fundamental purpose of providing logistical support to 
armies on the march, suggested by Sargon II‘s statement, that a vassal had ―piled up stores of flour 
and wine to feed my troops, just like my eunuchs, the governors of the provinces of Assyria‖, 
annexed territory was also required to support a substantial body of garrisoned troops. Postgate has 
noted that this could place a considerable strain on the economy, particularly in regard to supplies of 
straw and corn (Postgate 1979, p. 203), and this is certainly the impression given in Assyrian letters. 
In one letter, dated to the reign of Sargon II, an Assyrian official complains that he does not have 
the resources to feed the troops stationed in his territory, stating that they are in danger of starvation 
                                                 
261
  Note that Postgate maintains a distinction in his terminology between what he calls the ―Palace Sector‖ (the royal 
family, the king‘s courtiers and high officials, and domestic, administrative and military staff pertaining to the king 
in both the provinces and royal palaces) and what he calls the ―Government Sector‖ which incorporated the body of 
officials responsible for the running of the state‘s affairs (1979).   
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and causing civil unrest (SAAV No. 126, Lanfranchi & Parpola 1990, p. 98). In another, dated to the 
same period, a shortage of corn forced the governor of Mašennu, Ṭab-šar-Aššur, to take from the 
corn tax owed to the central government in order to feed his troops. In the letter, the governor 
justifies his actions, stating ―If I did not allot it, they would take [the corn] they have harvested 
[prev]iously and eat it, and would not cultivate their fields but turn to me[with]out a superior, 
saying: ―Bread [is being with]held from us!‖ (SAAV No. 289, Lanfranchi and Parpola 1990, pp. 
202-203)
262
. Obviously, feeding provincial forces was an operational necessity for Assyrian 
governors which could take precedence over taxes, however, it is interesting to note that Ṭab-šar-
Aššur‘s argument was probably accepted by the central government263. The difficulties involved in 
providing enough food to feed those Assyrian forces and personnel stationed in Assyrian provinces 
is further illustrated in another letter which shows that it was sometimes even necessary to deploy 
rations from one province to another where a provincial territory was unable to provide for itself 
(see ND 2495, Saggs 1966, pp. 183-185).  
 
Indeed, the origins of the province system can ultimately be found in the supply function of 
provincial territories. According to Grayson, provinces evolved initially out of the need to establish 
military supply depots along campaign trails in the 9
th
 century (Grayson 1976, p. 135). During the 
9
th
 century Assyrian campaigning had pushed further into the western frontier than ever before, 
penetrating Anatolia, Syria and even Palestine where the army could not be supported logistically 
from the Assyrian centre. Although the army could live off the land for a while when on campaign 
(Saggs 1984, p. 252), this was not at all practical and it is not expected that an army of any 
significant size could be effectively maintained in this manner during a long campaign season 
                                                 
262
  A similar incident may be referred to in SAAV No. 82 (Lanfranchi and Parpola 1990, p. 66).  
263
  This is suggested by the fact that Ṭab-šar-Aššur‘s career was not hampered by this incident. He later held the office    
  of Treasurer (see Mattila 2000, p. 26-27) and was Eponym for the year 717 BC (Millard 1994, p. 60).   
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where they risked starvation 
264
. The campaign undertaken by Shalmaneser III during his first 
regnal year to the Mediterranean, for example, traversed a route in excess of 500 km in length
265
, 
and though much of the foodstuffs received as spot tribute from subjugated cities must have been 
consumed by the army along the way, it is still expected that supply depots would have been 
required to support the army along a campaign trail of this duration
266
.  
 
In addition to logistic bases, a consideration which became more necessary from the middle of the 
8
th
 century when the empire‘s borders had rapidly expanded, was the fact that annexed territory 
could support a permanent Assyrian military presence that could be quickly dispatched from 
strategic points throughout the empire to meet emerging threats. Unlike forces stationed in the 
capital, provincial units were not limited by the campaign season
267
, and could ensure the 
permanent security of subjugated territories by directly policing dissent elements and quashing any 
potential uprisings before they had a chance to take root. In the case of an uprising, troops stationed 
in provincial territories had a strategic advantage over those deployed from Assyria, in that they 
could respond quickly to disturbances and were able to effectively manoeuvre between already 
established Assyrian strongholds year round
268
. In this way, Assyria was able to maintain a better 
degree of control over areas incorporated into the empire in this way (Parpola 2003, p. 100). 
                                                 
264
  Supply problems were not good for maintaining discipline among the ranks and could hamper campaign operations   
   as Sargon comments in his annals regarding the 714 campaign against Urartu (Saggs 1984, p. 94).  
265
  For the route, see Yamada (2000, pp. 78-79; Map 4). 
266
  Saggs notes that vassals were also obligated to supply provisions for the Assyrian army when on campaign  (1984, 
p. 252). 
267
  Though Saggs (1984, pp. 250-1) notes that campaigns could take place outside of the typical campaign season in 
the summer months, such operations were probably rarely undertaken.  
268
  Nevertheless, though forces stationed in provinces were well-equipped to meet most threats to the security of the 
territory, larger disturbances could require the intervention of the main army stationed in Assyria, especially in 
Babylonia where Brinkman points out Assyria never maintained significant forces (1979, p. 235).  
151 
 
Provinces supporting permanent military forces allowed Assyria to effectively defend the borders of 
the empire against threats from foreign powers, and in the later Neo-Assyrian empire, were utilised 
as bases for launching campaign operations. During the reign of Sargon II, the northern provinces 
were utilised for this purpose in campaign operations against Urartu
269
. During the reigns of 
Esarhaddon and Ashurbanipal, Palestine served a similar purpose as a vital logistics base for staging 
campaign operations into Egypt (see Ephʿal 1984, pp. 137-138).The province system effectively 
allowed Assyria to station forces of considerable size all over the empire which could be deployed 
between provinces, or directly to the front to partake in campaign operations aimed at imperial 
expansion and defence.  
 
Government officials stationed in the provinces were also an important source of information for 
the king on developments in the provinces and the immediate borderlands, particularly military 
activity. Though few reports of this kind have survived from the reign of Tiglath-pileser III, they are 
abundant in the correspondence of Sargon II. Letters from the reign of Sargon II, for example, 
describe in detail Urartian military activity, including the position, movements and activities of the 
Urartian (Lanfranchi & Parpola 1990, Nos. 2, 86, 87, 112, 114,  164, 168, 165, 176, 177, 178) and 
Assyrian armies (nos. 3 and 72), military engagements between Assyrian and Urartian forces 
(Lanfranchi & Parpola 1990, Nos. 173 and 174), and other reports concerning internal political 
developments within Urartu itself (Lanfranchi & Parpola 1990, Nos. 22, 113, 115, 144, 166, 179, 
181, 182, 184). Reports of this kind kept the king well informed of political, military and economic 
developments in the empire and were vital to the operation of the empire.   
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 See letters pertaining to Sargon II‘s reign regarding this purpose in Lanfranchi and Parpola (1990, pp.  XXVI-
XXVII). 
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6.5 Military Strategy 
 
6.5.1 The ―Threat of Force‖ 
 
Luttwak remarks of the Roman Empire, ―In the Imperial period at least, military force was clearly 
recognized for what it is, an essentially limited instrument of power, costly and brittle. Much better 
to conserve force and use military power indirectly, as an instrument of political warfare‖ (1976, p. 
2). While many of the conclusions made by Luttwak have been subject to harsh criticism in recent 
years (see Kagan 2006, pp. 355 ff.), some of Luttwak‘s observations regarding the Roman army‘s 
employment of an ―economy of force‖ continue to be recognised as playing a fundamental role in 
the maintenance of empire (Kagan 2006, pp 354-361). In studies of ancient Assyria, the notion of 
―psychological warfare‖ and the threat of military force has already been acknowledged as forming 
an integral part of Assyrian military strategy which aided in the extension and maintenance of 
Assyrian control (Parker 2001, pp. 259-261; Saggs 1984, pp. 248-50). Parker, in particular, notes 
that Assyria utilised a tactic of ―overwhelming force‖ against individual targets or what he calls 
―centres of opposition‖ in order to discourage any further opposition from surrounding areas (2001, 
p. 262)
270
. Accordingly, the complete annihilation of centres of opposition and the cruel treatment of 
the leaders of these targets helped cement an image of the Assyrian army as an invincible fighting 
force and was intended to discourage future resistance against Assyrian authority (Saggs 1984, p. 
249; Parker 2001, pp. 260-261). In line with this policy, Assyrian forces specifically targeted main 
centres where opposition or resistance to Assyrian expansion was likely to spring. In Syria-
Palestine, Aram-Damascus represented the dominant polity in the region, and thus the complete 
destruction of this territory served to gain the voluntary submission of the smaller city-states in 
                                                 
270
  Note, however, that Parker views this tactic as part of a wider economic policy, which left surrounding areas 
untouched for the strict purpose of future economic exploitation (2001, p. 262). I disagree with this notion and 
suggest that these actions were more primarily motivated by a desire to conserve military resources.  
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surrounding areas, which seeing the fate of a more powerful nation would not oppose Assyrian 
expansion. The purpose of this strategy was obviously to economise military force and to limit the 
amount of resources expended in any one campaign
271
.  
 Warfare was certainly a costly exercise for all imperial powers, and one which came with many 
risks. It was not merely the defeat of its armies on the battlefield which concerned Assyria, but also 
the possibility of becoming locked into drawn out conflicts where resources became overcommitted 
in individual sectors of the empire. While it was not always possible to avoid prolonged military 
conflict, the risk could be mitigated using strategies such as ―overwhelming force‖ which reduced 
the risk of a stalemate and encouraged the voluntary submission of the surrounding populace. This 
tactic was effectively used by Tiglath-pileser III to conquer large areas rapidly and with minimal 
force.  
 
This tactic is clearly illustrated in a military operation conducted by Tiglath-pileser III against 
Gurgum. The annals report on the surrender of its ruler, Tarhularu, who submitted on the basis that 
Tiglath-pileser would not destroy Gurgum: ―Tar[hularu . . . together with the foremost men of his 
land, with [their] corvée baskets [came before me and] kissed my feet (with a plea) not to destr[oy] 
the land [Gur]gum. I received [….] from him.‖ (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, i 37‘-42‘a, p. 85). The 
destruction of several key cities forcing the surrender of Gurgum's ruler was clearly a strategic 
measure aimed at economising military force and avoiding a drawn out conflict in which Assyria 
was forced to subdue all of the cities of Gurgum. However, the use of military pressure to 
encourage voluntary submission could also be used to conquer much larger territorial areas. In 737 
BC Tiglath-pileser III used this tactic to force the surrender of Media. In a commemorative stele 
from Iran, Tiglath-pileser declares: ―In my ninth palû, I ordered (my troops) to march against the 
Medes. I conquered the cities of city rulers who were unsubmissive, I defeated (them) and carried 
                                                 
271
  Note that this view conflicts with that of Dubovský who argues that one of Tiglath-pileser‘s chief strategies was to 
eliminate small fortified cities first which were easier to lay siege to and conquer (2004, p. 67).   
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off their booty defeated them and took their spoil … I received payment from those who did not 
submit‖ (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 35, ii 25‘-29‘, p. 86). Interestingly enough, rather than 
record the spoil taken from those unsubmissive cities Tiglath-pileser was forced to subjugate by 
force, the stele goes on to list the tribute received from cities which yielded voluntarily under threat 
of military intervention, perhaps indicating that this represented the greater achievement– conquest 
through politic rather than arms.  
 
The threat of force had far-reaching political implications, and could compel distant lands to submit 
to Assyria even where direct military intervention was not imminent. In another report from the 
reign of Tiglath-pileser III, a ruler whose name is unfortunately unknown, but who had not 
submitted to any earlier Assyrian kings, dispatched envoys to Kalah to pledge his submission to 
Assyria, and presumably to offer tribute, following Tiglath-pileser‘s conquest of Hatti (Tadmor and 
Yamada 2011, No. 49, r. 23-25, p. 132)
272
. Though we cannot be certain where the polity pertaining 
to this ruler was located, given that the ruler had not formerly submitted to Assyria, it was probably 
to be located in southern or central Anatolia. The threat of military intervention was therefore a 
highly effective tool in the creation of empire, which Tiglath-pileser III exploited to the full during 
the course of his campaigning.   
 
6.5.2 Provinces as Bases for Implementing a ―Threat of Force‖ Strategy 
 
A territorial empire did not necessarily present a more effective model for maintaining control over 
subjugated territories than one based on the vassal-system where coercion could still be effectively 
utilised to maintain imperial control from the Assyrian centre
273
. However, the orbit of this control 
                                                 
272
 Despite the fragmentary condition of the text, Tadmor‘s restoration is based on a reproduction of the text in No. 48, 
20‘-21‘ (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, p. 126). 
273
  Note that Parpola disagrees on this point, arguing that annexation represented a more effective model of 
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was inevitably restricted by the capabilities of the army. Prior to the reforms of Tiglath-pileser III, 
the main army deployed from the Assyrian capital territory, and only once per year during the 
annual campaign season (Saggs 1984, pp. 250-251). Thus, it was not always possible for the 
Assyrian army to respond effectively to incidents of rebellion, particularly where multiple revolts 
emerged in different sectors of the empire simultaneously, and it was not uncommon for many years 
to pass before a rebellion was quashed and Assyrian authority restored over an unsubmissive vassal-
state. Though Assyrian kings of the 9
th
 century often boasted of conquering extensive lands and 
imposing vast tributes on local kings, the extent of this control is often questionable. Even 
Shalmaneser III who opened up Assyrian expansion in the West and was able to force the 
submission of polities located some distance from Assyria proper in Syria and Anatolia but was 
never able to secure long-term Assyrian control here. Indeed, Yamada has stated that most 
references to tribute in the inscriptions of Shalmaneser III constituted no more than spot tribute, 
noting only eight cases where it can be said with certainty that the tribute received was fixed and 
made annually (2000, pp. 240 ff.).   
 
Assyria‘s difficulty during this period in maintaining long-term control over subject states may be 
credited to a reliance on a centrally-stationed army. Critically, the army was limited in the amount 
of terrain troops were able to successfully traverse in any given campaign season. This was 
determined not only by seasonal considerations and geographical constraints, but also by the 
physical capabilities of the troops themselves. Saggs suggests that the Assyrian army was capable of 
covering distances of fifty kilometres per day (1984, p. 254), however, a more likely estimate, 
                                                                                                                                                                  
government for creating a stable empire, which was responsible for its successful expansion under Tiglath-pileser 
III: ―There is, however, an essential difference between the Neo-Assyrian Empire and its predecessors that accounts 
for the 8
th
 - 7
th
 century expansion – namely, the strategy of systematic economic, cultural, and ethnic integration 
introduced by Tiglath-pileser III in 745 B.C.E. Until then, the Empire had only a relatively limited core area under 
direct control of the central government, with vassal-states loosely tied to the center through treaties, loyalty-oaths 
and royal marriages‖ (2003, p. 100).  
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particularly on a long campaign trail, might be set at around forty kilometres per day over easy 
terrain
274
. Though Shalmaneser III sometimes led campaign trails in the 9
th
 century spanning some 
600 km into length through Anatolia and Syria, it is important to remember that these lengthy 
campaigns were not conducted every year, and were often alternated with campaigns of  
significantly shorter distances
275
. The introduction of provinces during the 9
th
 century helped to 
extend the length of campaigning by providing logistical support base for the army, however these 
were not typically situated far from the Assyrian centre
276
. It was only with the expansion of the 
province system and the stationing of military forces outside of Assyria proper on a massive scale 
that Assyria was able to overcome these constraints on its ability to expand and to exert effective 
control over subjugated states.  No longer was the ―threat of force‖ tentatively maintained from the 
imperial core. Military pressure could now be exerted from multiple regions outside Assyria proper 
via provincial centres and border fortresses which maintained substantial forces in annexed 
territories
277
. That provincial centres were responsible for administering neighbouring vassal-states 
is apparent in a letter dated to the reign of Sargon II (SAA V No. 117) (Mattila 2000, p. 138). The 
letter, from an official named Gabbu-ana-Aššur278, details a report on timber beams hauled by 
vassals located on the northern border with Urartu, including Kumme, Ukku, Mēṣi, and Babutta, to 
                                                 
274
  Following the estimate of Luttwak, who suggests that this was the distance Roman armies were able to cover each    
 day (1976, p. 186). 
275
  For the campaign routes of Shalmaneser III in Syria and Anatolia, see Yamada (2000, pp. 409-410).  
276
  This role of providing logistical support to the army may have been fulfilled earlier by vassal-states (Yamada 2000,   
  n. 35, p.  307). 
277
  Though it cannot be ignored that the building of new Assyrian cities in conquered territories or the renaming of 
existing towns and cities was ideologically important, the policy of building and maintaining Assyrian cities in 
conquered lands also served a practical purpose in that it facilitated the consolidation of Assyrian power over newly 
conquered lands (Yamada 2005, p. 62). 
278
  Gabbu-ana-Aššur has been identified as holder of the office of nāgir ekalli (Palace Herald) during the reign of     
      Sargon II (Mattila 2000, p. 32).  
157 
 
an unknown location. Though the letter concerns economic matters, the report makes it clear that 
these vassal-states were subject to the authority of Gabbu-ana-Aššur279, and hence that it was the 
responsibility of this official to manage the obligations of vassal-states located in his sector of the 
empire.   
 
In this context, strategic considerations must have had a tremendous influence over which territories 
were annexed. Following the Assyrian conquest of Syria-Palestine by Tiglath-pileser III in 734-732 
BC, the Philistine states, as well as Ammon, Moab, Edom, and Judah were retained as vassal-states, 
while northern Transjordan was annexed, specifically that territory pertaining to Aram-Damascus
280
. 
Some scholars have viewed this as an attempt to establish a ―buffer zone‖ with Egypt (Donner 
1977, p. 420; Na‘aman 1979), while others have viewed the vassal status of these states, particularly 
the Philistine states, as an attempt to encourage economic activity in the region (Ephʿal 1979, pp. 
287-288; Mattingley 1979, p. 52). Yet, Tiglath-pileser‘s reluctance to territorially expand into this 
region could also be attributed to strategic considerations. Luttwak has noted that the Romans were 
disinclined to establish territorial control over the Levant because it presented unfavourable military 
conditions, flanked on one side by the Mediterranean sea, and on the other by a vulnerable 
geographical border with the Syrian desert (1976, pp. 107-108), which was during our period prone 
                                                 
279
  Mattila identifies the land pertaining to this official as located on the Upper Zab on the Urartian border (2000, p. 
162).  
280
 Note that there is significant debate over the precise number of provinces created by Tiglath-pileser III following his 
campaign against Syria-Palestine in 734-732 and where these should be located. The statement made by Tiglath-
pileser III that he annexed ―the widespread land of Bit-Hazail. . . from the to[wn of Kashp]una as far as the town of 
Gilea[d and the town of Abel-šiṭṭi‖ (Tadmor 1994) is fairly precise, but unfortunately our limited knowledge of the 
ancient political geography of this area means that we are unable to conclusively define the limits of this territory. 
For a discussion of this issue, see the following works: Bienkowski (2000, pp. 44-56), Forrer (1920), and Oded 
(1970).  
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to attack by tribal peoples that inhabited the borderlands of this desert frontier
281
.  Under Tiglath-
pileser III, there was no attempt made to annex Ammon, Moab or Edom, which bordered this 
vulnerable area, or even to reinforce this area with Assyrian garrisons
282
. Rather, Assyrian territorial 
control was limited to northern Transjordania, and in doing so, the risk of exposing stationed armies 
to the danger of advancing armies, which could under the right conditions effectively trap stationed 
forces here between the desert frontiers and the sea, was mitigated. The larger states of Aram-
Damascus and Hamath were annexed because they controlled access to south Syria and Palestine 
via several routes linking Syria, Palestine and central Mesopotamia with Egypt, and were situated 
on the cornerstone of this strategically vulnerable area. However, Assyria‘s failure to reinforce the 
southern front which bordered Egypt
283
 could reflect a wariness of the possibility that Egypt might 
move to challenge Assyrian authority over this region
284
. Nevertheless, it is clear that Assyria was 
                                                 
281
  Raids by the tribal population of the Syro-Arabian Desert and Northern Sinai were probably always a problem for 
the settled population here, but they were not yet a concern for Assyria at the time of the Assyrian conquest of Syria-
Palestine. Moreover, Assyria's relationship with these peoples was not always turbulent, and it is clear from Assyrian 
sources that the Arab population served an important role in the empire, as regulators of commercial traffic and later, 
assisting in the logistic aspects of staging military operations into Egypt, see Ephʿal (1984, pp. 93 ff.).      
282
 Though Oded argues that the borders of these states were reinforced with fortifications (1970, pp. 182-5), 
Bienkowski has criticised the archaeological evidence cited by Oded, arguing that there is not only disagreement 
over whether the forts referred to by Oded are indeed Iron Age, there is also no reason to identify any one of them as 
an Assyrian garrison on the basis of the archaeological evidence (2000, p. 50). 
283
  The appointment of Idibiʾilu as ―Gatekeeper‖ on the border of Egypt appears to have had more of a commerce 
purpose. See Ephʿal (1984, p. 93)  
284
  Note, however, that there is not enough evidence to make any definitive judgements on the nature of Assyrian 
policy towards Egypt during this period. Dubovský‘s argument, for example, that Tiglath-pileser‘s efforts in the 
Levant around Gaza were aimed at blocking Egyptian intervention is dubious, notably because it rests not only on 
the far-reaching assumption, following Ehrlich (1996, pp. 85-94), that Egypt controlled both the trade and trade-
routes which passed through the Mediterranean coastal ports in the Levant during this period, but also that Egypt 
was politically and militarily positioned to respond to an Assyrian advancement in this area during this period. The 
fact that Egypt did not move to block Assyrian expansion in this region until the reigns of Sargon II (720 BC) and 
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able to exert sufficient military pressure on vassal states from annexed territory in northern 
Transjordania, at least during the reign of Tiglath-pileser III. Though a number of rebellions were 
staged by the Philistine and Trans-jordanian states against Assyrian rule in later times, it is 
interesting to note that when vassals did rebel, they did so collectively rather than individually 
(Ephʿal 1979), no doubt in response to the large number of Assyrian forces stationed in annexed 
territory nearby.  
 
6.5.3 Alternative Methods of Empire Creation     
 
In Chapter 2 the point was made that the ARI place a strong emphasis on the use of aggressive 
military tactics in their descriptions of conquest while providing only scant evidence of the use of 
alternative methods of empire creation used by the Assyrian kings. This provokes an important 
question about the nature of Assyrian imperialism: how did Assyria ensure that subjugated polities 
would remain loyal once Assyria‘s armies had departed? The answer inevitably depended to some 
degree on whether the area was annexed to Assyria or retained some of its independence under a 
vassal agreement. However, it is also clear from the ARI that methods other than warfare were used 
by Assyria to ensure that polities supported Assyria‘s interests and maintained their loyalty to 
Assyria (see Fales (2009); Landfranchi (1997; 2003; 2011; Porter (1993)).  
 
Traditionally, securing the submission or continued loyalty of subject rulers could be achieved by 
Assyria through a variety of formal non-military mechanisms such as diplomatic marriages and 
alliances. However, other less formal methods were also employed to ensure Assyria retained 
control over subject territories and states. The rebuilding of cities destroyed in the process of 
subduing enemy territory and the settling of deportees there would have served the important 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Sennacherib (701 BC) (see Ephʿal 1979) may suggest that Egypt was experiencing a period of weakness during our 
period. 
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function of stimulating economic activity but also highlighted the benevolence of the Assyrian king. 
The use of persuasion by Assyria in the pursuit of imperial expansion is perhaps best known from 
the example given in II Kings (18:31-32) where an offer of deportation to a prosperous land is made 
by the rāb šaqê to the people of Jerusalem who are suffering under siege from Assyrian forces 
during the reign of Sennacherib. Although there is some uncertainty surrounding the issue of 
whether this offer in II Kings represents an authentic speech made by the Assyrians to the 
Jerusalemites, other evidence from Assyrian sources indicates that political persuasion and 
negotiation were methods by the Assyrians to achieve their imperial goals. A letter dating to the 
reign of Sargon (Lanfranchi & Parpola (1990), SAA V 210), for example, concerns an incident 
involving deportees to Media, who after being mistreated by the Assyrian official transporting them 
(the ―son of Bēl-iddina) fled and took up residency in various fortresses. In response to this 
situation, the governor rather than use force attempted to gain the cooperation of the deportees by 
offering them fields of land and asking them to build houses there (see Gallagher 1994, pp. 61-62). 
This example suggests that the Assyrians did not always resort to force in their efforts to subjugate 
populations and that some people may actually have benefitted from subjugation under the Assyrian 
empire.    
  
Statues and palaces were similarly erected in subjugated cities as a visual reminder not only the 
power of the Assyrian king, but also of his divine support. Esarhaddon, for example, states on an 
inscription found at Zincirli (670 BC), ―I had a stele made (with) my written name and I had 
inscribed upon it the renown (and) heroism of the god Aššur, my lord, the mighty deeds which I had 
done with the help of the god Aššur, my lord, and the victory (and) booty. I set it up for all time to 
astonish all my enemies‖ (Leichty 2011, pp. 186-191). Violent visual images were also often 
erected, such as the flayed bodies of enemy rulers which were set up on city walls to remind 
viewers of the savage capabilities of the Assyrian army and the consequences of rebellion. The 
success of such threat of force measures are sometimes evident in the ARI where the submission of 
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cities and populations targeted for conquest was secured without the need for military intervention. 
The king of Mannea, for example, is said to have brought tribute to Tiglath-pileser III and become a 
willing vassal of Assyria following the defeat of the Medes who occupied neighbouring 
borderlands: ―[Iranzu of the land of Mannea] heard about [the glorious valour of (the god) Aššur, 
my lord, that I had] accomplished again and again [throughout all of the mountain regions], and the 
terrifying radiance of (the god) [Aššur, my lord, overwhelmed him.... He came before me (and) 
k]issed my feet.‖ (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 17, 10b-12, pp. 53-54)285. States, such as Mannea, 
which voluntarily submitted to Assyria and became loyal Assyrian subjects received significant 
advantages beyond the immediate benefits of avoiding plundering and destruction by the Assyrian 
army. This could involve significant economic or political gain, such as the granting of royal favour 
where disputes arose with neighbouring subject states
286
.  The benefits enjoyed by Assyrian subjects 
were in many cases reciprocal. King Kilamua of Sam‘al mentions in an inscription dated c. 830 B.C 
that he had requested aid from Assyria against the Danunians: ―The king of the Danunians was 
more powerful then I, but I engaged against him the king of Assyria‖ (Hallo & Younger 2000, pp. 
147-148). His son, king Barrākib, later wrote in one of his inscriptions that Kimamua had been 
restored to his throne by Assyria after his forced removal, ―Then my father, Panamuwa, son of 
Barṣūr, brought a gift to the king of Assyria, who made him king over the house of his father‖, and 
that Kimamua had died in battle against Damasus fighting for Assyria, ―My father, Panamuwa, died 
while following his lord, Tiglath-pileser, king of Assyria, in the campaigns‖ (Hallo & Younger 
2000, pp. 158-160). A further inscription of King Barrākib indicates that the admission of economic 
and political benefits were in some cases freely acknowledged by Assyrian subjects: ―I am 
                                                 
285
 This tactic is called by Parker ―the economy of force‖ which asserts that the empire relied on the threat of force to 
persuade foreign cities and territories to submit to Assyria in the interest of preserving valuable resources (2001, pp. 
259-261). The use of non-military tactics employed in the creation and maintenance of empire are further discussed 
in Chapter 6. 
286
 For cases where Assyria adjudicated disputes between Assyrian vassals, see Galil (1992).  
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Barrākib, son of Panamuwa, king of Sam‘al, the servant of Tiglath-pileser (III), lord of the four 
quarters of the earth. On account of the loyalty of my father and on account of my loyalty, my lord, 
Rākib-El, and my lord, Tiglath-pileser, caused me to reign upon the throne of my father. The house 
(ie. my kingdom) of my father profited more than all others‖ (Hallo & Younger 2000, pp. 160-161). 
Indeed, the provision of such benefits to encourage loyalty among subject populations was 
particularly useful for avoiding the expenditure of resources involved in military campaigning. 
 
 In some cases, Assyria‘s successful expansion was facilitated by the economic and political decline 
of other states
287
, whose weakness was exploited by Assyria.  
                                                 
287
 Tiglath-pileser‘s successful expansion into Syria during this period may have been facilitated by Urartu‘s decline. 
Some evidence of this decline may be seen in the results of Tiglath-pileser‘s 743 BC clash with the North-Syrian 
alliance involving Urartu, as well as the later campaign against Urartu in 735 BC when Tiglath-pileser was able to 
successfully penetrate Urartu‘s territory as far as the Urartian capital (see Tadmor and Yamada 2011, 39: 23-25a, p. 
98). Egypt‘s international weakness at this time may also have been responsible for Egypt‘s failure to respond to 
Tiglath-pileser‘s expansion into southern Palestine during the course of his 734-732 BC campaign, when he marched 
all way to the Egyptian border without any opposition from the Egyptian army (see Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 
42, 8‘-15‘, pp. 105-106 and No. 48,14‘-19‘, p. 127). This point is significant since Assyria‘s presence here at the 
―brook of Egypt‖ certainly positioned Assyria as a threat to Egypt, not only because Tiglath-pileser now commanded 
a physical presence at the Egyptian border but also because he had subjugated neighbouring peoples, such as Samsi 
the queen of the Arabs and Siruatti the Me‘unite whose assistance could facilitate an invasion of Egypt across the 
Sinai desert (Zamazalová 2011, pp. 302-303). Egypt‘s international weakness at this time is probably to be explained 
by internal troubles which had politically fragmented the state until its conquest by a Kushite king, Piye around 728 
BC. The Kushite dynasty, which was probably still in the process of consolidating its control over Egypt when 
Tiglath-pileser III invaded the southern Levant in 734 BC. Tiglath-pileser‘s reinstating of Hanun of Gaza on the 
throne after he fled to Egypt in the wake of the Assyrian advance on Gaza is not easily explained, but is perhaps to 
be taken as an indication of a recognition by Tiglath-pileser that Egypt did not pose a threat at this time, as well as 
his desire to take advantage of Hanun‘s relationship with Egypt to facilitate trade as Zamazalová suggests (2011, p. 
308). Dipolomatic relations are noted between Assyria and Egypt during the second half of the 8
th
 century (see 
Zamazalová 2011, pp. 304-305) and it was not until the reign of Sennacherib in 701 BC that Egypt would go on to 
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There is also evidence that empire was consolidated in areas, not only by the threat of military  
intervention against subjugated territories, but also by efforts to gain the acceptance of the local 
population to Assyrian rule. In Gaza, the ARI indicate that Tiglath-pileser III exercised leniency in 
the case of its ruler there, Ḫanun (Ḫanūnu), who had fled to Egypt, where he had either sought aid 
from the Egyptians against Assyria or else sought political asylum, in the wake of Tiglath-pileser‘s 
734 BC invasion of Philistia. Tiglath-pileser describes the episode as follows in the ARI: 
―Moreover, [as for him (Ḫanūnu), the terrifying splendor of (the god) Aššur, my lord, 
over]whelmed him and he flew (back) from Egypt like a bird and […]. I returned him to his 
position.‖ (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 42, 12'b-13'b, p. 106). Ḫanūnu‘s return from Egypt here 
can probably be credited to political negotiation rather than fear, as the ARI claim. However, it is 
likely that Tiglath-pileser III, in desiring to secure the favour of the local elite and to encourage their 
future cooperation, adopted a ‗soft‘ approach toward Gaza, a territorial holding of both economic 
and strategic importance, by permitting Ḫanun to remain on the throne there. This episode contrasts 
with the belligerent image of Assyrian conquest typically presented in the ARI, and confirms that 
the ARI do not present a wholly accurate picture of the nature of Assyrian conquest and the creation 
of empire.  
 
Further evidence for the utilisation of alternate methods of Assyrian rule may be noted in Assyria‘s 
policy toward Babylonia during this period, where a number of strategies were implemented with 
the aim of gaining the acceptance of the local population to Assyrian rule. Assyrian policy in 
Babylonia is discussed in detail in Chapter 4, however a brief overview of this is necessary to our 
discussion here. Babylonia held a unique position under the empire because of its close affinity to 
Assyria, which shared many of the same cultural and religious practices, and it is clear that Assyrian 
rule was flexible and utilised alternative methods to military force in the maintenance of empire 
                                                                                                                                                                  
challenge Assyrian supremacy in the southern Levant under the Kushite king Shebitku.     
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here during our period. In Babylonia, Tiglath-pileser III ascended the Babylonian throne and ruled 
directly over Babylonia in an effort to gain the favour and acceptance of the local population. In this 
capacity, he assumed the duties of the traditional Babylonian king, bestowing kidinnu privileges on 
at least the Babylonian capital. He also performed the traditional religious duties of the Babylonian 
king by taking part in the annual Babylonian akītu festival, adorning the statues of the principal 
Babylonian deities in several Babylonian cities (Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 5, 1-5a, pp. 26-27) 
and offering sacrifices to the chief temples. Further, Tiglath-pileser III sought to promote the local 
economy and to improve infrastructure, establishing a trading emporium called Kar-Ashur (Ḫumut) 
and restoring the Patti-Enlil canal so that it could be used for irrigation projects (Tadmor and 
Yamada 2011, No. 5, 1b-5a, pp. 26-27). These measures all sought to foster an acceptance of 
Assyrian rule among the local population here and to legitimise Assyrian rule here (see Chapter 4).   
Tiglath-pileser‘s successful expansion into Syria during this period may have been facilitated by 
Urartu‘s decline. Some evidence of this decline may be seen in the results of Tiglath-pileser‘s 743 
BC clash with the North-Syrian alliance involving Urartu, as well as the later campaign against 
Urartu in 735 BC when Tiglath-pileser was able to successfully penetrate Urartu‘s territory as far as 
the Urartian capital (see Tadmor and Yamada 2011, 39: 23-25a, p. 98). Egypt‘s international 
weakness at this time may also have been responsible for Egypt‘s failure to respond to Tiglath-
pileser‘s expansion into southern Palestine during the course of his 734-732 BC campaign, when he 
marched all way to the Egyptian border without any opposition from the Egyptian army (see 
Tadmor and Yamada 2011, No. 42, 8‘-15‘, pp. 105-106 and No. 48,14‘-19‘, p. 127). This point is 
significant since Assyria‘s presence here at the ―brook of Egypt‖ certainly positioned Assyria as a 
threat to Egypt, not only because Tiglath-pileser now commanded a physical presence at the 
Egyptian border but also because he had subjugated neighbouring peoples, such as Samsi the queen 
of the Arabs and Siruatti the Me‘unite whose assistance could facilitate an invasion of Egypt across 
the Sinai desert (Zamazalová 2011, pp. 302-303). Egypt‘s international weakness at this time is 
probably to be explained by internal troubles which had politically fragmented the state until its 
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conquest by a Kushite king, Piye around 728 BC. The Kushite dynasty, which was probably still in 
the process of consolidating its control over Egypt when Tiglath-pileser III invaded the southern 
Levant in 734 BC. Tiglath-pileser‘s reinstating of Hanun of Gaza on the throne after he fled to 
Egypt in the wake of the Assyrian advance on Gaza is not easily explained, but is perhaps to be 
taken as an indication of a recognition by Tiglath-pileser that Egypt did not pose a threat at this 
time, as well as his desire to take advantage of Hanun‘s relationship with Egypt to facilitate trade as 
Zamazalová suggests (2011, p. 308). Diplomatic relations are noted between Assyria and Egypt 
during the second half of the 8
th
 century (see Zamazalová 2011, pp. 304-305) and it was not until 
the reign of Sennacherib in 701 BC that Egypt would go on to challenge Assyrian supremacy in the 
southern Levant under the Kushite king Shebitku.    
                  
6.6 Conclusion 
 
Under Tiglath-pileser III the empire was dramatically transformed through a series of sweeping 
military reforms which coincided with the expansion of the province system. Although annexation 
assisted in the effective economic exploitation of subjugated territories and undoubtedly generated 
wealth for the empire, they also served a vital role in sustaining the various administrative and 
military structures of the empire. This purpose had ultimately resulted from the need to position 
troops outside of Assyria proper for military and strategic purposes. The 9
th
 century had borne 
witness to numerous internal problems as the empire suffered regular periods of growth and 
recession, and the state struggled with issues of manpower and the problem of how to maintain 
control over an empire comprised largely of vassal-states located far from Assyria proper where the 
main army was stationed. Tiglath-pileser‘s reforms effectively allowed Assyria to overcome certain 
military restrictions which had earlier constrained its imperial expansion and prevented it from 
sustaining imperial growth. From the middle of the 8
th
 century, no longer was the empire solely 
dependent on kiṣir šarrūti forces stationed in Assyria to provide for the defence and expansion of 
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the empire. Increasingly, this burden fell to provincial forces or ṣab šarri which could be rapidly 
deployed between provinces and to the front line under the command of governors and other 
officials who now assumed much of the responsibility for the expansion and defence of the empire.   
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CHAPTER 7     Conclusion 
 
 
The reign of Tiglath-pileser III remains an obscure but remarkable period of Assyrian history which 
not only marks Assyria‘s miraculous revival following a significant period of decline, but also set 
the stage for Assyria‘s ascendency to a world power, dominating a vast and stable empire not 
rivalled by any former imperial power in the ancient Near East. This thesis has attempted to shed 
some light on the nature of Assyrian imperialism during this period, and to answer the fundamental 
question of how such rapid imperial expansion was realised during this period. Consequently, the 
campaigns and events pertaining to the years 745-740 BC of Tiglath-pileser‘s reign have formed the 
focus of our enquiry here, on the grounds that these were the defining years in which the imperial 
policies of Tiglath-pileser III were developed and the empire born. Assyrian imperialism during 
these early years can largely be viewed as a reaction to the domestic turmoil and imperial decline 
which had prevailed during the preceding period in Assyria, and were essentially successful because 
of the decline of foreign powers and states, such as Urartu, in those areas where imperial expansion 
was pursued.   
   
Chapter 1 showed that Tiglath-pileser‘s achievement of empire cannot be understood in terms of a 
general expansion of the province system and Assyria‘s transition to a territorial empire based 
predominately on annexed land. Provinces were already a feature of the imperial system in the 9
th
 
century, and it is clear from the Eponym Chronicle that a huge expansion of the province system 
was already undertaken at the beginning of the 8
th
 century. Although deportations of conquered 
people were increased during our period, Tiglath-pileser‘s annexation policy was but a continuation 
of a policy already pursued by his predecessors. Tiglath-pileser‘s real achievement was the 
expansion of the province system beyond the traditional boundaries of the empire, marked in the 
West by the Euphrates River. Here, Assyrian imperial expansion was pursued into southern Anatolia 
in the north and up to the border of Egypt in the south, and though Tiglath-pileser did not annex all 
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of the West to the empire, a substantial amount of new provincial territories were carved out of the 
territory conquered in greater Syria and Palestine.  
 
Chapter 2 provided an overview of the written evidence for this period and concluded that the ARI, 
in addition to being biased, also do not provide a reliable description of how conquest was carried 
out. In particular, the ARI do not illuminate the drivers of imperial policies or alternate non-military 
methods of empire-building. An alternate interpretation of the historical notations in the Eponym 
Chronicle was also suggested in this chapter, which argued that the chronicle served as a 
mechanism for dating comparative texts of the same period and that the event entry was added in 
the middle of the 9
th
 century as a result of limmu overlap. This discussion led into Chapter 3 which 
examined the accession of Tiglath-pileser III and suggested that Tiglath-pileser was not a usurper to 
the Assyrian throne but rather, ascended the throne as part of a co-regency operating from 745 BC 
until the death of Ashur-nerari V in 744 BC, which was probably initiated to curb the growing civil 
unrest in Assyria.  
 
Chapter 4 examined Tiglath-pileser‘s campaigns to Babylonia in 745 BC and 731-729 BC, 
respectively. It was argued that the origins of Assyria‘s Babylonian policy pursued by later Neo-
Assyrian kings of the Sargonid era can be found in this period. Assyrian rule here following Tiglath-
pileser‘s first campaign in 745 BC had followed a policy pursued by earlier Assyrian kings of the 9th 
century. These kings had been equally reluctant to campaign against the Babylonian city-states, 
which were also major cult centres, and had restricted Assyrian political and military intervention in 
Babylonia. Although Tiglath-pileser‘s campaign of 745 BC had penetrated Babylonia proper, this 
military campaign had only targeted the tribal population of Babylonia and the annexations carried 
out by Tiglath-pileser in this area had also only targeted those areas inhabited by Aramaeans in the 
north and north-east. The Babylonian king, Nabu-nasir, was permitted to remain on the throne, 
likely under Assyrian influence, and direct rule was not imposed over any those areas where the 
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principal Babylonian city-states were located. However, this form of indirect rule proved 
ineffective, as the events in Babylonia following the death of Nabu-nasir shows, and despite his 
efforts Tiglath-pileser had failed to effectively establish Assyrian authority over Babylonia 
following the 745 BC campaign. Eventually, an Assyrian campaign was ordered to remove Mukin-
zeri from the throne, which also coincided with a departure from the non-intervention policy 
pursued earlier in Babylonia. The new policy was distinguished by the accession of Tiglath-pileser 
III to the Babylonian throne and the imposition of direct Assyrian rule over Babylonia, which had 
no precedent in Assyrian history. Assyrian policy would now not only try to foster good relations 
with the Babylonian city-states, but also seek to promote Tiglath-pileser as the legitimate king of 
Babylonia and ignite a vigorous public relations program which would be continued under Tiglath-
pileser‘s successors. While the absence of any united resistance to Assyrian rule in Babylonia may 
be viewed as evidence of the decline of this state during this period, it may be that the Babylonian 
city-states purposefully adopted a passive policy towards Assyria and exploited Assyria‘s reluctance 
to conduct military campaigns against the major cult centres. This is certainly the impression given 
in Letter 1 from the Nimrud archives, which clearly illustrates the hesitancy on the part of the 
Assyrian envoys to apply military pressure against Babylon and its inhabitants. The very fact that 
Assyrian envoys are said in this letter to have returned to the city on multiple occassions in an effort 
to persuade the Babylonians to open the city gates to the army suggests that the Babylonians were 
well aware of Assyria‘s reluctance to besiege the city.     
 
Chapter 5 explored the origins of Assyria‘s vast expansion in the West, begun in 743 BC with a 
campaign to North Syria. Here, Tiglath-pileser encountered opposition from a coalition of states, 
which though largely interpreted as anti-Assyrian, was more likely a local alliance which mobilised 
to provide assistance to Arpad, an ally under attack from Assyria. There is little evidence to suggest 
that Tiglath-pileser‘s ambitions in the West at this time were directed toward the complete 
subjugation of the West. Rather, it was argued that Tiglath-pileser‘s campaigns in this region, from 
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743 to 740 BC, were clearly focused on the re-subjugation of Arpad, a state which had rebelled 
from Assyrian control under Ashur-nerari V. Although the campaigns directed against Arpad during 
these years were probably also motivated by economic and strategic considerations, the recovery of 
Arpad was largely driven by ideological concerns. Following the crisis which had earlier engulfed 
Assyria under Ashur-nerari V, Tiglath-pileser sought to restore the empire of his predecessor by re-
asserting Assyrian authority over Arpad, a powerful state in the West and one of Assyria‘s most 
prized vassal-states which had been lost in the preceding period of Assyrian weakness. It was 
argued that Assyria‘s vast expansion in this area had resulted only from the defeat of the local 
alliance that came to Arpad‘s aid in 743 BC, and that Assyria‘s subjugation of this area should more 
likely be interpreted as the result of seized opportunity rather than planned imperial conquest. 
Urartu‘s involvement in what was likely a unilateral alliance, as well as its inability to limit 
Assyrian expansion in this area, provides clear evidence of Urartu‘s decline during this period 
which undoubtedly contributed to Tiglath-pileser‘s successful expansion in the West.  
 
Chapter 6 sought to account for Assyria‘s transition to a territorial-based empire, begun already in 
the 9
th
 century, and greatly expanded under Tiglath-pileser III. It was argued that in the preceding 
period, imperial expansion had been restricted by the capabilities of a centrally-stationed army, 
which was unable to sustain control over conquered territory beyond the traditional boundaries of 
the empire through a single annual campaign. While provinces certainly provided strong economic 
and strategic incentives, it was argued that provinces played a crucial role in overcoming logistical 
and supply problems to the army, which inevitably led to the creation of a vast and stable empire. 
By stationing troops outside of Assyria proper in provincial territories as ṣab šarri forces, Assyria 
was no longer dependent on a centrally based army to maintain and extend the empire and was 
therefore no longer restricted in the amount of territory that could be effectively controlled from the 
core centre. Although the success of Assyria‘s imperial policies during this period was largely 
dependent on the decline of foreign powers, the rapid growth and maintenance of the vast empire 
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created by Tiglath-pileser III was greatly assisted by the introduction of key military reforms which 
placed a growing emphasis on forces stationed externally in provincial territories to protect and 
extend the empire.  
 
On a final note, while the military reforms introduced during this period were crucial in enabling 
Assyria to maintain control over a vast empire of annexed territory located far from Assyria proper, 
the speed with which Tiglath-pileser was able to conquer and extend Assyrian control over such a 
vast area must largely be credited to the decline of foreign powers during this period, notably Urartu 
and Egypt, which were unable to check Assyrian expansion. The conquest of the West firmly 
exemplifies this point where Tiglath-pileser was able to extend Assyrian authority up to the borders 
of the lands pertaining to these powers with little or no resistance. Although some opposition was 
met in the north against Urartu in 743 BC, as the above discussion shows this confrontation cannot 
be regarded as an attempt to halt Assyrian expansion in this area.     
 
The reign of Tiglath-pileser III will undoubtedly continue to provoke more questions than can be 
answered at the present time, and this is largely a product of the limited evidence available for this 
period of Assyrian history. In any case, it is hoped that this thesis has shed some light on the context 
and nature of Tiglath-pileser‘s imperial expansion, and challenged the notion that it was Tiglath-
pileser III, himself, who should be credited with Assyria‘s phenomenal revival during this period. 
Further research may explore the role which Assyria‘s elite officials played in the emerging empire, 
and test the thesis that powerful officials had undermined the power of the king in the preceding 
period of weakness.      
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Appendix A     The Nimrud Letters 
 
 
Letter 1   (ND 2632; SAA 19 98; CTN 5, p. 19)  
                                                                          
(O) 
1
a-na  LUGAL be-lí-ia  
2
ÌR-ka  
md
U[TU]-DÙ-a-a  
md
PA-ZALÁG-ir  
3
lu  DI-mu  ana  
LUGAL be-lí-ia  
4
d
PA 
d
AMAR.UTU a-na  LUGAL be-lí-iá l ik-r[u-bu] 
5
UD 28 [KÁM]  
a-na  TIN.TIR.KI ni-it-ta-la[k] 
6
pa-an  [KÁ].GAL mar-duk ni-i t-t i-ti-zi 
7
TA 
DU[MU](?) TIN.TIR.KI ni-id-du-bu-ub  
8
m
[…]-si-nu  
LÚ
ÌR ša  mGIN-NUMUN  
9
LÚ
k[al]-da-a-a  i-ba-áš-ši  i-d[a]-e-šu 10[ú-ṣ]u-u-ni  TA DUMU TIN.TIR.KI.MEŠ 
11
pa-an  [K]Á.GAL i-za-zu  a-ni-ni-k[ i]  an-ni-i  
12
a-na  DUMU TIN.TIR.KI.MEŠ    
ni-iq- ṭ í-bi 13ma-a L[UGA]L AŠ UGU-ḫ i-┌šu┐-nu i-[……]-na-ši  14ma-a  […………..] 
šu-nu TA(?) X [………………] 15  [……………………..] na(?)-a  16  [a-n]a 
[…………..]TI[N.T] IR.KI l im-gur  1 7LÚki-di-nu-tu-ku-nu  ta[š]-š[a]-ku-un 18a-na  
TIN.TIR.KI al-[ la]-ka  [dib]-bí  ma-a‘-du-ti  
19
i-si-šú-nu ni-id-du-bu-ub ERIM. 
ME[Š] [UN?].MEŠ 20ERIN2 .MEŠ—GÌR  ba-áš-ši  la i-[ma(?)-gúr(?)] 21 la ú-ṣu-u-ni  
i-si-ni  l[a] i-da-[b]u-bu 
22
i-sa-nap-pa-ru-na-š[ i] a-ni-ni 23ni-iq- ṭí-ba-šú-nu ma-a  
KÁ.GAL pi-ti-ia  
24
a-na  TIN.TIR.KI né-ru-ub  la  i-ma-gúr  
25
ma-a  a-na ka-na-šú-nu  
a-na  TIN.TIR.KI 
26
nu-šé-ri-ib-ku-nu  ma-a ki-ma  27LUGAL-ma  ┌i t┐-tal-ka  mi-i-nu 
28
[a-n]a  LUGAL a-[qa]b-b[ i] ki-ma  
29
[LU]GAL i t-tal-ka  KÁ.GAL i-pat-ti-ú  
30
la  
i-qi-pu  ša  LUGAL [ i] l-lak-u-ni   
 
(R)  
31
ki-i  an-ni-i  ni-iq-ṭ í-ba-šú-n[u] 32ma-a  
m
[………]  ù  L[ÚAR]AD.MEŠ 33ša  
m
muk[ in]-ze[r] lu ˹paq˺-[d]u-ni-ku-nu  34a-di  É LUGAL i[ l]  -la-ka-an-ni  35a-ni-ni 
ana  URU .kar -
d
U.GUR-ma [……………..]-ma  36[a-na  p]a-ni  LÚ?  DUMU.TIN. 
TIR.KI ni-di[b]-b[u-u]b  
37
mi-i-nu ša ṭe-[mu] ša-nu nu-du(?)-úb(?)-ub-u 38a-na 
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LUGAL be-lí-ia  ni-š[a]p-pa-ra  39[
LÚ
l i-]-ta-ma-a-a  i-sa-ap-ru-na-ši  40ma-a  
LÚ
ÌR.MEŠ ša LU[GAL] a-ni-ni ma-a  UD‒30‒[K]ÁM  41ni-il-la-ka i-[s]i-ku-nu  
ni-dab-bu-ub 
42
ù  [S]AG.KAL.MEŠ -[ te]-ni  ina  UGU LUGAL i l-lu-ku 43ki-ma  
i[ t]-t[a]l-ku-u-[ni?] pa-an  LUGAL be-lí-ia 
44
[ú?]-ba-la-š[u?-n]u? ṭ[e] -e-m[u] ša  
U R U
dil-bat
KI
 
45šu  […………… ………………….]  46  mukin-z[er…………………….. 
47
a-ni-n[ i…… ………………..] 48a-na  […………………………….]  49[……………… 
……………… .]  50ni-mur-ra-a a-n[a?  ………………]  
 
(O)
1 
To the King, my lord: your servant(s) Šamaš-bunaya and Nabu-nammir. May it be well with 
the king, my lord, and may Nabu and Marduk bless the king, my lord. 
5 
On the twenty-eighth we 
came to Babylon and stood in front of the Marduk gate (where) we spoke with the Babylonians. 
…………., the servant of Mukin-zeri, (and) the Chaldeans were at his side.
10 
They came out and 
stood with the Babylonians before the gate. We spoke to the Babylonians in the same way, saying: 
―the king ……….. concerning them and ……….. them ……………………………….15
 
……………… Let him agree to  ………… Babylon and your citizen privileges will be set down‖. 
I  kept coming (back) to Babylon. We spoke many words with them but (because of) the soldiers, 
the people
20
 and the foot soldiers present they would not agree  to come out and speak with us. 
They kept sending (messages) to us. Now we said to them: ―Open the gate! We will enter 
Babylon!‖. He would not agree, (saying) 
25
 ―We would only allow your entering of Babylon for 
our submission‖. (We replied to them): ―When the king arrives what will I say to the king? When 
the king comes they will open the gate?‖. 
30
 They did not believe that the king would come.  
 
(R) So we spoke to them, saying: ―Let …………  and the servants of Mukin-zeri be entrusted to 
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you until the king comes 
35
 here to Kar-Nergal. We spoke in front of the man of Babylonian 
(saying): ―What is it that we are to say (in) the report? We will send to the king, my lord, The 
Li‘tamu have sent to us (saying): 
40
 ―The servants of the king are here. On the thirtieth we will 
come and speak with you, and our leaders will go to the king‖. When they have come, I will bring 
them before the king my lord. Report of the city of Dilbat:
45
 …………… ………………….. 
Mukin-zeri ……………… …………… we ………………………… ……….. to 
……………………………………we have seen ….………………………… 
 
 
Letter 1 - Notes 
 
(O) Line 1 - Although it is not known what position Šamaš-bunaya held in Babylonia during the 
reign of Tiglath-pileser III, he is known from a later letter published by Dietrich (2003, 95:4, p. 87). 
The letter is from Gambula, a province located northeast of Babylon, and dates to the early reign of 
Sennacherib (Dietrich 2003, pp. XXVI-XXVII). In this letter, Šamaš-bunaya is referred to as the 
predecessor of one Marduk-belu-uṣur. While the text is extensively damaged in parts, the reference 
made in line 20 on the obverse to ―this governor‖ and the fact that Marduk-belu-uṣur is quite clearly 
the subject of the writer‘s complaint, strongly suggests that Marduk-belu-uṣur served as an Assyrian 
provincial governor in Babylonia during the reign of Sennacherib. If this assessment is correct, we 
can assume that Šamaš-bunaya held a similar position in Babylonia under Tiglath-pileser III.  
Line 2 – Note that the name of the second official mentioned here, Nabu-nammir, follows Saggs 
later revised translation of this letter (2001, p. 19) and deviates from his earlier translation of Nabu- 
ētir (1952a, p. 23). For attestations of the name Nabu-nammir ―O Nabu, make bright!‖, see Baker 
(2001, p. 854-855).  
Line 6 - The additional TI sign in this line is taken here as a scribal error.   
Line 7 - Saggs suggests an alternative reconstruction, reading the sign preceding TIN.TIR.KI 
(Babylon) as LÚ, and translating these signs as ―the Man of Babylon‖ (1952a, p. 25; 2001, p. 20).  
Line 8 – Note that Luukko (2012, p. 104) reconstructs the sign -za here reading mz[a]-si-nu. 
175 
 
Line
 
9 – Note that the transliteration of the final form in this line agrees with Saggs‘ transliteration 
(2001, p. 19) reading i-d[a]-e-šu.despite the odd appearance of the –e sign here. Luukko (2012, p. 
104) has more recntly read this form as i-˹se-e˺-šu. The translation offered by Saggs (1952a, p. 24; 
2001, p. 20) for this line ―the servant of Mukin-zeri, the Chaldean,‖ does not fit the grammatical 
framework of the following lines of the letter. The verbs used in lines 10 and 11 which take their 
subject from lines 8-9 are constructed in the plural, not the singular form. Therefore, I suggest that 
the reconstruction ―the servant of Mukin-zeri, and the Chaldeans‖ is the most suitable reading of the 
text. The 3cs. present/future form of the verb bašu (ibašši) does not preclude this reading of the text 
because it can occur with pl. subjects (see Huehnergard 2000, p. 490). Note that Luukko (2012, p. 
104) provides the translation ―some Chaldeans‖ here.    
Line 10 – Note that both Luukko (2012, p. 104) and Saggs (2001, p. 19) reconstruct the first two 
signs in this line as i[t-t]u which may be problematic given there is such little space here for both 
signs.  
Line 13 – Note that where muḫ-ḫi-┌šu┐-nu is restored ,  Luukko (2012, 98, p . 104) 
reconstructs  UGU-hi -
┌
ku
┐
-nu. Saggs reconstructs the final verb in this l ine as  t[ a ]-
na[k-ka ]-ra-na-si (2001, p. 19), while Luukko (2012, p. 104) restores i-s[a-ap]-ra-na-ši.  The damage done 
to the text is such that I have chosen not to provide a reconstruction here where there is such little evidence 
to go on.   
Line 14 – Luukko‘s (2012, p.104) reconstruction of -ku-nu here over šu-nu is unlikely as is his 
reconstruction of the unknown signs in the second half of the line which is too badly damaged to 
offer any reliable reconstruction. 
Line 15 - Luukko‘s reconstruction of this line (2012, p. 104) is also largely hypothetical due to 
heavy damage sustained by the tablet in this area. 
Line 16 – Luukko‘s reconstruction (2012, p. 104) of the final sign in this line as ┌ú┐ is also 
plausible. 
Line 17 – Note that the final form in this line is reconstructed by Saggs (2001, p. 105) as ra┐-na 
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k[a]-' –un , while Luukko (2012, p. 104) restores ┌la-áš-ku┐-un.    
Line 19 - This form of the preposition issu may appear without the doubling of the –s consonant and 
is not uncommon in Neo-Assyrian (see Hämeen-Antila 2000, p. 72). Note that Luukko (2012, p. 
104) reconstructs 
┌
KALAG
┐
.MEŠ at the end of this line.  
Line 20 - Saggs‘ revised his earlier transliteration of ERIN.MEŠ.U ―10 soilders‖ (1955a) reading 
ṣābē meš X (2001, p. 20). Luukko (2012, p. 104), however, while reading these signs as 
ERIN.MEŠ.U, translates ―10 powerful men‖. The alternative transliteration of ERIN2 .MEŠ—
GÌR proposed above is also possible taking away the i- prefix from the following verb. This 
reading of the text also fits better with the context of the letter.    
Line 21 - Taken as the 3m pl. preterite form of waṣû ―to come out‖ with the ventive marker. For the 
forms of waṣû, see Hämeen-Antila (2000, p. 158).  
Line 25 - Following Saggs (1955a, p. 25, l. 25; 2001, p. 20; 21 n. 25), ka-na-šu-nu is taken as the 
infinitive of kanašu ―to bow down; submit‖.   
Line 26 – Note that the form given here differs from that given by both Saggs (2001, p. 20) nu-si-ri-
ib-ku-nu and Luukko (2012, p. 104) nu-se-ri-ib-ku-nu.  
Line 35 – Note that Luukko (2012, p. 105) reconstructs the form n[i-is-h]ur in the lacuna at the end 
of this line.  
Line 36 – Luukko‘s (2012, p. 105) reconstruction of [ki-i a]n-ni at the beginning of this line is 
certainly possible, however his reconstruction of –˹ma TA˺ following this does not seem likely on 
the basis of the cuneiform.  
Line 37 -  The reconstruction here is unclear. Saggs‘ earlier transliteration (1955a) provided the 
reconstruction nu-kúr(?)-(ur)-tu-u ―hostility‖. Yet, the presence of the ša sign as the beginning of 
the clause, as well as the lengthening of the final –u vowel, suggests that this is a relative clause 
and, therefore, that these signs represent a verb in the 1c. pl. The context of the speech suggests that 
the verb is dabābu, but it may be noted that this is uncertain. Saggs‘ revised transliteration (2001, p. 
20) reconstructs the final four signs in this line as nu-x-tu-u, while Luukko (2012, p. 105) 
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reconstructs the final three signs in this line as ANŠE BABBAR-ú ―white donkey‖ which seems an 
unlikely translation given the context of the letter. Note that Luukko‘s assertion that this 
reconstruction should be taken as an indication that the Assyrians perceived the use of a ‗white‘ 
horse as symbolic of their peaceful intentions here is unsubstantiated (2007).   
Line 42 – Reconstruction of ù  [S]AG.KAL.MEŠ -[ te]-ni  follows Luukko (2012, p. 105, n. r12). 
See Saggs (2011, p. 20) for the alternate reconstruction of L[Ú]?.X.DAN.MES.    
Line 50- Note Luukko‘s (2012, p. 105) alternate reconstruction for this line ni-har-ra-ṣa!! a-na 
L[UGAL be-lí-ia ni-šap-p]a-ra which is not certain given the poor preservation of the text.  
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Letter 2 (ND 2717; SAA 19 125; CTN 5, p. 22) 
 
 (O)
1‘
[. . . . . . . . . . .] nu [. . . . . . . . . .] ˹a˺-ta-a [. . . . . . . . . . . .] 2‘[. . . . . . . . .] at-t[u]-nu ina É  
kam-mu-sa-[.....] 
3‘
[mu-uk] 
LÚ
e-mu-q[í] ša É.GAL AŠ lìb-bi 4‘[AŠ ŠÀ-b]i la ni-il-lak pa-al-ḫu-šu a-
dan-niš 5‘[………] AŠ ŠÀ-bi-šú la il-lu-ku a-na-ku 6‘[. . . . . . . . . . .] a-na pa-ni-šú-nu lal-lik 
m
GIN.NUMUN  
7‘
[ 
LÚ?
i-t]u-u-a  AŠ bi-[ri]-tu-uš-šú-nu ma-dak-tú 8‘[iš(?)-kun(?)] la il-lak ana 
UGU-šú-nu la e-ti-qi  9‘ i-sa-ḫi-ia-ši la nu-sa-ta-maḫ 
m
ia-su-ba-a-a 
10‘AŠ ŠÀ-bi BAD-HAL-l[i 
AŠ(?)] UGU-šú-nu a-šáp-ra mu-uk 11‘ a-la[k] qí-ba-[áš]-šú-nu [lu]-u-ṣu-ú-ni mu-uk 12‘a-ta-[a] ina É 
[k]am-mu-s[a-k]u-nu mu-uk šúm-ma 13‘ AŠ Š[À]-bi mGIN-NU[MUN] la tal-[l]a-ka mu-uk  14‘ a-d[i] 
URU
ma-rad al-ka-ni mu-uk ana-ku 
15‘
 TA a[n]-na-ka lal-li-ka ina  ŠÀ-bi-ku-nu 16‘ lu-s[a]-me-eh  
[i]t-ta-l[ak] 
[m]
ia-su-b[a]-a-a 
17‘
 iq-ṭi-ba-áš-šú-nu la i-ma-gúr-u-ni la ú-ṣu-u-ni 18‘ 
m
ia-su-ba-a-[a]  
i-su-ḫu-ra it-tal-ka 19‘ ṭè-en-šú-nu iq-ṭi-bi-a  ma-a i-da-bu-ub 20‘ma-[a] šúm-ma 
LÚ
e-mu-qì i-ba-áš-ši 
21‘
 [i]t-tal-ku-u-ni ni-ta-mar ma-a TA ŠÀ-bi 22‘ [AŠ? URU?] nu-ṣa-a ma-a ú-la-a 
LÚ
e-mu-qì  
23‘
 [la] 
il-li-ku-u-ni ma-a la-áš-šu la nu-[ṣa?]-˹a?˺ 24‘ [AŠ U]RU nu-kal-la kam-mu-sa-n[i ina É] 25‘ [......] 
LÚ
e-mu-[qì] ni-im-m[a-ru-ni] 
26‘
 [i?-ba?-áš?]-šu-ú ṭè-en-šú-nu a-na […………..] 27‘ [. . . . . . ]  
la-áš-šú qa-ra-b[u . . . . . . . .] 28‘ [. . . . . . .] la il-lu-k[u-u?-ni? . . . . . . . . . . .] 29‘ [LUGAL?] be-lí  
u-še-[. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .] 30‘ [. . . . . .] la-áš-šú ana-ku-[. . . . . . . . . . . . .] 31‘ [. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .] a 
[. . . . . . . . .  . .] 
 
(R)
1‘
  [. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ] 
2‘
dul-l[i . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .] 
3‘
ma-a mi-[ni? ša? . . . . . . . .]˹ú?˺-za-qa  dul-l[i]-šú-nu  4‘ta-d[a-an?-šu?-nu?. . .  . . . . ]-šu am-mar 
LÚ
a-ru-mu-ú 
5‘ša AŠ URUsa-pi-ia TA mGIN.NUMUN  i[t-ta]l?-ku-u-ni 6‘ mGIN.NUMUN k[i]-i TA 
URU
sa-pi-i[a u?]-[ṣ]a-ni  7‘AŠ ši[d-di?. . . . . . . . . .]-šú lu-[. . . . š]a(?) UD.UD A[G.KI i]ḫ-ta-bat 8‘ 
UDU.M[EŠ š]a mGIN.NUMUN  AŠ URUbu-ḫa-r[uKI] ˹e˺-ku-lu 9‘
  
LÚ
UD.UD.AG
KI
-a-a it-tal-ku 
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UDU.MEŠ 10 LIM 10‘ša mGIN.NUMUN iḫ-tab-tu-u-ni ṭè-mu ša 11‘ KÁ.DINGIR.RAKI
    
m
GIN.NUMUN  a-na DUMU.MEŠ KÁ.DINGIR.RA
KI
 
12‘
iq-ṭi-bi ma-˹a˺ i-si-ia a-[t]a-[k]a-ni ma-a 
13‘
 
GIŠ
GIŠIMMAR ša dil-bat
KI
 du-[k]a la i-tam-gu-ru 
14‘ DUM[U].MEŠ KÁ.DINGIR.RA.
KI
 i-si-šú  
[….] la il-lu-ku 15‘ 
LÚ
ši-ir-ki ša EN i-si-šú it-tal-ku 16‘ ṭ[è]-mu [š]a [LÚGÚ.]EN.NA UD 3 KAM ša 
ITI DU6 
17‘
 ˹a˺-[n]a  [p]a-ni-ía it-tal-ka 3 GIŠ.GIGIR 18‘ [ ANŠE].BAD.HAL-lu  5 ME LÚERIM. 
MEŠ GIŠBAN i-si-šú 19‘ [it-t]al-ku-u-ni TA UGU 
LÚ
a-ru-me ša 20‘ [LUGAL be-lí i]š-pur-a[n-ni] ma-a 
šu-ṭur še-bi-la  21‘[ . . . . . . . . … M]EŠ MUNUS ar-me-te 5 22‘ [ . . . . . . . . . . . .] i-sú-[ri LUGAL  
be-]-lí i-qab-bi  
23‘
 [ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ]-e 
 
(S)
1
 [. . . . .] 
LÚ
EN.NAM ša 
URU
LIMMU2-ḫa a-na 
UR[U]
 
2
 [. . . . . . . . ] x [t]-u a-na LUGAL be-lí-ía  
u-[. . . . . . . . . .] 
3
 [. . . . . 
LÚ
]A.KIN ša LUGAL be-lí-ía AŠ UGU-šú ˹x˺[ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ] 4 AŠ 
UGU-ía lu-bi-[l]a-šú 
 
(O) 
1‘
…………………………….………………………. you are gathering in the premises  
……………… ………..  (saying): ―The (armed) forces of the palace are therein. We will not go 
inside.‖ They are very much afraid of him. 
5‘
They will not go inside it …. I will go before them … 
Mukin-zeri is among the Itua. He has pitched camp. He will not go. He will not proceed further 
toward them. We could not join with one another. 
10‘ 
I sent Iasubaia with cavalry (to them), saying: 
―Go! Tell them they should come out‖ and ―Why are you gathered in the premises?‖ and ―If you 
will not go towards Mukin-zeri, go as far as Marad!‖ and 
15‘ 
―I myself will certainly come from here 
(and) join among you‖. He went (away). Iasubaia spoke to them but they would not agree to come 
out. Iasubaia came back and told me their decision, 
20‘
saying, ―If there really are troops and they do 
come, we will see (them) and we shall go from inside the city; or if the troops do not come and there 
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are none, then we shall not come out. We are holding the city and are gathered in the premises‖. 
25‘
…… we will see troops and they do exist..……….their decision…………….. There are no . . . . . . 
. . .    battle  . . . . . . . . . . . they will not come . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . the king, my lord . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
30‘
 there are not. . . . . . I  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
 
(R)
1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . work. Whatever ………… I will make exempt…………….. Give 
them their work 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . as many Aramaeans 
5 
who are in the city of Sapia have come from Mukin-zeri. 
Mukin-zeri went out from the city of Sapia and plundered . . . . . . . . .of Larak along the border of  
his…………. The sheep of Mukin-zeri were feeding in the city of Buharu. The Larakeans have 
gone and plundered 10,000 sheep 
10
 of Mukin-zeri. The report of Babylon: Mukin-zeri has said to 
the citizens of Babylon: ―Come away with me‖ (and) ―Destroy the date palms of Dilbat!‖. The 
citizens of Babylon could not agree with one another and would not go with him (but) 
15 
the temple 
oblates of Bel have gone with him. The report of the Governor of Nippur: He came before me on 
the third day of the month of Tašrītu. Three chariots, cavalry, and five hundred archers came with 
him. With respect to the Aramaeans about who 
20‘
 the king, my lord, sent to me, saying: ―Write 
down and send to me!. . . . . . . . . . . the Aramaean woman, five . . . . . . . . .‖ Perhaps the king my 
lord will say ―. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .‖ 
 
(S)
1 
……………. the governor of Arrapha to the city of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . to the king my 
lord………….. the messenger of the king my lord …………… concerning him. Let him bring 
him/it to me.  
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Letter 2 – Notes 
 
Line 1‘ – Saggs‘ (2001, p. 22) line 2‘ corresponds to line 1‘ here and in Luukko (2012, p. 126).   
Line 2‘ – kam-mu-sa is taken as the stative of the verb kamāsu I ―to gather in‖ (see Black et. al. 
2000, p. 144). 
Line 3‘ – Restoration of [mu-uk] follows the suggestion of Luukko (2012, p. 126).  
Line 7‘ – Both Saggs (2001, p 22) and Luukko (2012, p. 126) restore [ina pa-n]a-tu-u-a at the 
beginning of this line. I do not see the –na sign at the edge of the lacuna, however.  
Line 8‘ – Luukko (2012, p. 126) reconstructs [šá-ki]-˹in˺? in the lacuna at the beginning of this line.  
Line 9‘ – For the form i-sa-ḫi-ia-ši, see Saggs (2001, p. 25, n. 10‘).   
Line 11‘- In agreement with Luukko (2012, p. 126), the second sign in this line looks more like a –
lak than the expected –lík which Saggs restores (2001, p. 22). Reconstruction of the –lu sign here in 
the break follows the suggestion of Luukko (2012, p. 126).  
Line 12‘ – Reconstruction of –ku in the form [k]am-mu-s[a-k]u-nu follows Luukko (2012, p. 126). 
Line 23‘ – It is uncertain whether a further sign preceded the –il sign at the beginning of this line. 
Following Luukko (2012, p. 127) I reconstruct a –la sign here in the lacuna, which is a likely 
restoration given the context of the speech. Note, however, that Saggs (2001, p. 23) maintains that 
the –il sign is the first sign in this line.  
Line 25‘ – Saggs (2001, p. 23) reconstructs [šú]m?-[m ]a? in the lacuna at the beginning of this line, 
while Luukko (2012, p. 127) restores EN ˹É˺. 
 
(R)  
Line 1‘ – Note that Line 1‘ here corresponds to Luukko‘s line 9 (2012, p. 127) on the reverse.  
Line 2‘ – Luukko (2012, p. 127) and Saggs (2001, p. 23) both restore the only sign visible here as –
ki, but it is clearly a -dul like that seen in line 3‘.  
Line 3‘ – The sign following the –mi sign is most likely a –nu or a –ni, but I do not see the –nu in 
Saggs‘ copy of the cuneiform (2001, Pl. 3) which Luukko (2012, p. 127) has partially restored here. 
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The form ˹ú?˺-za-qa  is taken as the 1cs. present form of the verb zakû ‗to exempt‘ in the D-stem. 
Luukko (2012, p. 127) also suggests the signs x]x-za-qa might be read ―4 litres‖.  
Line 5‘ – How the TA sign in this line is translated has a significant bearing on how the text is 
interpreted. Luukko (2012, p. 127) translates issu here as ―with‖ Mukin-zeri, whereas I translate the 
sign as ―from‘ Mukin-zeri, suggesting that this group of Arameans had fled from Mukin-zeri or 
switiched political allegiances.     
Line 7‘ – The cuneiform for the first half of this line is difficult to make out from the copy of the 
text provided by Saggs (2001, Pl. 3). The first half of this line is read by Saggs‘ ina x illati(ILLAT)-
šú lu? x [l]i?/[š]a?, while Luukko (2012, p. 127) similarly restores ina ši[d-di] KASKAL-šú 
UD[U].˹MEŠ ša˺. I do not see enough evidence from the cuneiform which might conclusively 
support either reconstruction. In agreement with Luukko (2012, p. 127), the sign following UG.UG 
is most likely AG, since UG.UG.AG.KI is a common spelling for Larak. See for example, Tadmor & 
Yamada 2011, No. 51: 18). 
Line 8‘ – For the city mentioned in this line, see Saggs (2001, p. 25, n. 46‘).  
Line 9‘ - For the restoration of Larakeans here, see Borger (2004, p. 382).  
Line 13‘ – Note that Luukko (2012, p. 127) reads the –tam in i-tam-gu-ru as a scribal error for –ma.  
Line 16‘ -  LÚ.GÚ.EN.NAM = The šandabakku or governor of Nippur (Labat 1988, p. 87). 
Line 18‘ - For ANŠE.BAD.HAL-lu, see also SAA 17 (Dietrich 2003, p.106, 120:10; p.107, 120: r. 
11).   
Line 20‘ – Restoration of [LUGAL be-lí i]š-pur-a[n-ni] follows Saggs (2001, p. 23) and Luukko 
(2012, p. 127).  
 
(S) 
Line 2 – Luukko (2012, p. 128) restores [x x e-g]ír-[t]u in the lacuna at the beginning of this line, 
but this restoration assumes that the scribe left a gap between the writing of the first and last half of 
the –gír sign. For the cuneiform, see Saggs (2001, Pl. 3).   
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Letter 3 (ND 2700) (SAA 19 126; CTN 5, p. 64) 
 
(O)
1‘  [……………………………………….] 2‘[….ú-]ma-a a-sa-par bé-et šá [……-n]i 3‘ e-mu-ru 
ki-ma dul-li ug-da-mir
 4‘
la ú-da-ma a-di É a-na šá-a-šá  5‘a-ma-ḫa-á[r]-ši-i-ni an-nu-rig ka-ni-ku  
6‘ša tu-š[e-b]i-la-an-ni ak-ta-na[k] AŠ U[G]U LUGAL 7‘ú-se-[b]i-la TA UGU 
LÚ
MAḪ ša 
m
GIN.NUMUN  
8‘ša a-na LUGAL áš-pur-an-ni nu-ku EN.NUN-šú 9‘ ú-da-in nu-ku šúm-mu i-n[a] 
ŠU 2 i-t[u]-˹qut˺? 10‘i-ṣab-tú-ni-šú ina UGU LUGAL ú-š[e-b]i-la-šú 11‘ 
m
ia-di-i‘-i-lu                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
MU-šú ih-ti-liq [A]Š UGU  12‘ mGIN.NUMUN i-ta-lak É-šu UN.MEŠ-šú  13‘ [i-n]a 
[U]RU
ḫi-in-da-na 
an-nu-rig 
14‘
 [LÚ. A.KIN]-ia ina UGU 
md
IM.A.AŠ a-[sap-ra] 15‘ [ú]-ṣa-bu-tú AŠ UGU LUGAL 
[…………..] 16‘ [….. l]u-u-da i-si-šú 
m
[…………...................] 17‘[………………………………… 
……….] 
 
(R) 
1‘[…. e-m]u-qa a-[…………………………..]2‘ [……e-m]u-qa a-ka-[……] [………………… 
…..] 3‘[AŠ? p]a?-ni-šú an-nu-rig LUGAL […….] 4‘[ú-s]e-bi-la-šú ˹ù˺ li-sa-ta-al-šú  5‘[AŠ UGU] 
dul-li ša URU  BÀ[D]-ti-nu-ta-a 6‘[ša a-na] LUGAL áš-pur-an-n[i S]IG4.MEŠ 7‘[………..] ú-di-na 
[i-n]a UGU 
8‘[………..]x la a-qa-ri-[b]i  9‘[ú?-ṣa?-b]i(?)-tu i-na ŠU2 TA qi-e-pi
  10‘
[UGU-h]i(?)-ia 
ta-sa-pa-ra
  11‘
[e?-gir?-tu?] tu-si-bi-la ma a-ta-a 
12‘
 […………]-ka ta-du-ku  13‘ [……….-n]i  
a-na-ku gab-ru-ú 
14‘
 […………] a-sa X[…………………..]15‘ […………] nu[……………………..] 
 
(O)
1‘
 ………………………….…….Now I sent (word), where they saw ……….. When I have 
finished my work. I will not know until I have received her.
5
 The document which you sent to me, I 
have now sealed and sent to the king. Concerning the envoy of Mukin-zeri, about whom I have sent 
word to the king, saying: ―I have strengthened his guard‖, and, ―If 
10 
he falls into (their) hands they 
will capture him and I will send him to the king‖. His name is Yadi‘-il – he has escaped and gone to 
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Mukin-zeri. His house and his people are in Hindana. At this moment, I have sent my messenger to 
Adad-aplu-iddinna,
15
 (saying) to take possession of them and …………  the king …………… may 
he know…………. the one with him is …………….………………………… ……………………. 
 
(R)
1‘
 I ……………. the troops and I ……………. troops ……………3‘ in his presence. Now, I have 
sent him to the king. Let him question him. 
5‘
 Concerning the work of the city of Dur-tinutâ, I sent 
word to the king: ―…………… the mudbricks but has not yet approached above ………. They are 
fastened by the hands of the royal delegate 
10‘
 You are writing about me and have delivered a letter 
saying, ―why did you kill your …….…….…. I ……………... a copy………………..
15
…………… 
………………………. 
 
Letter 3 - Notes 
 
(O) 
*Note that Luukko (2012, p. 127) takes Saggs‘ ‗Face A‘ for the reverse. Since the beginning of both 
sides of the tablet is broken away, it is difficult to be certain which side was, in fact, the starting 
point or obverse side of the letter.  
Line 2‘ – Luukko (2012, p. 127) reconstructs ša-˹ki?˺-[nu]-˹u-ni˺ at the end of this line.  
Line 3‘ - Taken as the preterite 3cs form of the verb emuru with the –u subjunctive marker found in 
dependent clauses. The writing of the verb amāru as emūru is attested elsewhere in this period 
(Luukko & Van Buylaere 2002, p. 178). The form ug-da-mir is the D stem of the verb gamāru in 
the Perfect exhibiting the consonantal shift of t > d (see Hämeen-Antilla 2000, p. 144; Luukko 
2004, p. 79).   
Line 6‘ – Luukko (2012, p. 128) takes the sender of the document as a female, translating the form 
tu-š[e-b]i-la-an-ni as ―she had sent me‖.   
Line 7‘ – Following both Luukko (2012, p. 128) and Saggs (2001, p. 65) it seems the the form ú-se-
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[b]i-la is likely the 1cs form of the verb wabālu in the Š-stem with the ventive marker. Note, 
however, that the form could also be the 3cs with the ventive marker or the 3fp form of the verb 
with usual ending.  
Line 9‘ – Reconstruction of i-t[u]-˹qut˺ follows Luukko (2012, p. 128) and is taken as a form of the 
verb maqātu ―to fall‖ where the –m has been assimilated. For the verbal paragdigm of maqātu, see 
Hämeen-Antilla (2000, p. 143). Note, however, that this restoration is not certain. What remains of 
the final partial sign in Saggs‘ copy of the text (2001, Pl. 12) is more readily identified with the GÍR 
sign (see Labat 1988, p. 47). However, the form i-tu-gír does not make grammatical sense, since we 
might rather expect the form i-tu-gúr as the perfect form of the verb magāru with the assimilation 
of the -m consonant. Note that Saggs (2001, p. 64) restores i-t[u-‗]a ―the Itua‖ here.    
Line 11‘-  For the name 
m
ia-di-i‘-i-lu, see Baker (2000, p. 486-7).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Line 14‘ – Reconstruction of a-[sap-ra] follows Luukko (2012, p. 128).  
Line 15‘ – Reconstruction of the –ú sign in the lacuna following the suggestion of Luukko (2012, p. 
128).  
 
(R) 
Line 3‘- Following Luukko (2012, p. 127), the sign slightly visible in the lacuna at the beginning of 
the line is almost certainly the –pa sign.   
Line 4‘ – Saggs (2001, p. 66, n. Face B 4‘) takes the form li-sa-ta-al-šu as the Precative formed 
from Perfect Gt of ša' iilu. Luukko, attempting to overcome the obvious grammatical problems 
associated with this transliteration, alternately reads these signs as LUGAL? [be]-li ˹liš?-‘a?˺-al-šu 
but this is not convincing on the basis of the cuneiform text. While ša’alu(m) is most certainly the 
verb in question, the form remains unclear.     
Line 5‘- While I cannot see the ˹UGU˺ sign which Luukko (2012, p. 127) reconstructs here at the 
beginning of the line, following Luukko, it is reasonable to expect the signs AŠ UGU here in the 
break at the start of this line. Reconstruction of BÀD follows the suggestion of Luukko (2012, p. 
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127) and Saggs (2001, p. 65).   
Line 7‘- Luukko (2012, p. 127) suggests reconstructing the sign –rab here, though due to the break 
in the text there is not enough remaining of this sign to make a positive identification. The 
reconstruction of ú-di-na over Saggs‘ (2001, p. 65) proposed ú-ki-na follows Luukko (2012, p. 
127).  
Line 9‘ - Note that the determinative LÚ sign, which would typically precede qi-e-pi, has been 
omitted. Luukko (2012), however, takes the TA sign here as LÚ.  
Line 10‘ – Reconstruction of UGU-hi in the lacuna at the beginning of the line follows Saggs (2001, 
p. 65) and Luukko (2012, p. 127). 
Line 12‘ – Taken as the 2c. plur. form of the verb dâku in the preterite. The absence of a medial long 
vowel here can be explained by the addition of an ending beginning with a vowel. For this feature 
of Neo-Assyrian grammar, see Hämeen-Anttila (2000, p. 96).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
187 
 
Letter 4 (ND 2603; SAA 19 87; CTN 5, p. 25) 
 
 
1‘ [ . . . . .] ˹i-hal-la˺-q[u?……..] 2‘ [la i-ma-g]úr la il-la-ka LÚ.A.KIN.MEŠ-šú AŠ U[GU . . . . . . ]  
3‘
 [ . . . . .] MEŠ ša 
m
GIN.NUMUN AŠ UGU-šú il-la-ku-ni e-gir-[tu] 4‘ [m . . . . ]-PEŠ AŠ UGU 
md
AMAR.UTU.DUMU.UŠ.SUM-na na-ṣu-ni  5‘[ . . . m]a at-ta-a AŠ ŠÀ LÚ(?) ri-‘a-sa-ni ša KUR 
kal-di  
6‘
[ša d]al-ha-ka-ni ma-a a-ta-a qa-la-ka  KUR kal-du i-sa-am-mu 7‘ [i-na p]a-ni-ka  
ma-he-e-ri a-ki 
m
ba-la-su KUR kal-du 
8‘
 [a-na] ha-pe-e id-da-nu-ni e-gir-tum ša AŠ UGU 
 
9‘
 
[m]d
AMAR.UTU.A.SUM-na  na-ṣu-ni-ni it-tab-lu-ni  10‘[AŠ? pa]-ni-ni i-si-si-ú ù 
m
ba-la-su  
11‘
[ip]-ta-la-aḫ a-da-niš ma-a an-nu-rig [.....] 12‘ [ at-t]u-nu tal-la-ka ma-a ša-ga-la-ni [ . . ]  
13‘
 [it-ti]-ku-nu la-al-lik ma-a DUMU.NIN-ia 
14‘
[ a-ke]-e a-na-ki-ir ma-a  
LÚ
e-mu-qi 
15‘
 [
m
GI]N. 
NUMUN i-ša-da-da  KUR  i-hap-pi 
 
(R)
1
 [ . . . ]-un-na-ka LÚ URU DÚR-[s]u-la-ta-a-a AŠ muh[hu . . ] 2 [ . . . . ] ma-a a-ki-e a-ha-ri-di 
ma-a  eb-ra-ni 
3 
[……]-tu ku-[u]l-da i-su-ri  LUGAL be-lí i-qab-bi  4 [ ma-a l]a ti-bi-ra LUGAL  
be-lí u-da pa-ṭù-ni ma-hi-ṣi  5 [ . . . . . l]ìb-bi DÙG.GA.MEŠ i-si-šú  ni-du-bu-ub 6 [ . . . . . ] a-na  
a-a-li-e ša URU la-rak-a-a 7[ . . . . . . . a-]˹a˺-li-ka ik-ke-e la ni-la-ka   8 [ . . . . . . . . . . A]Š.UGU-šu 
lu tal-l[i]-ka  lu-šar-hi-ṣu-šú 9 [ . . . . . . . ] a [ . . . . . . . . . .]-a? i-ga-li-ú 
 
(O)
1
 . . . . . are fleeing . . . . . . . . . . . . .he will not agree and he will not come. His messengers 
concerning . . . . . . . . the ……………. of Mukin-zeri are coming to me concerning him. The letter 
of X about Merodach-baladan was brought,
5
 saying: ―You are amongst the chiefs of Chaldea
5
who 
trouble you. ―Why do you stay silent (when) the land of Chaldea is troubled. There is an opponent 
in your presence when Balasu is giving the land of Chaldea to ruin‖. They brought back the letter 
which concerned Merodach-baladan and read it out in 
10
our presence and Balasu became very 
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much afraid, saying ―You will go at this moment and send me into exile!  Let me go with you. He 
is my nephew. How can I engage in hostilities?‖ Mukin-zeri is drawing forces  
15 
 and is breaking up the land. 
 
(R) 
1
. . .  . . . .  . . The man of the city of Dur-Sulata is among . . . .  . .  How can I be on guard? 
Cross over to me! Conquer the ……….. Perhaps the king my lord will say, ―do not cross over‖. The 
king, my lord, knows that our districts are fighting. 
5
We were friendly with him and spoke . . . . . . . 
……. to the help of the Larakeans. How would we not come to your help? Let …………. go 
towards him and let them make him trust in them………………. (they) will go into exile.    
 
 
Letter 4 - Notes 
 
Line 1‘ – I do not see the –li sign which Luukko (2012, p. 90) restores instead of –la.  
Line 3‘ – Both Saggs (2001, p.25) and Luukko (2012, p. 90) reconstruct LÚ.A.KIN as the noun 
missing due to the lacuna here, but this restoration is not assured. 
Line 4‘ – Luukko (2012, p. 90) restores the name Zakir here, the leader of the Bit-Ša‘alli tribe. 
Note, however, that this is not certain. Zakir/Zaqir is nowhere mentioned in the remainder of the 
letter, nor is he identified in any of the other Nimrud letters.  
Line 6‘- Saggs (2001, p. 25) reads the partial sign in this line as –pal. However, in agreement with 
Luukko (2012, p. 303, n. 87: 6), Saggs‘ copy of the cuneiform does not support this reading. 
Luukko (2012, p. 90) reads the sign as –re and takes this as a form of the verb riāhum ―to remain, 
be left over‖ (see Black et al. 2000, p. 303). However, this translation does not fit well with the 
context of the speech. The verb reconstructed here is dalāhu ―to disturb, trouble‖, whicvh fits 
better with the context. Similar forms are attested in CAD D, p. 44).  
The unusual form qa-la-ka is from the verb qâlu ―to be silent‖. This form is also attested in SAA 
19 70: r. 15 and in SAA 1 244 (ABL 1263): atâ qālāka da-ba-bu anniu ina ekalli tašme ―why did 
you keep silent when you heard the rumour?‖ (Parpola 1987, 244: r.13, p. 190). Several 
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comparative examples of the form qa-la-ka can also be found in other Neo-Assyrian texts. For 
these, see Langdon (1914, pl. 3, r. iii, v) and Luukko & Van Buylaere (2002, p. 6, CT 53 930+, r. 
4). Saggs takes i-sa-am-mu as the verb šemû ―to hear‖. Other comparative examples suggest that 
the verb is to be taken as samû (CAD S, p. 125). The problem here lies with translation, which has 
largely been established elsewhere from context due to lexicon obscurity (see CAD S p. 126). In 
these contexts the verb refers to some personal ―anxiety‖ or ―trouble‖, yet in other contexts it has 
also come to mean ―undecided‖ or politically ―undependable‖ (Black et. al. 2000, p. 315; CAD S, 
p. 125).   
Lines 8b‘ – 9a‘ – Note that Luukko (2012, p. 90) gives the following translation of this line ―They 
intercepted the letter which was brought to Merodach-baladan‖.  
Line
 12‘ – Luukko (2012, p. 90) translates the verb tal-la-ka as the 2ms.form of the verb in the 
Present with the ventive marker and translating the verb‘s meaning as ―to come‖ rather than ―to 
go‖. However, Balasu‘s request in Line 13‘ to go ―with you‖, using the 2 m. pl. acc. suffix, 
suggests the verb tal-la-ka should be read as the 2c. pl. form of the verb.    
The form ša-ga-la-ni is perhaps to be taken as the the Imperative form of the verb galû II ―to be 
deported‖ in the Š-stem. Saggs suggested in his original publication of this letter that the form 
reflects Aramaic influence and may be translated ―to go away‖ (1955a, ns. Line 12‘ and 24‘, p. 
34), but has since revised this position, preferring not to offer a translation of the verb (2001, p. 
25).  
Line 14‘ – The form is a-ke-e rather than the expected a-ki-i. For the interchangeable use of i- and 
e- in Neo-Assyrian, see Luukko (2004, pp. 40-42). 
Line 15‘ - Saggs prefers a West Semitic translation of the verb i-ša-da-da, asserting that no 
suitable translation could be found incorporating the Akkadian meaning of the verb šadādu ―to 
pull; drag‖ (1955a, p. 34, n. 15‘; 2001, p. 26). However, the verb is used elsewhere with the 
meaning ―to bring in allies‖ (CAD Š/II, p. 55), and thus Saggs objection that the ―normal 
Akkadian meaning does not give good sense‖ is not warranted, since to ―bring in‖ or ―pull in‖ 
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forces is clearly the meaning of the clause. 
(R). 
Line 1 – Both Saggs (2001, p. 26) and Luukko (2012, p. 91) restore the city in question here as 
Malilatu, reading URU ma-lu-la-ta-a-a and URU ma-li-la-ta-a-a respectively. Yet, their reading of 
the –ma sign, in particular, is suspect.   
Line 3 – The form ku-ul-da is from the verb kašādu. Luukko (2004, p. 80) has noted that the 
combination of š + d can lead to a shift > ld.    
Line 4 – Reconstruction of signs in the lacuna following Luukko (2012, p. 91). The partial sign at 
the beginning of the line could also be –ma, but is not likely given that the scribe is preceding 
lines chose to represent mā ―thus‖ as ma-a rather than just ma. Luukko (2012, p. 91) reconstructs 
GIŠ.gup-ni ―trees‖ here, but the context of the letter which is concerned with internal power 
struggles in Chaldea does not fully support such an interpretation of the signs.    
Line 5 – Luukko‘s (2012, p. 91) reading of the first sign at the beginning of the line here as –bi 
rather than -lìb (ŠÀ) is not convincing. Compare, for example, the scribe‘s writing of this sign in 
line 5‘ in Sagg‘s copy of the cuneiform (2001, Pl. 4). On this basis, Luukko‘s reconstruction of the 
form [d]i-ib-bi can be disregarded. Note also that there is little evidence of the –di sign restored by 
Luukko (2012, p. 91) here. 
Line 6 – aialu ―help‖, see ajalu B in CAD, A/1, p. 226.  
Line 7 – Since it is unlikely that the form a-li-ka is a scribal error and it could not be the 2nd sg. 
Imperative form of the verb alāku with the ventive marker, which takes the form alkā (Luukko 
2004, p. 148), in agreement with Luukko (2012, p. 91) this must be a form of the verb aialu ―help‖ 
also found in Line 6. Following Luukko (2012, p. 92) who takes the form ik-ke-e as a variant of 
akê ―how‖ (see Luukko 2004, pp. 116 & 136).   
Line 9 – Luukko‘s (2012, p. 92) restoration of [xxxxx U]N.[MEŠ lu la]-a ―[…….. the pe]op[le 
should no]t‖goes beyond the evidence from the cuneiform and is potentially misleading.  
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Letter 5 (ND 2674; SAA 19 133; CTN 5, p. 14) 
 
 
 
(O) 
1‘ [….]-mu [u]m-m[a ……..] 2‘šá Š[E]Š-ú-a iš-pu-ra um[-ma……] 3‘ṭè-e-mi il-t[i-me ……… 
…………………] 4‘m[i]m-mu-ú mGIN.NUMUN [………………] 5‘ ˹ù˺ […]-mi-ri x […………]  
6‘ 
[u]l a-ša[k]-k[a]n še [……] 7‘[mi]m-ma a-na ˹É˺? u[b? …..] ul [……….]  8‘ [š]á ŠEŠ-ú-a  
iš-pu-r[a] [u]m-ma m[i-n]u-˹ú˺  9‘ṭè-e-mi šá KUR it-ti-ka id-bu-bu 10‘m[u]s-si-ma šup-ra ˹i˺-na  
mah-ri-i 
11‘
 
md
AG.ŠEŠ-ir  a-na LUG[AL] [i]l-tap-ra um-ma 12‘mGIN-NUMUN ANŠE.KUR.RA. 
MEŠ š[á] KÁ BÁR.SIPA.KI 13‘a-na  UGU TIN.TIR.KI ki-i ˹ú˺-š[e- [lu?]-ú 14‘mam-ma ul-tu 
T[IN].TIR.KI ul uṣ-ṣi-ma 15‘e-r[i]-šú ul ni-ri-iš ár-ki-šú  16‘ LUGAL [i]l-tap-ra um-ma ina bi-rit 
17‘
TIN.TIR.KI u BÁR.SĺB.KI  S[I]G5 ši 18‘a-na-[k]u ù LÚ ra-šá-a-nu šá LÚ kal-du 19‘ ˹ki-i˺  
ni-˹il˺-li-ku ANŠE.˹KUR˺. RA.MEŠ-nu 20‘ul-tu BÁR.SIPA.KI nu-ul-te-ṣa-a 21‘ [………..] ˹TIN. 
TIR˺.KI u BÁ[R].SIPA. KI 22‘[…………………..] e [……] ˹ti˺  23‘ [………………………………] 
 
 
(O)
1‘………… thus says …………..……my brother sent word, saying: ― He has heard a report 
…….… anything of Mukin-zeri…………………. 
5
I did not provide ………… 
… not …………… anything to …………………… About that which my brother wrote to me: 
 ―What report of the land did they speak of with you?‖. 
10
 Examine (it) and write to me! Previous, 
Nabu-naṣir sent word to the king, saying: ―Mukin-zeri has sent horses from the Borsippa gate 
towards Babylon and no-one can leave from Babylon
15
 and we have not done the cultivation. 
Thereafter, the king sent word: ―Is the area between Babylon and Borsippa well? I and the 
chieftains of Chaldea went and 
20
 brought the horses from Borsippa.……………. Babylon and 
Borippa …………………..………………………………….. 
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Letter 5 – Notes 
 
Line 1‘ – The tablet is too damaged to offer any complete reconstruction of this line. Note, however 
that Saggs (2001, p. 14) restores x x x-MU [u]m-[ma] i[na? muhhi?] while Luukko (2012, p. 134) 
restores [lu]-˹u šul˺-mu ˹um-ma˺-[a a-na ŠEŠ-ia-a-ma].  
Line 5‘ – Luukko (2012, p. 134) reconstructs the GIŠ sign here after ù but the cuneiform is too 
damaged to be certain of this restoration. Luukko further reconstructs tal-ta[k-na ….] at the end of 
this line. 
Line 6‘ – Reconstruction of the form a-ša[k]-k[a]n follows Luukko (2012, p. 134).    
Line 10‘ – Reconstruction of m[u]s-sí-ma šup-ra follows Luukko (2012, p. 134) over Saggs‘ 
reconstruction of mus-sag-ru-ra (2001, p. 15). The context suggests that m[u]s-si-ma should be 
taken as a form of the verb wussû(m) (D) ―to identify; distinguish‖ (see Black et al. 2000, p. 438) .  
Line 17‘ – Note that Luukko‘s reconstruction of ˹sul˺-lim here (2012, p. 135) is also possible and 
that any certain reading of the text here is impossible at this time due to the poor preservation of the 
tablet.  
Line 19‘ – Reconstruction of ˹ki-i˺ ni-˹il˺-li-ku follows Luukko. For an alternate transliteration, see 
Saggs (2001, p. 15).  
  
* Note that although a transliteration and translation of the reverse side of this text appears in CTN5 
and Luukko (2012, p. 135), the decision has been made not to transliterate the reverse side of ND 
2674 here due to the poor preservation of the text. This decision results from a number of factors, 
the foremost being the intention not to mislead the reader by giving an inaccurate transliteration of 
the tablet. Although the cuneiform copy published in CTN 5 (Pl. 2) is much clearer than that 
originally published by Saggs in Iraq (1955, Pl. VII),  the text still remains largely unclear, and 
thus, any transliteration given can not be assured. Saggs admitted in his 2001 publication that 
although his revised cuneiform copy was made following cleaning by the Iraqi Museum, he was 
largely restricted in the amount of time he was able to spend with the tablet and it was thus 
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completed largely on the basis of photographs (2001, p. 16). This can be seen in the vast differences 
which appear in the transliterations of both Saggs (2001) and Luukko (2012). It may be noted that 
Luukko‘s conclusion that the letter concerns a treaty with the ―son of Yakin‖ DUMU-mia-ki-nu on 
the reverse is not certain. In particular, the sign taken by Luukko as DUMU (Saggs 2001, Pl. 1, r. 2, 
3, 6, 12, 15, and 18) is reconstructed by Saggs as DUB (2001, p. 15), and in many respects is very 
close in form to the –um sign which appears elsewhere in the text (see the cuneiform in Saggs 2001, 
Pl. 1, r. 4, 11, 16, 23). Luukko restores DUMU here on the basis that the final wedge does not form 
part of this sign but is the determinative preceding personal names. While the letter is written in 
Neo-Babylonian rather than Neo-Assyrian, the uncertainy of this sign may more likely be due to the 
poor preservation of the text. It is also suspect that ―son of Yakin‖ would be written in two alternate 
forms in the same text, DUMU-
m
ia-ki-nu in lines 2, 3, 12 and DUMU-
m
ia-GIN in lines 6, 15, and 
18 of Luukko‘s transliteration of the text (2012). While the letter does certainly refer to a treaty 
(contrary to Saggs‘ (2001, p. 17, ns. 11‘, 15‘) suggestion that the form a-de-e found in lines 11 and 
17 is an alternate spelling for adi rather than the noun adê ―treaty‖), to whom the treaty refers 
remains uncertain.   
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Letter 6 (ND 2385; SAA 19 80; CTN 5, p. 45)  
 
(O)
1
 a-na LUGAL be-lí-i[a] 
2
ÌR-ka
 m
aš-šur-DI-n[i] 3 lu-u DI-mu a-na LU[GAL EN-ia]4 UD-26-
KÁM ni-ip-tu-h[ur] 
5
ina LÚ tur-tan–ni ni-te-t[e]-z[i] 6 ṭè-e-mu ˹a˺-ḫa-a-a-iš ni-sa-kan 7AŠ ŠÀ-bi 
KÁ.GAL.MEŠ8ni-iq- ṭ i-ri-ib di-ik-tú  9ni-du-ak  mGIN-NUMUN  10de-e-ki  
m
MU-GIN 
DUMU-šú  11de-e-ki  URU ka-[a]š-du  šu-ú  12LUGAL be-lí  l[u] ha-du  13LUGAL be-lí  
pa-an 
14
LÚ A.KIN lid-din 
15
a-d[i] bi-it LÚ A.KIN-ni 
16
 il-la-kan-ni  
17
ha-r[am-ma-ma] LUGAL 
be-[lí-ia 
 
(B)
18
am-li-ka   
 
(R)
19
 i-su-ri  LUGAL be-l[ í]  
20
 i-qab-bi ma-a AŠ ŠÀ K[Á].G[AL.MEŠ]  21i-du-ku 
AN.MEŠ  ša LUGAL be-lí-ia  22  šúm-ma DIŠ.KÙŠ DIŠ.LAL AŠ MURUB4  URU  
23
la(?)  e(?)-r[a]-bu-ni  
24
 LU[GAL]  be- l í  liš-al   25UGU  ŠE .PAD.MEŠ ša a-na 
md
AMAR.UTU.A.AŠ  26  ša LUG[AL] be-lí  iq-bu-ni 27  a-ki d[ i-i]k-tú e-mu-ru-[n] i   
28
ma-a a-[sa] -par [ú]-ba-lu-[ú-ni]   
 
 
(O) 
1To the king, my lord, your servant, Aššuršalīmanni, may it be well with the king. On the 
twenty-sixth we assembled, stood (before)
5
the turtanu and made a report together. We came close 
within the gates and inflicted a defeat. Mukin-zeri is 
10
killed. Šum-ukin, his son, is killed. The city 
is taken. May the king, my lord, be glad.  May the king, my lord, give attention to the 
messenger
15
Until our messenger comes, thereafter, (B) I will advise the king, my lord.   
(R) Perhaps the king, my lord, 
20 
will say, ―They have slaughtered within the gates‖. By the gods of 
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the king, my lord, they did not enter more than 1 cubit and 1 span into the centre of the city. May 
the king, my lord, ask. 
25
 Regarding the grain for Merodach-baladan about which the king, my lord, 
spoke, when I saw the defeat I sent (a message), saying: ―They will bring …………..‖  
 
 
 
Letter 6 - Notes 
 
(O) 
Line 2 - Aššur-šallimanni was the governor of Arrapha who also served as eponym for the year 735 
BC. 
Line 3 - Although Saggs restores the form bēlīya here (2011, p. 45), following the standard greeting 
formula in Assyrian royal letters, there does not appear to be enough room in the lacuna for this 
restoration. Our reconstruction follows Luukkko‘s (2012, p. 84), who admits that this would be an 
unusual writing of this common greeting formula (2012, p. 84, n. 80.3).  
Line 4 – Following Luukko‘s (2012, p. 84) reconstruction. Although the tablet (see Saggs 2011, pl. 
8) is too damaged to be certain of this reconstruction, the use of the verb pahāru ―to assemble‖ is a 
likely restoration given the use of the verb izuzzum in the following line. Note that Saggs (2011, 
p.45) reads bir-ta.  
Line 5 – Note Luukko‘s (2012, p. 84) insertion of IGI here to accommodate the translation of this 
line.  
Lines 8-9 – Note that Luukko prefers the transliteration de-ek-tú  here. The translation of di-ik-
tú  ni-du-ak ―we inflicted a defeat‖  follows that of Luukko (2012, p. 84) as the preferred 
translation. 
Line 14 – Note that Luukko‘s (2012, p. 84) reconstruction of the final form in this line lid-gúl is not 
indicative of the signs found on the tablet which clearly read lid-din.   
Line 16 - The 3cs form of the verb alāku(m) with the 1cs accusative suffix –anni.  
Line 17 – Reconstruction of ha-r[am-ma-ma] following Luukko (2012, p. 84).  
(B) – Saggs‘ reconstruction of [q]ab-li  āli-[šu-u] does not seem likely on the basis that we would 
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expect a verb here. Luukko also doubts Saggs‘ restoration on the basis of the roundness of the 
tablet, arguing that no sign could possibly have come after the URU sign (2012, p. 84, n. 80.18). 
Luukko suggests reconstructing the verb ˹lil˺-li-˹ka˺ (2012, p. 84) here, however, his reading of the -
-lil sign here does not seem likely on the basis of the cuneiform.  
 
(R) 
Line 23 - This construction takes the form of a promissory oath containing the negative lā. For this, 
see Huehnergard (2000, pp. 437-438).  
Line 27 – Luukko (2012, p. 84) reads d[ i-i]k-tú  as de-ek-tú ―defeat‖. Note also that Luukko 
takes e-mu-ru-n[i] as the 3mp preterite form of the verb, viewing the unusual spelling with an -e as 
a shift from i > e rather than a > e as it is taken here and by Saggs (2001, p. 46).  
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Letter 7 (ND 2602; SAA 19 86; CTN 5, p. 43) 
 
 
(O)
1
 [a-na LUGAL be-lí-ia ÌR-ka] 
m
aššur-DI-an-ni [……] 2 [lu-u DI-mu a-na LUGAL be-lí-i]a DI-
mu a-na ma-dak-[tú?] 
3[……………………………..]-a ša LUGAL be-lí  i-ma-li-ku-na-ši-n-[i]  
4[… ………………………l]i-kal-ka TA 
URU
ma-ru-ri ni-su-uh-r[a] 
5
 [………………………….] a-na 
SÀ 
LÚ
a-ri-mi pa-ni-ni  
6
 [………………………] AŠ pu-ut  EN.LÍL
KI 
AŠ UGU-ni na-ṣu-ni 7[……… 
……………] AŠ UGU-ku-nu il-la-ka 8 [……………………..] pu-uḫ-ra li-kal-ka ŠE ub-bu-lu 9 […… 
…………LÚ?] a-mu-ka-ni us-ha ni-su-ḫur 10[AŠ? URU(?) ma(?)-ru(?)-r]i kam-mu-sa-ni  LÚ ša  
pit-hal-la-ti 
11
 […........... AŠ(?)] 
URU
ma-ru-ri nu-še-ti-qu-ni 12 [……AŠ(?)] 
URU
ma-ru-ri kam-ma-su-ni 
60 
LÚ
ERIN.MEŠ 13 [a-li-]ku-ti u-ṣa-bi-tu-ni a-na  2 UD-(mi)14 [……………………………………..] 
 
(R) 
1
 […………………………………………..] 2[…………………………..] la i-[………..]3 [… 
………………………....] i t[i(?)……] 4 […ṭè?-e]n-šú-nu a-na LUGAL EN-ía a-šap-ra 
 
(O) 
1
To the king my lord, your servant Aššur-šallimanni. May it be well with the king my lord. It is 
well with the military camp ……………………. about that which the king my lord advises us: ‗Go! 
………………….‘  We turned around from the city of Maruru 
5
……….…..towards the Aramaeans 
before us.…………………. Opposite Nippur, they brought ……………………….. he is coming 
towards them. Gather ……………. and go! They will bring grain. Take away the ……………. of Bit-
Amukani. We will turn back 
10
 to Maruru
 
(where) we will gather. The cavalrymen ……..  we sent to 
Maruru are gathered in Maruru. They seized 60 walking troops. For two days. ……………………… 
 
(R) 
1
……………………………………………….……………………………………………….…… 
………………………………………………… I have sent a report about them to the king my lord.  
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Letter 7 – Notes 
 
Line 1 - Aššur-šallimanni was the governor of Arrapha during the reign of Tiglath-pileser III. For 
other attestations of this official, see Radner (1998, p. 217). 
Line 3 – Note that Luukko (2012) reconstructs [ina UGU LÚ.ar-ma-a] in the lacuna at the 
beginning of this line. Luukko‘s restoration of è-mu iš-ku-na-˹ši-ni˺ is problematic. His restoration 
of the -mu sign here for –ma, for example, relies on a scribal error, since nowhere else in this text is 
the –mu sign written in this way (see line 9).  
Line 4 – Note that Luukko (2012) reconstructs [ma-a na-am-me-šá] in the lacuna at the beginning 
of this line. The form li-kal-ka is the 2
nd
 pl. Imperative form of the verb alāku in the G-stem. For the 
verbal paradigm of this verb, see (Hämeen-Anttila 2000, III. 1 b, p. 148).  
Line 6 – Note that Luukko (2012) reconstructs [ni-sa-kan un-qi] LUGAL* at the beinning of this 
line. The form na-ṣu-ni is the NA stative 3pl. with the ventive ending.  
Line 8 – Note that Luukko translates ub-bu-lu as an Imperative form of the verb even though the 
form is clearly not the Imperative form of the verb wabālu.     
Line 9 – Note that Luukko (2012) restores [TA É-MEŠ ša] É* at the beginning of this line. 
Reconstruction of us-ha following Saggs (2001, p. 44) and Luukko (2012). The form us-ḫa is the 
imperative form of the verb nasāḫu(m) with the ventive marker.  
Line 10 - Note that Saggs reconstructs [it-t]al-KAM-in-ni here (2001, p. 44).  
Line 13 – Reconstruction of [a-li-] in the lacuna at the beginning of the line follows Luukko 
(2012).  
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Letter 8 (ND 2365) (SAA 19 111; CTN 5, p. 31) 
 
 
(O) 
1
 [a-n]a [LU]GA[L] EN-ia  
2 
Ì[R]-ka 
m
a-[š]i-pa-a 3 l[u]-u DI-mu  a-na MAN EN-[í]a  
4
 
G[IŠ]
MÁ.MEŠ URU su-[. . . . . ] 5 uq-ṭa- ri-ba  6 AŠ [. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ] 7 
L
[
Ú
 . . . 
. . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .] 
8
 [ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ] 
9
 [ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ]
10
  [ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ] 
11
 [ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . ] 
 
(R)
1‘
 [ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ] 
2‘
 [ . . . . . . . . . . . .URU? bar?-]-sip?-a-a 
3‘
 [ . . . . . . . . . 
. . . .  i?-tu?]-ṣu-ni 4‘ [AŠ U]GU 
LÚ
ERIN.MEŠ 5‘ ša 
m
ba-la-si  
6‘
 i-zu-uq-pu 
7‘
 7 ERIN.MEŠ i[t-t]u-ṣu 
8‘5 ERIN.MEŠ di-˹e˺-ku 9‘ 1 
LÚ
A.KI[N-i]a 
10‘
 KI-šú-nu-ma 11‘ di-e-ki 12‘ [D]I-mu a-na 
GIŠ
MÁ.MEŠ 
13‘[…..] 
KUŠ
maš-kir 
 
 
(O)
1
To the king my lord, your servant, Ašipa, May it be good with the king my lord. 4 I have 
brought the ships of the city of Su ……………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………  
(R) 
1‘. . . . . . . . … the Borsippan …….…………came out towards the troops 5‘ of Balasu and  
 rose up (to attack). Seven soldiers escaped. Five soldiers were killed. One of my messengers was 
killed 
10‘
with them. It is well with the boats  . . . . . . . .and  the (inflatable animal skin) rafts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
200 
 
Letter 8 - Notes 
 
(O) 
Line 1‘- For the name Ašīpâ and reference to an individual of the same name who served as 
governor of a northern province during the reign of Sargon II, see Radner (1998, p. 142).  
Line 4‘ – Note that Luukko (2012, p. 114) transliterates an extra AŠ sign here. Luukko (2012, p. 
114) further identifies the city in question here as su-ru.   
 
(R)  
Line 2‘ – The restoration of [URU bar]-sip-a-a here follows Luukko (2012, p. 114) who restores 
this line as [ERIM-MEŠ URU.bar]-sip-a-a. However, there is the possibility that the sign taken for 
–sip is incomplete and forms part of another sign whose other half is now missing due to the lacuna.  
Line 3‘ – Restoration in the lacuna of [i-tu]-ṣu-ni follows the suggestion made by Luukko (2012, p. 
114).   
Line 13‘ – The form KUŠmaš-kir is attested elsewhere in this period. See Parpola 1987, 14, p.128, 
and also Lanfranchi & Parpola (1990, 11, p. 200) for the form 
KUŠmaš-ki-ri.  
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